Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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NATO Discusses Grachev's Statements From Talks With Perry

LD0504163095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1451 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels April 5 TASS—The NATO council today started the discussion of the statements of Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev during his talks with U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry.

One of the statements was that Russia might revisit its commitements under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and consider other moves if NATO rapidly expanded eastward.

This news comes from a joint news conference held by NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes and Polish Prime Minister Josef Oleksy.

Russian Official Says Invitation To Join KEDO U.S. 'Scheme'

SK0604010395 Seoul YONHAP in English 0042 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 5 (YONHAP)—The U.S. overture to have Russia participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization's (KEDO) project in North Korea is part of a scheme to block Russia's nuclear reactor deal with Iran, an official of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry said Wednesday.

The ITAR-TASS news agency quoted a senior expert of the Atomic Energy Ministry as saying that it was nothing new for U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, during his recent visit to Moscow, to ask for Russia's cooperation with regard to the North Korean nuclear reactor issue.

He, however, hinted at Moscow's dissatisfaction with the U.S. offer, saying that Russia's role in the KEDO project would be disposing of trash.

Another official of the ministry, commenting on North Korean Ambassador to Moscow Son Song-pil's latest remarks on Pyongyang's wish to build at least one atomic reactor using Russian technology, said that although the North had expressed that desire many times, no formal request to that effect has been filed.

As the Moscow-Pyongyang Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement was signed a decade ago, the agreement should first be revised if a new relationship is to be established, the official explained.

Commonwealth Representative To Work at UN European Branch

LD0504202795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1741 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva April 5 TASS—The Commonwealth of Independent States which received the status of an observer at the United Nations, has made an important step forward in widening international contacts: the first plenipotentiary representative of the Commonwealth Secretariat will begin working in Geneva.

Abdulla Ismailov, an officer of the Russian Foreign Ministry, was appointed to this post.

Ivan Korotchenya, executive secretary of the Commonwealth, officially introduced Abdulla Ismailov to Vladimir Petrovskiy, head of the U.N. European branch and deputy secretary-general of the United Nations.

"The task of the representative of the CIS Secretariat is to inform the secretariat and member states of the Commonwealth, in the first place, those who do not have ambassadors in Geneva, of the activities of the European headquarters of the United Nations and other international organizations," Ivan Korotchenya said in an interview with ITAR-TASS.

This is the first foreign representation of the Commonwealth Secretariat. Its opening is an evidence that on the international arena the Commonwealth is proving its vitality and correctness of its establishment.

Abdulla Ismailov, Uzbek, the section head at the department on the Commonwealth affairs at the Russian Foreign Ministry, is due to begin working at the U.N. European branch in Geneva early in May.

Russia, as the country chairing the Commonwealth, undertook to finance the representation for three months. These funds were not planned in the Commonwealth Secretariat's budget, Ivan Korotchenya explained.

Some member countries of the Commonwealth expressed their doubts about the necessity to send a CIS representative to Geneva stressing that the Commonwealth is not a state and member countries can receive information from their own ambassadors.

"It is possible that in three months a decision will made on the extension of the term of powers of this representative or on the enlargement of the representation," the Commonwealth executive secretary noted. This will be useful for the Commonwealth. After all, other regional organizations, for example, the European Union, have tens of their representatives in Geneva. This is a storeroom of information, Ivan Korotchenya emphasized.

According to him, the fact of sending a representative of the Commonwealth Secretariat to Geneva has found a positive response among members of the leadership of the U.N. European branch.

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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 6 Apr

LD0604063195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0618 GMT 6 Apr 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 (TASS)—Moscow-based newspapers continue to devote attention to the developments in the Chechen republic.

In ROSSIISKIYE VESTI, Emil Pain, head of the sector for inter-ethnic relations and conflict predictions at the Analytical Centre to the president of the Russian Federation and member of the Presidential Council, points out that, in his view, "much in the further development of events in Chechnya will depend on how vigorous will be the actions of the so-called third force—the politically active sections of the population who did not participate either in the civil war or hostilites after December 1994. It is only with them that the hesitant will be able to find a common language," Pain believes.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA draws attention to the Russian parliament efforts to resolve the Chechen crisis. The newspaper emphasises in this connection that "only a bill on a settlement of the crisis has been adopted so far."

IZVESTIA reports that "President Boris Yeltsin is most likely to leave for the Kabardian-Balkaria at the beginning of next week. Over where, he intends to familiarise himself with the socio- economic situation in that north caucasian republic, and people's reaction to the situation in Chechnya."

The newspaper also reports that "in the coming days Boris Yeltsin intends to express his attitude to Crimean affairs". In view of this "chances that the president will visit Kiev in mid-April are slim".

ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA carries an article headlined "Who is it That Does Not Like a United Russia" about the problems of preserving the territorial integrity of the country.

" 'Regional barons' did not like the idea of putting Russian lands under the protection of the Constitution and the head of state," the newspaper noted.

It believes that "the main contradiction, which is expected to determine the entire course of political processes in the country in 1995 and subsequently, will be not elections to the federal assembly but the struggle of top regional elites with the government and president of the Russian Federation along the lines of the so-called delimitation of powers".

In ROSSIISKIYE VESTI, Grigory Karasin, head of the Russian foreign ministry's department for information and the press, comments on the recently ended tour of middle east countries by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

Karasin is of the opinion that "there was nothing extraordinary or sensational in the tour". It was prompted by the fact that "the Russian political leadership devotes paramount attention to all developments in the region which is of strategic importance to us".

IZVESTIA recalls that coal miners remain on a hunger strike in the seaside town of avangard since March 28. According to the newspaper, defaults of payments by coal users have amounted to 2,500,000 million roubles. Electric power industry users account for a large share of the debts—42 percent.

In this connection the newspaper quotes first Vice-Premier Anatoliy Chubays as saying at the recent meeting between the government and coal miners that "the problem is divided into two. One is concerning the entire economic mechanism in general. Major solutions are necessary and they are being intensively sought. The other half of the problem is brought on by elementary laxity or even plain stealing, which is concealed by the overall problem of debts. This is whats is happening in Primorye. Our approach here will be very tough..."

IZVESTIA runs a dispatch from Kiev under the headline "The President of Ukraine Changes Direction of Reforms".

"Although the ultimate goal of reforms by Leonid Kuchma (the building of a market-oriented state) has remained the same, methods to attain the objective have radically changed," the newspaper writes.

"Judging by the Ukrainian president's pronouncements, two principles should remain unchanged irrespective of changes at the top: a priority strategic partnership with Russia and the maintenance of the crimes as an autonomous entity within the Ukrainian state".

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Foreign Ministry on Safeguards for Nonnuclear States

LD0604115695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1025 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 6 (Interfax)—Russia will not use a nuclear weapon against any signatory to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, not possessing such a weapon, unless Russia, its armed forces, its allies are attacked. This is said in a Russian foreign ministry statement delivered to Interfax Wednesday evening.

A foreign ministry spokesman reported that a resolution had been drafted at the UN Security Council in New York on safety guarantees for non-nuclear states. An appropriate draft will be submitted to the Security Council for debate.

He explained that in keeping with the document, if a non-nuclear participant in the nuclear nonproliferation accord faced nuclear aggression or its threat, the nuclear powers—permanent UN Security Council members—would immediately bring the issue to the Security Council's knowledge and would induce it to adopt measures and provide essential help for the victim of aggression.

Proper measures are also envisaged in response to a request from such a victim for technical, medical, scientific, and humanitarian assistance and for a compensation on the part of the aggressor for the losses, property and other damage suffered through attack.

Moscow hopes that if the UN Security Council passes such a resolution, it "will be received with satisfaction by the nuclear states, participants to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and will consolidate the nonproliferation regime, global security and stability", the source stressed.

'Text' of Statement on Use of Nuclear Arms

LD0504191795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1850 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Wednesday [5 April] confirming Russia's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against any member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Following is the full text of the statement:

"The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against any country participating in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which does not possess nuclear weapons, except in the event of invasion of or attack against it, its territory, armed forces or other troops, its allies or the states to which it has security obligations; such invasion or attack being carried out or supported by such a state together, or under allied obligations, with a state possessing nuclear weapons."

Commentary Views Perry Visit, NATO Threat

LD0404121095 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1110 GMT 4 Apr 95

[Commentary written by Yuriy Solton; read by announcer]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In Moscow, visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry has held talks with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and other top Russian officials. Yuriy Solton has the details.

Secretary Perry's visit was part of the work currently being done to prepare the Russo-American summit scheduled to begin early May in Moscow. Apart from signing two agreements on the U.S. to help Russia scrap its nuclear warheads, and on stepping up Russo-American cooperation on converting their defense industries, the negotiators spent much time discussing security measures. Both countries are taking their cooperation in this area very seriously, because it directly affects the overall political situation in the world.

The START I Treaty, which went into effect on 5 December last year, has been successfully implemented and our countries started scrapping their strategic nuclear arsenals even before the 5 December deadline. By the way, on Tuesday 4 April, William Perry was taken to a military base near Moscow and saw a Russian strategic bomber being taken apart there.

As the START II Treaty—which will bring the number of U.S. and Russian strategic warheads down to 3,000 and 3,500—still awaits ratification by Russian and American legislators, now our presidents are already setting their sights on a follow-up START III agreement, (?which will) effectively eliminate all the nuclear weapons on earth [as heard].

Security issues certainly go beyond disarmament, and there are many other problems to tend to, and we don't see eye to eye on everything. One such problem is Russia's future relationship with NATO. In June last year Russia signed on to NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and a comprehensive agreement on our military and political cooperation was already in place by December 1994, but was never signed because of NATO's U.S.-influenced decision to expand to the east.

Russia doesn't like the idea of NATO edging closer to its borders, and this concern was made clear to the U.S. secretary of defense in Moscow. The Russian side was also quite open about the possible countermeasures, hinting it might not abide by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and will probably create new military groups in the most threatening directions, set up closer cooperation with other CIS countries, and even prevent the ratification of the START II agreement.

The problem is a fairly complicated one, and any wrong step threatens to turn cooperation into a new round of confrontation between Russia and NATO. I think that

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we should be looking for a mutually acceptable solution where everyone will stand to gain. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev believes that a blueprint of such a decision can well be prepared for the upcoming summit between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in May.

Results of Perry Moscow Visit Seen 'Equivocal'

MK0504120595 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 5 Apr 95 pp 1, 4

[Report by Andrey Smirnov: "A Constructive Dialogue: A Complete Divergence of Opinion"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The official visit by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry to Russia, which ended yesterday, can hardly be assessed unequivocally. [passage omitted]

According to Pavel Grachev, the negotiations with William Perry have been constructive. And one can quite agree with this. At least, in the runup to the May meeting between the two presidents, problems have been defined whose solution will depended exclusively on them. There are two such problems: NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and delivery of Russian nuclear reactors to Iran.

As for the latter problem, at a meeting with the Russian prime minister it was indicated to the Pentagon chief in no uncertain terms that Russia will not put up with any pressure on this question. The U.S. defense secretary's conscience is clear, however: He did try to persuade his interlocutors, even if without success. Perry made it clear that Washington will in the future seek to get Moscow to annul the deal. And the next (probably decisive) such attempt will be made at the presidents' meeting. Even now it can be said that Washington will apparently manage to shake Moscow's position, because within the Russian Government some disagreements on this problem have emerged. [passage omitted]

The problem of the North Atlantic Alliance's expansion to the East is even more acute. According to Grachev, NATO expansion will force Russia to take countermeasures. [passage omitted] According to him, in response to the threat of NATO expansion Russia may cease to observe the [CFE] treaty and create corresponding troop groupings along the directions of the "greatest threat."

The fate of another disarmament agreement also remains unclear: START II, whose ratification and work on whose continuation—START III—should become one subject of the Russian-U.S. summit. While the U.S. Congress has already begun hearings on START II, the Russian parliament is clearly in no hurry. Moreover, in the course of negotiations with Perry, Vladimir Shumeyko said that parliament at present does not deem it necessary to ratify START II. The reason again is NATO. According to Shumeyko, NATO's preservation is an obstacle in the way of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the sphere of disarmament. Interestingly, on the same day Kozyrev announced: Ratification of START II is among the central questions of the Russian-American dialogue. In other words, there should be no doubt: Even the presidents will find it hard to resolve this problem. Judging by the results of Perry's visit, Moscow will perceive NATO expansion as a challenge, which will call for a symmetrical response. And bilateral relations will not stand to gain from this.

Perry's Visit Failed To Diminish Mutual Distrust

MK0504102195 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Igor Korotchenko under the "Negotiations" rubric: "Russian Generals Do Not Trust William Perry. Moscow and Washington Could Not Come to an Agreement On the Majority of Issues Under Discussion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Successful operations by federal troops in Chechnya; the conferring of the military rank of "reserve Lieutenant Colonel" on Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's (LDPR) leader; and the detection of another American nuclear Los Angeles-class submarine in the area of the Northern Fleet's naval weapons test range for combat training—such were backdrop events during the visit of William Perry, U.S. defense secretary, to Russia. Although both sides are for now refraining from any commentaries, the ever increasing mutual distrust between Moscow and Washington may be considered as the main outcome of this visit.

With the exception of two signed agreements—linked with the problem of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation Armed Forces strategic arsenal—all other questions still remain matters to be discussed in the future, with rather vague prospects for solution. As for the implementation of the agreements already reached, the General Staff and the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate intend to take thorough measures in order to protect military nuclear facilities from excessive curiosity by the American side.

Despite Perry's statement that "today NATO's aim is to promote stability and security in Europe," Moscow seems to have a somewhat different opinion in this respect. It is probably not by chance that Army General Pavel Grachev threatened to create—in response to NATO's expansion—new battleworthy groupings of the Russian Army in the most critical sectors and to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. And there are good grounds for such statements, indeed. According to the GRU's (Main Intelligence Directorate) Western Europe residents, NATO leadership is giving a top priority to investigating and simulating the use of new techniques and forms of conducting combat operations in the European theater of war. The aim of current strategic command and staff exercises is to train staffs and troops for large-scale military actions with the use of various weapons. Issues to be practiced include: shifting NATO's conventional armed forces from peacetime to war status; strategic deployment of

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battle groups; and airlifting reinforcement troops from the United States and Canada. Operational preparation of theaters of military activity is under way. NATO plans envision—in case of aggravation of relations between the Russian Federation and Baltic states—redeployment of mobile NATO forces onto the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and a blockade of the Baltic Fleet's naval bases.

No less worrying are the United States' persistent aspirations to evade the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: In exercises on the use of ABM systems in the theater of war operations, it is planned to deploy, on the continental U.S. territory, THAAD mobile complexes capable of destroying warheads of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles at an altitude of up to 150 km and at a distance of up to 300 km. The possibility of deploying THAAD antimissile complexes on ships is presently under consideration.

Since the ratification of the START II treaty by Russia is still probable, and the main emphasis in Russian strategic nuclear forces is going to be shifted from land-based to naval facilities, in 1996 the United States will begin series production of new multipurpose nuclear Seawolf submarines. Submarines of this class are adapted for use in Arctic conditions and are designed to track—and, if necessary, to destroy—guided missile submarines of the Russian Federation Northern Fleet.

In his turn, William Perry has serious grounds for worry, too. One of them is the rising number of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's supporters in power structures, including the army. The probability of the LDPR leader's coming to power as a result of the presidential election is regarded as a major threat to U.S. national security interests till the end of this millennium. In that case, the American leadership suggests, a new expansion of Russia would be possible, with the absorption of the new geographic formations that have arisen on the former USSR territory since the Belovezhskaya accords. Moscow and Washington have failed to come to an agreement on the majority of issues under discussion, which will remain to be considered during the Bill Clinton's visit to Russia in May.

U. S. Role in Defense Conversion for Energy Said Limited

MK0404140395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 3

[Andrey Baranovskiy report in the "Machine Tools" column: "The Defense Industry Is Ready To Meet the Fuel and Energy Complex' Demands. The Americans Are Being Advised To Hurry With Capital Investments"]

S Translated Text] Russian Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Shafranik said yesterday that the sector has managed to reduce the share of its equipment which is imported as a result of conversion projects in the military industrial complex. Addressing a Russian- U.S. roundtable, "Conversion in the Interests of the Fuel and Energy Complex," Shafranik said that Russia's conversion industry has managed to launch the production of more advanced equipment than was manufactured in the Soviet Union.

Shafranik stated that at least three-quarters of projects with a foreign share of capital in the fuel and energy complex should by be contracted out [otdavatsya na podryad] to Russian participants. The minister believes that in implementing these projects, no less than 75 percent of the equipment for them should be produced in Russia. He announced that [illegible] program for the certification of corresponding Russian equipment, which is required for such projects, has already been signed by the Fuel and Energy Ministry and the World Bank.

Speaking at the roundtable, Yuriy Starodub, deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, said that 20 percent of equipment produced for the fuel and energy complex even now meets world standards. "The Americans should hurry with their capital investments," he said. The Russian defense industry believes that it can cope with fuel and energy complex orders without U.S. assistance just as well because "the military industrial complex has plenty of available capacities and designer cadres."

U.S. representatives stated that all investments subsidized by the U.S. Government have to be directed exclusively to private enterprises or to those where the state share does not exceed 50 percent. In the lobbies, Russian defense plant directors said that the Americans will not invest much money in the machine building sector, which is being converted for the fuel and energy complex' needs, so as not to help a competitor on world markets.

Army Commander Sees NATO as Potential Enemy

LD0504191295 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1519 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A news conference relating to our defense affairs has been held in Samara today. Our correspondent Aleksey Deryabin is on the phone, over to him:

[Deryabin] Thank you. That is right, a news conference has just ended at the headquarters of the Volga Military District in Samara. It was held by Colonel General Vladimir Semenov, the commander in chief of the Russian Ground Forces. The commander is holding a command and staff exercise here. [passage omitted]

The backbone of the district—and in fact of the entire Russian Army—is of course the Ground Forces. Therefore, it is understandable that Semenov's reaction to the

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possible reduction in the Ground Forces was very sensitive. As we know, this issue was recently discussed by the State Duma. Having agreed in principle that the reduction is necessary, he said that this reduction and reorganization should be planned by experts. [passage omitted] And another thing: The commander in chief said that it will be a mistake to believe that Russia no longer has external enemies or military adversaries. They exist both in the south—countries with an unstable political situation—and now they also include the expanding NATO bloc in the West. This is what the commander said in this connection. [passage omitted]

[Begin Semenov recording] Can you tell me what the purpose of NATO's existence is, and what sort of organization it is? This is, first and foremost, a military-political organization, a military-political bloc. What or who is this bloc aimed at? If you tell me it is aimed at preserving peace in Europe, I will say: You are wrong. Does anyone threaten Europe today? The Soviet Union does not exist any longer, the Warsaw Pact is no longer there, the Soviet Army does not exist, there is the Russian army instead. For whom does the NATO bloc then exist? Why does the NATO stretch its tentacles toward the Baltics—we know that its emissaries began appearing in the Baltic countries since the 1990s? Why do they stretch their tentacles toward the Eastern European countries, and work is actively under way there for those countries to join NATO as soon as possible? Therefore, my personal view is that the NATO bloc, under the pretense of strengthening trust, is today expanding the sphere of its influence. Whom can the Defense Ministry threaten today? So, if we state our opinion on this matter clearly, is this bad? The NATO bloc is approaching Russia's borders and in my opinion we should regard this as a threat. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Levin Questions Grachev's Anti-NATO Threats

LD0504210095 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0221 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Unidentified announcer] Now we have a commentary on a topical theme. Our observer Viktor Levin picks out two acute problems in Russian-American relations that were clearly seen during talks our leadership held with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry.

[Levin] These problems concern NATO's eastward expansion and the delivery of Russian reactors to Iran for nuclear power stations. [passage omitted setting out the two sides' different views on these problems]

In general, there is nothing terrible in the fact that there are acute problems between the two countries. The question is how to resolve them. And here it seems to me that, unfortunately, the Russian side displayed not the most diplomatic form of approach to this problem. I am speaking of the statement made by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev that if the West does not give up its plans to expand NATO eastward, then we shall leave the treaty on restricting armed forces and conventional armaments.

The statement was a spirited one. But before making such spirited statements, one should think it over 10 times. Pavel Sergeyevich [Grachev] has on occasions in the past sinned by making statements that predetermined political actions. But this is not the prerogative of the defense minister. And some military men, for example in the West, have already expressed the opinion that in the final analysis this statement is not worth very much since the basic restrictions—90-95 percent of them—have already been implemented.

But politically, this gives rise to the most unpleasant recollections of the imperial tone very often employed by the Soviet Union during the cold war. The same tone was used toward us at that time, but it was the time of the cold war.

[Announcer] Viktor Nikolayevich [Levin], excuse me, you know that at present many Russian citizens think we, Russia, should adopt a harsher tone when speaking to the West.

[Levin] I think we should speak in a firm tone. Just as we do on the question of the nuclear reactors. A conversation is being held that analyzes the facts, a businesslike conversation. Without arrogance, without excessive emotions, a businesslike and specific conversation, a firm conversation. Firmness is necessary. But threats? In my opinion that is the wrong method, it is yesterday's method.

[Announcer] How do you see the prospects now after the departure of the U.S. defense secretary?

[Levin] The prospects are like in [19th century poet Nikolay] Nekrasov's verses: the master will come and the master will settle our dispute. The two presidents will meet and make their pronouncement.

[Announcer] Thank you.

NATO Differences on Expansion Welcomed

MM0604093295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Vadim Markushin: "Russia and NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This was the topic of a debate at the Russian Federation Defense Ministry involving deputies of the North Atlantic Assembly, representatives from NATO headquarters, and Russian military people and academics.

"To find a way to expand NATO without harming its relations with Russia"—this is the West's task, as Mrs. Annette Just (Denmark), who opened the debate, sees it. Such an explicit introduction proved very appropriate for Lieutenant General Gennadiy Ivanov, the Russian Federation defense minister's assistant for military

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policy. He set out the Russian position on this matter without any unnecessary digression.

The gist of it is that NATO's eastward evolution can be seen as nothing other than an attempt to revive confrontation and alienate Russia from other Europeans. This does not tally with the concept of a nonbloc system of security and it undermines what has already been achieved, first and foremost the legal treaty foundation of arms control.

The foreign roundtable participants' reaction to the report cannot be described as uniform. Some immediately tried to push the idea of expanding the bloc on "general European security" grounds or as a a kind of "insurance against an unpredictable future." Another group strove to persuade the Russian representatives that it was not NATO that wanted expansion, but those who intend to join it. A third group actually questioned the advisability of admitting new members to the bloc. For instance, Katrin Gisher [name as transliterated] (France) said that she was "very skeptical" about the idea of expanding NATO. In her opinion, "we should think hard about it, particularly as it would concern the Russians."

So, yet another debate on a familiar topic. How productive can it be? In reply to your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent's question Major General Pavel Zolotarev, chief of the Defense Ministry Information Analysis Center, said: "Parliamentarians in the NATO countries are the public forces that can influence political decisions. This meeting showed that not all of them agree with the idea of NATO's eastward evolution. And if in the course of this debate we find more and more people who disagree, the debate will have been entirely warranted."

E. European, Baltic NATO Membership 'Threat' To Russia

LD0504154695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1426 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—NATO membership for East European and Baltic nations "would do harm to Russian democratic forces and pose a potential military threat to the Russian Federation," Coordinating Director of the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Association Yevgeniy Silin told Interfax today.

"All parties, both opposition and democratic, believe that NATO's expansion would consolidate nationalist forces," said the director of the international public organization.

In his opinion, "nationalist, anti-West and anti-NATO feelings would grow in Russia."

The expansion of NATO would also mean a "situation where political decisions are taken without the participation of Russia, because it will be outside the system," added Silin.

Analyst Views Russian Strategy in Europe

AU0504163295 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Apr 95 p 9

[Interview with Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Moscow Institute of International Economic and Political Research, by Gabor Horvath in Moscow; date not given: "Central Europe Is Close to Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Horvath] You and your institute have always been regarded as believers in cooperation with Central Europe, and now it seems as if this region did not even exist for Russia, because the Kremlin does not care very much about these relations. What is your opinion on this process?

[Bogomolov] The attention of the Russian leadership toward Central and Eastern Europe has indeed weakened considerably. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], the focus of our policy rapidly shifted toward the West, primarily toward the United States. Certain promises, like the reform concepts of the International Monetary Fund, played a role in this process. In the wake of the shift from clearing rubles to the dollar, the trade opportunities narrowed down already on the eve of the "velvet revolutions." Of course, there were other factors as well, like some kind of an ill-feeling toward our allies that became disloyal, as well as the turning of these countries toward the West. Only recently could we see signs in Moscow that they are beginning to view Russia's foreign interests and the importance of the Central and Eastern European region in a more mature way. It is obvious that this region is very important for Russia from commercial and security policy viewpoints. In my opinion, we are just getting rid of the illusion of western help and rapid involvement in world trade, as well as of our treating Central Europe in an off-hand manner.

One should also see that the West has lately become much more open and understanding toward the demands and worries of these countries. Getting into some kind of security policy vacuum, these countries want to exclude the possibility of an unpleasant surprise. For the time being, these countries see membership in the Western European structure of NATO as the only way of defense. I think we should understand this, because a feeling of not sufficiently firm security lies behind all this, primarily because of instability in the East, namely Russia's instability. However, for the time being, our foreign policy is more interested in our own security and, in this respect, an extension of NATO can naturally not be regarded as a positive development. But the essence of foreign policy is the discovery of mutually acceptable solutions.

[Horvath] What are Russia's interests toward Central Europe, and what means does Russia have to assert these interests?

[Bogomolov] In my view, the interests are common. I could even say that Central Europe's vital interests are

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connected to Russia, because any instability in the East would represent a serious blow for Central Europe, as well as for the entire continent. As for Russia, Central Europe is primarily a trade partner, because there are well-formed contacts and some kind of a division of labor has survived; the economies compensate each other; there is a certain infrastructure, and geographic proximity is also an advantage. On the other hand, there is also a geopolitical interest involved here. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its outside defense zone.

[Horvath] But it seems that there is no danger of anyone trying to attack from that direction either....

[Bogomolov] The same applies to every state in Europe. I just returned from Brussels where NATO repeatedly declared that the organization is not against anyone but, as a defense alliance, it must provide protection in any possible unforeseen crisis situation. This applies to every country: There must be some kind of a minimal defense even if there is no threat. So, the question can be reversed: Why should they extend NATO when Russia is immersed in its own internal problems?

[Horvath] However, there is a slight difference here, because fighting has not ceased for even a minute in the former Soviet Union.

[Bogomolov] That is true, but there are at least one or two countries everywhere between the crisis zone and Hungary. In this respect, the conflict in Bosnia is much more dangerous than the situation in Chechnya. After all, Russia feels much less secure today than in the past. The army is not the same either.

[Horvath] But the danger has also diminished: There is no threat of a nuclear war any more.

[Bogomolov] It is not worth convincing each other that there is no danger, because this does not have any effect. One should always count on the worst scenario. Defense capability is also a foreign policy factor, even if this factor is not applied. Military power is always a hidden argument, one that is generally not even mentioned, but one that plays a role nevertheless. It is possible that we do not have to count on an attack, but situations might evolve in which the weaker side comes under pressure. So, from a geopolitical viewpoint, friendly and good-neighborly relations with Central Europe is a vital interest for us.

[Horvath] Experts seem to find a contradiction in the fact that while Russia opposes the extension of NATO, it does not have anything against the EU that provides almost identical security guarantees. With Finland's EU membership, the Western European defense alliance has practically reached the Russian border....

[Bogomolov] I agree. There is a certain unnecessary hysteria in the press and in politics alike. After all, these countries will have to make their own decisions, and life will tell whether they chose well or not. Besides, I think there are a lot of hidden obstacles here, because NATO membership involves the transfer of many more rights than membership in the former Warsaw Pact or CEMA. Not a single country in Central or Eastern Europe has yet realized that they hardly got rid of the Russian influence, and they are already getting under an even stricter patronage. The conflict among the current members regarding the issue of broadening the alliance is causing further difficulties.

[Horvath] It is not a secret that Hungary would prefer to start its European integration with the EU, but it seems that it is easier to make it into NATO.

[Bogomolov] If the West were more flexible, it would seek solution equally satisfactory to all. After all, a structure must be developed that will also provide guarantees to those who now feel less secure, and will not divide Europe into two again.

[Horvath] Do you think that everything depends on economic performance? Neither Japan nor France asserted their interests primarily through their army.

[Bogomolov] That is absolutely true. Both Hungary and Russia should primarily conduct their foreign policy within the country. Economic and scientific potential is an important part of foreign policy. But let us take the real situation prevailing today. Russia is weak both economically and militarily. In this situation, it is useless to meditate about the fact that Russia would not have to make use of this or that thing if it were stronger. Instead, it should concentrate on how to avoid the worst despite its weakness.

[Horvath] Theoretically, is it possible to strengthen the relations without consolidating the Russian domestic policy situation?

[Bogomolov] The effects are mutual. Lack of stability does not favor the development of relations. On the other hand, if we have good relations with Hungary—where the reforms have developed relatively favorably, a lot has been achieved in developing democracy, as well as in the peaceful change of the political elite as shown by the latest elections—this shows an example and can have a favorable influence on the Russian domestic political situation and can strengthen stability. We feel the Central European region close to us also because, generally, we must solve similar tasks.

U.S. Seen as Mercenary in Opposing Iran Deal

MM0504160795 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Apr 95 pp 1, 2

[Report by Vladimir Mikhaylov: "$1 Billion Disappearing To Moscow Not To Their Taste"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The hysteria whipped up in the United States and Israel over the proposed sale of four Russian reactors to Iran for a total of $1 billion could

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scarcely have reached a higher pitch even if Moscow had announced the sale of an atomic bomb.

This contract was signed back in January, but the United States had hitherto merely put out cautious feelers to ascertain the terms on which Russia might abandon the deal, pointing out both the possibility of offering aid and the possibility of withholding the promised $788 million. The last time this question was raised "sotto voce" by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was during his recent talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Geneva.

With last week's speech by Warren Christopher at Indiana State University and the statement by Republican Senator John McCain the propaganda campaign has become a large-scale affair. "Russia is Iran's neighbor. It will rue the day it began cooperating with that terrorist state," Mr. Christopher stated. "This is too dangerous, if Iran creates a nuclear bomb by turning Russian knowledge and equipment to its advantage."

Senator John McCain's language was more trenchant: "That country (Iran—V.M.) requires that we make a very tough political decision, a decision which could determine the success of all our efforts to contain the threat posed by the Russian-Iranian deal," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee for the Near East and South Asia. McCain urged the president to make the decision to introduce sanctions against Russia in view of its breach of the provisions of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Either tell the Russians to stop the aid, or else officially abrogate the existing legal provisions on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons."

The fuss created over the economic, technical, and trade cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is becoming increasingly loud at every level of the American establishment and press. However, Washington prefers to keep quiet about the fact that Iran occupies sixth place among America's business partners and that last year U.S. companies constituted the no.1 purchaser of Iranian oil. How so? Well, business, of course, is sacred when it is your own.

Israel has gone much farther. A highly significant statement came from a pretty high level there the other day and so has to be treated extremely seriously. Do not let Iran think that its nuclear facilities, regardless of their purpose, are immune to bombing by alarmed neighbors—that is the gist of the threat uttered by an anonymous spokesman for the Israeli leadership. In the opinion of commentators, this was done with the sole aim of frightening the Russian specialists.

To supplement this clamorous campaign against the Russian-Iranian contract President Clinton, who is getting ready to visit Moscow to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory, will most likely use his meeting with Boris Yeltsin to try to influence the Kremlin's position. Last year he managed to persuade the Russian president to scale down military cooperation with Tehran. But this time Moscow is, I think, more resolute and "friend Boris" is unlikely to agree to "buddy Bill's" wishes.

Indeed, why should he? After all, all the American arguments are pretty groundless. Ministry of Atomic Energy experts are firmly convinced that the contract with Iran does not breach the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Last Friday the BBC reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Commission which has been working in Iran has found no proof that work is being carried out in the country to create nuclear weapons. Who, then, can you believe? I would, additionally, remind readers that Iran is not only a member of the IAEA but has signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and advocates its extension.

I could be wrong, but I will nevertheless venture to suggest that such determined attempts to wreck the Russian-Iranian contract are mainly due to an acute reluctance to pass up the opportunity for the Americans to get that billion for themselves.

'Mercenary' U.S. Stance on Reactor Deals Hit

MM0604094695 Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Apr 95 pp 1, 4

[Roundup prepared by Valentin Simonin: "Anxieties Over Light-Water Reactor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What are the real reasons for the U.S. objections to Russia's construction of an AES [nuclear electric power station] in Iran?

Russia's fairly modest agreement with Iran to build an AES with a Russian light-water reactor on the territory of our southern neighbor unexpectedly caused sharp discontent in the United States. People in Washington assure us that Russia is facilitating Iran's nuclear armament. Are these accusations well-founded? We offer TRUD readers the opinions of specialists and experts on these matters.

Contract Worth $80 Million

Your TRUD correspondent was told by Georgiy Kaurov, chief of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy Information Administration, that in 1992 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev signed a Russian-Iranian agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In accordance with this document our country was scheduled to build two VVER-440 [water-cooled water-moderated reactors] nuclear power units in northern Iran, near the Caspian coast. In 1993 the Iranians asked us to examine the possibility of completing the construction of the AES at the Bushehr site, which was developed and then "put on ice" by FRG specialists, instead of building these units. An agreement was reached on this point, and early in January this year

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Russian Atomic Energy Minister V. Mikhaylov signed the relevant contract in Tehran worth $800 million. It envisages the construction of one VVER with a capacity of 1,000 kilowatts. The reactor is not designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Russia Ousted From High-Technology Market

The U.S. pressure designed to thwart the Russian agreement to build an AES in Iran can only be attributed to mercenary considerations, Yuriy Rogozhin, chief of a Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear Radiation Safety Scientific and Technical Center laboratory, believes.

All the claims that, by building an AES in Iran with a light-water reactor, we will thus be helping Tehran develop nuclear weapons are bankrupt. The point is that similar reactors are in operation in many countries of the world. Incidentally, the United States itself is offering them to the DPRK. As you know, Iran is one of the signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the AES's which it is building will come under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] supervision.

Furthermore, even if Iran somehow escaped IAEA supervision, to obtain weapons-grade plutonium (and that is the only way you can make a nuclear bomb) requires considerable funds, the construction of a whole series of production units associated with fuel reprocessing, plutonium extraction, purification, and so on. This work cannot of course go unnoticed by international observers.

Thus, the true reason for the U.S. objections lies elsewhere, namely in preventing Russian access to the international market in nuclear technologies and—rather than restricting the trade in nuclear materials (which the United States used to do)—restricting the trade in Russian nuclear technologies and AES's built using our technologies and specialists

Naturally, Russia has an interest in this trade because it not only enables us Russians to obtain a net income but also makes it possible to provide work for specialists, keep them in the country, and strengthen our nuclear industry, which took years to develop and is now to a large extent redundant.

Russia Is Warned

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking in Washington at a conference given by the leadership of the League for Combating Defamation—a Jewish human rights organization—confirmed that the U.S. Administration is resolutely opposed to Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. "How Russia behaves on this and other issues will undoubtedly affect its membership of international institutions," Christopher pointed out.

In turn, at a meeting with journalists U.S. State Department Spokesperson Kristin Shelly described as wrong the hypotheses that should Russia abandon its nuclear deal with Iran it will invariably "receive some special favor" with regard to the implementation of the project to build light-water reactors in North Korea.

The North Korean Train Has Gone...

Russia would like to supply North Korea with light-water reactors, but at the moment it sees no specific role for itself in the reorientation of the DPRK nuclear program. As Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov said, Russia is not taking part in the talks regarding the problem of the North Korean reactors; these talks are taking place directly between the DPRK and the United States. The diplomat recalled that Russia was invited to join the International Korean Energy Development Organization, in which the United States plays the main coordinating role. "We are not as yet joining since we do not understand what we would do there," he said, adding that the Russian Foreign Ministry is keeping an eye on the development of the situation.

In line with the U.S.-DPRK accord North Korea is scheduled to be supplied with light-water nuclear reactors in return for its existing heavy-water reactors, which are potentially capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. South Korea is prepared to assume the bulk of the expenditure on the project, estimated at $4.5 billion, on condition that its reactors are used.

Sale of Nuclear Reactors to Iran Assessed

LD0504223695 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1910 GMT 5 Apr 95

[Commentary by Galina Penenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Russian plan to build nuclear reactors in Iran is being widely discussed in the world. How correct are some of the circles in the United States about a supposed violation by Russia of the international agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons? More on this by Galina Penenkova, and this is what she writes:

The United States believes that its doubts are well grounded. According to the United States, Iran is an aggressive country, Iran is trying to increase its nuclear possibilities and acquire the nuclear technology necessary to manufacture a nuclear bomb. But Russian experts are convinced that this will not be the case and that is why there can be no talk of Russia violating any international agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

According to an official in the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Georgiy Kaurov, a clause in the said agreement not only allows but demands that nuclear powers assess nonnuclear states who are signatories to the agreement and are thereby implementing the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency strictly in their nuclear energy requirements. Iran is a signatory to the nonproliferation agreement and is meeting all the requirements of that agreement. Iran has

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been inspected three times by the International Atomic Energy Agency, including on request by Russia, and there have been no complaints against Iran by the agency. And therefore Russia had signed an agreement with it to build a nuclear power station.

By the way, three years ago [as heard] the United States and Germany took part in a project to build a nuclear power station in Iran, and this how Kaurov put it:

[Kaurov in Russian, fading into English report] The Germans had moved faster than the others in the work. The foundation for the reactors and roads to it had been laid. However during the Iranian-Iraqi war the building of the station was halted. And now Iran has approached Russia to help complete the laid reactors. As can be seen therefore, the idea to build a nuclear power station in Iran was born long before the participation by Russia.

As for the prejudiced assertion that Iran may use the new reactors to manufacture its own nuclear weapons, Georgiy Kaurov said that the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy does not share such a view or United States apprehensions, and here is Georgiy Kaurov again:

[Kaurov in Russian, fading into English report] Our nuclear scientists-researchers are carefully watching all countries, including in the construction of power stations. There are no reports that Iran wishes to acquire nuclear weapons from Russia. And so there are no tangible reasons why Russia should refuse to assist Iran. As for internal safety for Iran itself, the reactors to be supplied by Russia are the light-water types, which are carbon copies of those now in successful operation in Russia. In addition the water reactors' functions will make it impossible to use them to get weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement between Russia and Iran stipulates that waste from the reactors in Iran be sent to special factories in Russia for processing and then shipped back to Iran for interment.

That was Galina Penenkova on the Russian-Iranian agreement on the building of nuclear stations in Iran.

Iran Reactor 'Ballyhoo' Said Due to Competition

LD0504133595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1257 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, March [as received] 5 (TASS)—The ballyhoo raised in the United States and some other countries around the contract for the delivery of a Russian nuclear reactor to Iran is motivated by considerations of economic competition, Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Reshetnikov said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today.

The contract poses no threat to security. Objections mainly come from foreign countries, in particular the United States and Germany which used to provide goods for Iran's nuclear industry and would like to retain a firm footing on its market.

Reshetnikov noted that Iran "has neither desire nor potential to acquire nuclear weapons at this point". Three years ago it joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and opened its doors to repeated IAEA inspections.

Moreover, the nuclear power plant to be built with Russian assistance will be placed under IAEA supervision, and all security matters are covered by the terms of the contract, the Russian deputy minister said.

The contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr was signed between Russia and Iran in January 5, 1995. It provides for the building of one unit equipped with a VVER-1000 (light water) reactor.

According to specialists, reactors of this kind, three of which are now in service at Russian nuclear power plants, are incapable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. It is also unrealistic to obtain any amount of plutonium from its used nuclear fuel even in the amount insufficient for the manufacture of a nuclear bomb.

Incidentally, Russia and Iran have yet to agree on what to do with the used fuel. Two versions are being considered, one calling for the building of a nuclear waste burial in Iran, and the other envisioning its transportation to Krasnoyarsk, eastern Siberia for processing. According to Reshetnikov, the second version is preferable for it will completely rule out any possibility of making weapons-grade plutonium in Iran.

The deputy minister said the Iranian contract is valued at 780 million dollars to be paid by Iran in cash, whereas India and China under similar contracts expect Russia to do part of the work in building nuclear power stations in those countries on credit.

Commentator on Iranian Nuclear Deal, U.S. Relations

LD0504124295 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1110 GMT 5 Apr 95

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow and Washington are set to continue their discussion of the sale of Russian-made nuclear reactors to Iran and Yuriy Solton has the details:

This billion dollar deal has seriously strained relations between our two countries. The United States administration fears that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran could help Tehran develop its own nuclear capability. The Americans have even provided the Russian leaders with intelligence material allegedly proving that Iran is secretly working on its own nuclear bomb. The United States administration is trying to bring pressure on Russia to give up the deal, warning that otherwise we

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might some day wind up with a nuclear power right on our doorstep, and offering to (?defreeze) Russian-American cooperation in various nuclear power generation projects if we (?did).

During his recent meeting with visiting United States Secretary of Defense William Perry in Moscow, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made it clear that Russia was fully aware of the United States' misgivings and assured Secretary Perry that the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran will not violate a single provision of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Russia's Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov also defended the lucrative deal, stressing that the Russian reactors, with their non-weapons grade uranium, can't be used for military purposes. Moreover, the Russian Government has asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to tighten its control over the contract's implementation. Iran joined the nonproliferation agreement back in 1970.

Russia rejects any heavy-handed attempts on the part of the United States to pressure it on the matter, insisting that its cooperation with Iran in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is fully in line with its national interests and poses no threat to the nonproliferation idea. Moreover, Russia is not going to ask anyone's permission to cooperate with Iran or any other country.

However, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has told correspondents that in keeping with President Boris Yeltsin's latest instructions, his ministry will coordinate the country's foreign policy and will insist that all its cooperation with foreign countries, including Iran, be scrutinized by a panel of nonpartisan experts governed by long-term interests of their country.

Iraq's Implementation of UN Resolutions Discussed

LD0504191895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1651 GMT 5 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 4 [date as received] (Interfax)—Russia hopes for the head of the U.N. special commission for Iraq's disarmament, Rolf Ekeus, to give a "positive assessment of Baghdad's actions to implement the disarmament resolutions by the U.N. security Council" in his report to the body on April 10, a high-ranking Russian diplomat told Interfax Tuesday.

The diplomat said it was the focus of a meeting between Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and the head of the Iraqi Military and Industrial Commission, General Amer Rashid, and Russian-Iraqi consultations in the Russian Foreign Ministry Tuesday.

"The Iraqi side, according to General Amer Rashid, hoped for the U.N. security Council to adequately react to the conclusions by commission headed by Rolf Ekeus, who recently visited Baghdad. This is in keeping with Russia's position in many ways," he said.

According to the Russian diplomat, "the Moscow contacts showed that Iraq is serious about continuing constructive cooperation with the U.N. special commission." "This allows us to hope that item 22 of the U.N. security Council's Resolution No. 687 will be finally enacted to lift the ban on exports of Iraqi oil with the Security Council's consent," he added.

The diplomat emphasized that two of the U.N. security Council's permanent members—Russia and France—supported lifting the oil embargo sooner. "This does not mean lifting the whole regime of international sanctions against Iraq. To do this, it is necessary to solve a number of other issues such as the fate of missing Kuwaiti citizens, the return of cultural valuables taken away from Kuwait, etc.," he noted.

The diplomat said Baghdad's recent convicting two U.S. citizens accused of trespassing border was outside the scope of the meeting between Ivanov and Rashid and the bilateral consultations.

"This does not mean that Russia is not approaching this very sensitive issue. To solve it, other channels, including confidential ones, are being used," he said.

Kozyrev Mideast Trip Termed Not 'Sensational'

MM0604092095 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, under the rubric "Visits": "To the Near East—No Sensations, But Not Empty-Handed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's trip to the Near East has just ended. He visited Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and also the Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip. His talks with the leaders of the region's countries naturally evoked great interest in our country and abroad and aroused a great deal of comment.

First of all, what prompted this tour? There is nothing exceptional or sensational about the trip. The Russian political leadership pays priority attention to everything that happens in this region, which is of strategic importance to us. After all, it is in direct geographical proximity to our state. Russia is cosponsor of the Near East peace process and has long-standing and ramified ties with the Near East states.

The dual task that Russian diplomats set themselves during their detailed and frank conversations with the leadership of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel and also with Y. 'Arafat follows from all this.

Its first aspect is this: to make intensive and specific efforts aimed at stimulating the peace process. This is

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especially important and timely now, when it is seriously faltering in the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli salients. The Palestinian- Israeli talks are also creaking along with difficulty and are periodically rocked by flare-ups of extremism and terror. They are about implementation of the Declaration of Principles.

Of course, the Moscow mission did not come empty-handed. For instance, in Damascus, Gaza, and Jerusalem the delegation presented possible options for untying the knots of the disputed issues.

The second part of the task was to revive bilateral relations with the countries of the region and the Palestinians, primarily in the economic sphere. It has to be admitted that there has been a degree of stagnation in them in recent years. Taking into account the rather intensive political contacts among our states, the need to overcome the abnormal situation in economic ties automatically arises.

What, in brief, were the results of the talks? We considerably enriched our impressions of the essence of the present problems in the Arab-Israeli settlement and got down to the nitty-gritty. In my view, our ideas on a Near East settlement were greeted with interest. Speaking in general terms, our collaboration with the countries of the region is being fleshed out and is receiving an additional impetus toward progress. Incidentally, Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk visited Damascus, where he continued discussing problems of the peace process.

In the sphere of bilateral relations it was possible to discuss specific proposals for expanding cooperation. This established good groundwork for the immediate future for practical work by state departments and business circles. Four agreements on developing cooperation, primarily in the trade and economic sphere, were signed during the trip.

The Russian side, as a depository of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, had to raise the question of the importance of its unconditional extension for an unlimited term. This task has now come to the fore in world politics. We are in favor of this treaty being universal in character, since it is certainly of planet-wide significance as an extremely important instrument for strengthening international security.

The discussion of this topic was tricky. However, this merely strengthened our conviction of the need to continue the relevant contacts.

Incidentally, during the meetings and talks our interlocutors displayed lively interest in contemporary life in Russia and the country's successes and difficulties in implementing domestic reforms and strengthening democracy. The delegation endeavored to explain their nature frankly and as fully as possible.

Andrey Kozyrev invited Israeli President E. Weizman on behalf of B.N. Yeltsin to visit Moscow for the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of victory over fascism on 9 May, and the invitation was accepted with thanks.

To sum up: The visits to the region were a further stage in the practice of regular high-level contacts that is developing between Russia and the Near East states. Russia is in favor of strengthening this tradition.

Panov Comments on Supplying Reactors to DPRK

LD0504153995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1328 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Andrey Kirillov and Vladimir Solntsev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—Russia would like to supply its light-water reactors to North Korea, but does not see its concrete role in the reorientation of the North Korean nuclear programme.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov told ITAR-TASS today that Russia was not taking part in the current talks on the problem of North Korean reactors. These negotiations are proceeding directly between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the United States. The diplomat recalled that Russia was invited to the Korea Energetics Development Organisation (KEDO), in which the main coordinating role is played by the United States. "We have not joined it yet, because we don't know what we are expected to do there," he said, adding that the Russian Foreign Ministry was following closely the developing situation.

"We are watching. In principle, we would like to supply the reactors," the deputy minister said. Replying to ITAR-TASS, which wanted to know whether at least one Russian nuclear reactor could be delivered to North Korea, Panov said laconically: "Lets live and see".

In keeping with an agreement, reached between the United States and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the latter is to be supplied with light-water nuclear reactors instead of the heavy-water ones it now has, which can potentially be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The bulk of the spendings on the project, which is estimated to cost 4.5 billion U.S. dollars, will be assumed by South Korea, which is ready to shoulder the burden if its reactors were used.

North Korean ambassador to Moscow Son Sung-pil told ITAR-TASS on Tuesday [4 April] that the North Korean Government was pressing for the construction of at least one light-water atomic reactor according to Russian technologies. He said that this was explained by the accumulated experience of cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of nuclear energetics.

However, the ambassador refused to disclose the essence of the recent North Korean proposal, tabled at the American-North Korean talks in Berlin. According to some reports, Pyongyang representatives demanded

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there that one reactor should be built in North Korea according to American technologies, and another—according to Russian blueprints.

An ITAR-TASS cable from Washington says that representative of the U.S. State Department Christine Shelly told journalists on Monday that assumptions were absolutely wrong that Russia is bound to get something special in the North Korean light-water reactors project if it renounced its nuclear deal with Iran. In her opinion, it is KEDO's duty to adopt all the decisions relating to the light-water reactors. South Korea will play the role of the project's general contractor, but, according to Shelly, parts of the contract could be transferred to other countries. "We made it clear to Russia that we would welcome its participation in the project within agreed limits. However, I wish to repeat: it is too early to speak of the concrete forms of its participation in the project," she added.

"Although North Korean representatives had repeatedly declared their desire to benefit by Russia's assistance in the construction of their own nuclear power plant, no official invitation to begin this work has so far been received by the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energetics," ITAR-TASS was told by Georgiy Kaurov, the ministry's department chief.

He recalled that an agreement to build an atomic power plant in North Korea was signed by the Former USSR ten years ago. This document must be renewed and a contract must be concluded to begin the project.

"Russian specialists have gleaned much experience in North Korea. Moreover, Vver-1000 (light-water) reactor blocks have been operated for quite a time at three Russian atomic plants. It was planned to deliver them to the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Experts do not doubt their safety and dependability. They are sure that no weapons-grade plutonium can be produced on them.

"Reports on Russia's possible participation in KEDO is a smokescreen for a large-scale operation to torpedo the Russo-Iranian contract on the delivery of Russian reactors to Tehran," it is believed by Vyacheslav Sychev, leading expert of the information department of the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energetics. He told ITAR-TASS today that proposals for such cooperation, made by Defence Secretary William Perry during his visit to Moscow, were discussed before that, too. The Russian side then tabled fully grounded demands. Their essence was that Russia should be represented in KEDO at the level of vice-president, and that all the members of the organisation should have equal rights.

However, according to Sychev, KEDO reserves for the Russian atomic industry only the right to reprocessing the wastes. And it is precisely this organisation that is entitled to conclude agreements with sub-contractors.

DPRK Envoy in Moscow Meets Russian Reporters

SK0604025895 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Korean 1200 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 4 April, the DPRK Embassy in Russia arranged a news conference for Russian reporters.

The news conference was held to mark the second anniversary of publication of the 10-point program for great unity of the whole country for national reunification put forward by President Kim Il-song.

Son Song-pil, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, made a statement during the news conference. He pointed out:

[Begin Son recording] The program was published on 7 April 1993. The great leader [suryong] personally drafted the program and our Supreme People's Assembly [SPA] adopted this program as an official document at the Fifth Session of the Ninth SPA.

Two years have passed since the program was adopted, and even today, it is a most important document for the great unity of our nation and for our people's cause of reunification. The document comprehensively elucidates on how and from what position North and South Korea should achieve unity and reconciliation and how they can open the road for peaceful reunification. Taking this opportunity to mark the second anniversary of publication of this program, I would like to remark on a few issues. [end recording]

The ambassador then touched on the principled position that the DPRK has taken up to realize North-South dialogue and to develop contacts and exchanges in various fields.

The ambassador emphasized that the South Korean authorities should apologize for their anti-popular acts taken in connection with the death of President Kim Il-song; they should abolish the National Security Law, which is the evil antireunification law that defines the DPRK as an enemy; they should dissolve the iron concrete-reinforced barriers built along the nearly 240-kilometers long demarcation line; and they should immediately repatriate the non-converted, long-term prisoners of war from the Korean People's Army who still hold fast to their political faith.

The ambassador answered questions raised by Russian reporters.

Japan Loan Story Premature, Kurils Policy Inconsistent

MM0404143895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Sergey Agafonov: "Either Joyful News Is Mistake, or Foreign Ministry Will Correct President"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Tokyo—The Russian television audience has been gratified by a nice piece of news—the latest meeting between Russian First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets and Japanese Ambassador Koji Watanabe ended in a major achievement—the Japanese granted Russia a loan through their Export-Import Bank, guaranteed by the Russian Government, to modernize and develop the "KamAZ" Plant, the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, and the "Impuls" Enterprise in St. Petersburg.

This pleasant news immediately raised our spirits, but one fact was somewhat confusing—why had the Japanese media been so stubbornly silent about this unusual event? Why had the Japanese Foreign Ministry not commented on it? Why were there none of the traditional explanations on lending policy from the Export-Import Bank of Japan? A few simple checks into all the aforementioned areas of uncertainty revealed that, as it turned out, Japan—despite Soskovets' historic meeting with the Japanese ambassador and the triumphant TV report on it—has not yet formally decided to issue the loans.

According to the Export-Import Bank of Japan, these loans have been under discussion for a very long time. It is a difficult problem, although there is some hope of a positive solution. But it is still too soon to claim that it is a done deal. It would be more accurate to say that the loan plan has entered the final stage of work on it. But it is not clear how much more time will be required to finalize matters.

Meanwhile, figuratively speaking, a kind of diplomatic "boy" has emerged in the long-suffering Russo-Japanese relationship—which has been rent by various objective and subjective circumstances—and the partners are now arguing about whether he previously existed or not [reference to episode in Gorkiy's novel "The Life of Klim Sangin"].

Through the efforts of the Russian diplomatic service a relatively major and serious problem—the demilitarization of the South Kurils—has become just such a "boy." Russian President Boris Yeltsin has spoken unambiguously on this subject many times. A paragraph on the demilitarization of the South Kuril Islands was contained in Yeltsin's well-known plan for the normalization of relations with Japan. During his official visit to Tokyo the Russian leader talked about this too, and there were several high-level statements about the start of the actual troop withdrawal process from the islands.

Now suddenly against a backdrop of complete clarity and entirely clear-cut Russian promises to finalize matters, clouds are appearing on the diplomatic horizon. First the Japanese were shocked by Minister Kozyrev, who informed Tokyo during his recent visit about certain "difficulties" which had emerged in implementing the presidential promises, and then an official Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters that Russia has no commitment to withdraw troops from the South Kurils. Moreover according to information that the Japanese have unearthed in Moscow, the Russians are planning not to cut but to build up the size of their subunits in the region—intending, in particular, to bring the total numbers of border troops up to division level, increasing the complement from the current 4,000 to 10,000 officers and men.

Yohei Kono, Japanese vice premier and foreign minister, issued a special statement noting that Boris Yeltsin "clearly stated" during his visit to Japan in October 1993 that he intended to withdraw troops from the South Kurils. Japan, the minister said, is naturally interested in the situation regarding this problem. Moreover, the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry recalled that Andrey Kozyrev had promised to send special experts to Tokyo to explain "difficult aspects" of the subject to the Japanese. But, instead of experts, a statement had arrived from the Russian Foreign Ministry in which Russia rejected without any explanation the intentions declared by its president.

Either Yeltsin has had a rethink, or the Foreign Ministry (or somebody else) has corrected Yeltsin—there are plenty of theories. It is clear, incidentally, that the "diplomatic boy" as a collective image is becoming a real hero of our time in bilateral Russo-Japanese relations.

Japan Protests Shelling of Schooners Off Kurils

LD0604111795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1045 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kopnov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tokyo April 6 TASS—Japan has made a verbal protest to Russia over the shelling of two Japanese schooners on April 4 in the area of the South Kuril islands, which are a matter of a territorial dispute between the two countries. A representation to this effect was made today by the Japanese Embassy in Moscow to the Russian Foreign Ministry, a spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry told ITAR-TASS today.

The Japanese side stressed that Tokyo "does not recognise Russia's right to use arms in the waters around the northern territories, proceeding from its stand on the problem of what country they belong to."

On Tuesday Russian frontier guards were forced to open warning fire, following the violation of the Russian state border by two Japanese schooners. They penetrated into Russia's territorial waters in the area of the Tanfiliyev island and stayed there, until a patrol ship opened fire at them.

Expert Warns of Japanese Chemical Weapon 'Base'

MM0504084495 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Academician A. Kuntsevich, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Ecotoxinometry

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Center, by Valentina Nikiforova and Aleksandr Chernyak; date, place not given: "Secrets of Chemical Weapons. Is There a 'Russian Trail' in the Japanese Tragedy?"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The saga in the Tokyo subway, which has given rise to a wave of rumor, conjecture, and hypothesis, seems to be subsiding imperceptibly, making do with a hint at the "Russian trail" and a report that Japanese police are coming to Moscow—either to keep an eye on Aum Shinrikyo or for some other purpose.

Evidently no one is seeking the reasons behind the tragedy that cost lives and maimed hundreds of people. In order to find out whose trail is there and why it led nowhere we asked Academician A. Kuntsevich to explain the situation. He is well-known in scientific circles. He is director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Ecotoxinometry Center and the UN secretary general's chemical weapons consultant.

[PRAVDA] Anatoliy Demyanovich, the poisoning of the passengers in the Tokyo subway, the unambiguous allusions to a Russian trail to the sarin compel us to return to the problem of chemical weapons once more. As chief specialist in chemical agents, you are involved in this military secret. As far as you are able, could you tell us about its Russian history?

[Kuntsevich] In 1941 as a boy in Orsha I witnessed a panic: It was announced that the Germans were using gas weapons. Horror. This incident, interest in chemistry, or admiration for the teacher then led me to go to the Military Academy of Chemical Defense. Since 1952 my life has been associated with military chemistry. I spent the bulk of the time, 25 years, in the military-chemical center in Shikhany and for 10 of those years—1975 through 1984—I was chief of a combined institute and test-range complex.

In 1987 the military-chemical center was visited by 45 delegations from various states. All the visitors noted that the problem of protecting troops and population from chemical mass- destruction weapons was being given top priority. At the same time work was under way to develop new kinds of arms, and means of combating these weapons were being mastered. Therefore when people say today that Russian scientists lag behind when it comes to real methods of destroying chemical weapons, that is incorrect. In actual fact methods of destroying chemical weapons have existed from the moment that they were created.

That is natural: In order to develop weapons you have to understand safety methods. Our Soviet developments enable me to say that we had the best technical facilities for chemical decontamination. And not only for decontamination but also for defense as a whole. The Americans were staggered when they captured our tanks during the Arab-Israeli war, because they were equipped with chemical warfare defense facilities: Their system for defending personnel against chemical agents was that high-powered.

[PRAVDA] You are talking about defense and destruction. But first we need to clarify how many of these weapons we have stockpiled, and how they are being monitored.

[Kuntsevich] There are currently around 40,000 tonnes of chemical agents (in liquid form) in the reserve.

[PRAVDA] Have they been used?

[Kuntsevich] No, never. Neither during the prewar years nor since. The USSR and Russia have never used chemical weapons. Russia only used chemical agents in retaliation for a German attack in World War I. And the USSR never broke its word after signing the Geneva Protocol (it came into force in 1928) although we were accused of doing so on several occasions. But we provided clear evidence that we are honorable. Let me reveal an incident that I have never discussed previously. You will remember that the first serious accusation came when our troops entered Afghanistan. It was 1980. In actual fact U.S. grenades were discovered there containing CS gas which were used by the police. They were supplied to the mujahidin and used for provocation. As was shown by an on-the-spot examination.

[PRAVDA] It has been reported in the mass media that some chemical weapons were used against Dudayev.

[Kuntsevich] That is a bluff. I heard that Dudayev had also tried to use chemical weapons—to scatter prussic acid. But in springtime that would have had no effect. And Colonel General Chizh, chief of the Main Military-Medical Directorate, said that no one has been poisoned by chemical agents. You need more than a can of some substance to produce an effect. You need modern facilities and combat delivery methods.

But cover stories and hypotheses are being put about in our country to the effect that one bomb can kill so many people. Everything is determined by the dosage. For instance, in order to kill all living things you would have to contaminate the surface of the planet, i.e. you would have to distribute the toxin either in droplets or in aerosol form worldwide. That is a technical impossibility.

[PRAVDA] Nonetheless 40,000 tonnes is a lot.

[Kuntsevich] In the early eighties there was competition to see who had the larger stocks. We accused the Americans, they reciprocated. They said that we had 800,000 tonnes. We answered by saying that they had around 300,000. While NATO specialists calculated that they needed around 150,000-200,000 tonnes for a war in Europe. But we have just 40,000. From the military viewpoint the stocks are not large. It is a mere bagatelle for the chemical industry to process 40,000 tonnes. One major chemical combine processes around 500,000 tonnes of raw material a year. Never mind the fact that 40,000 tonnes are scheduled to take 10 years to be destroyed, at around 4,000 tonnes a year.

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[PRAVDA] How many have already been destroyed?

[Kuntsevich] Nothing has yet been destroyed. We do not have the material base. It still has to be set up. We have seven of these dumps, so we have to kit out seven of these "centers."

[PRAVDA] What is the most terrifying chemical weapon?

[Kuntsevich] They all demand respect. The most toxic are the VX-type toxins. They do not evaporate in use. On the other hand, they are nonvolatile. Sarin is seven to 10 times less toxic but more volatile.

[PRAVDA] Have people working with these substances being poisoned?

[Kuntsevich] There have been no major injuries when the Army has been involved in storing them. Throughout the period from the seventies through 1987, when chemical weapons production was suspended, four people died in the industry at all production units as a result of breaches of individual safety procedures. Around 15 people sustained injuries.

[PRAVDA] How are they stored and guarded? Have there been cases of their going missing?

[Kuntsevich] In all the time that the dumps have existed there have been a few cases. I am not concerned with the prewar period or those cases when "resourceful skilled craftsmen" stoked ovens with mustard gas: It burns well. But when the generation of organophosphorous substances came along, the recklessness stopped.

Defense Ministry commissions have checked out the dumps—there have been no violations. Of late steps have been taken to reinforce the guard. German terrorists recently calculated that in order to commission a substance you needed 1-2 kg of explosives per 1 kg of chemical agent. Just imagine "attache cases" being blown up at 16 Tokyo subway stations containing 1-3 kg of explosives. The effect would be shocking. And the number of casualties immeasurably higher.

[PRAVDA] Are you saying that we are not producing or destroying chemical agents now?

[Kuntsevich] The base is not in place.

[PRAVDA] But how are the preparations for the weapons' destruction going?

[Kuntsevich] That is a very big question. In order to destroy the stocks, a base is needed, to wit guards, technology, waste recycling. Plus sociocultural and consumer facilities. And they are not in place.

[PRAVDA] How long can these weapons be stored?

[Kuntsevich] From the viewpoint of the loss of combat qualities a substance like mustard gas is not combat-capable for long. A considerable proportion of the others are also liable to lose their combat characteristics. As for physical storage, we still have capacity for a few more decades. But each installation must have minicomplexes that enable hazardous stocks to be promptly destroyed. And the longer this goes on, the greater the number of "blown" [potekshiy] weapons there will be. In 1969 the Americans adopted a law on the destruction of their chemical weapons stocks for two reasons. They took two factors into consideration. First, they had overestimated the role played by chemical weapons and concluded that it was time to seek weapons with other qualitative parameters, namely greater effectiveness and fewer danger-related operational problems. They began to switch to the binary principle. That was why they adopted the law on the destruction of chemical weapons. They were scheduled to have destroyed them by 1994. Then that was put back to 1997. And then this program was built into international pledges. You get the impression that they will now link their timeframes with ours. They stand to gain politically and economically from doing so.

We adopted a decision to create that kind of installation in 1984. It was set up at Chapayevsk. At first the residents were proud: Chapayevsk would go down in history. But then came the election campaign—and the opposition movement managed to get the installation mothballed and the funds put on ice, and all the expenditure went to waste. Although it was only necessary to complete the construction of two components and we would have had a super-secure enterprise. The Americans burn things right away—and that is that. Whereas we first neutralize and then burn them.

[PRAVDA] Let us go back to the tragedy in Japan. What happened, in your view? You say that it is hard to attack a large number of people with chemical weapons, but nonetheless a lot of people were injured there.

[Kuntsevich] The point is that the incident in Tokyo is not the first. The first happened 27 June last year in the city of Matsumoto. Six people died there and around 150 were injured. Then the government overlooked the situation. There was no hullabaloo. But some journalists conducted their own investigation. Late last November the Japanese television company NDN turned to me. I asked them to provide reference data. I had a number of questions. Why did the Japanese Government not attach importance to the incident in Matsumoto? It was a serious incident for a country like that. Sarin was cited then too. And the data do seem to have indicated its presence: inhibition of the enzyme cholesterase and contraction of the pupils. But these symptoms are also caused by other organophosphorous compounds.

I suggested returning to that tragedy and setting up a commission comprising chemists of various kinds, medics, the public, and the police. And, second, publishing data regarding this incident.

But nothing was done. And now we have another tragedy in Tokyo: It is being claimed that sarin was used, and that is that. Sarin may have been involved. It is a German product dating back to 1935. All the primers

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describe how it can be obtained. Around 150 states work with it. There are no secrets when it comes to its production. That is why it is absurd to speak of a "Russian trail." No exotic products are needed to manufacture sarin.

[PRAVDA] But our mass media wavered and began to seek culprits in our country.

[Kuntsevich] As a citizen I was offended: No matter where in the world anything happens, people start blathering on about Russian aggression and the hand of Moscow. And we take it up and, as it were, share responsibility and seek our own culpability. It must be clearly stated that it is the Japanese Government that is legally accountable.

[PRAVDA] It is keeping quiet.

[Kuntsevich] And it is obvious why. It does not stand to gain from this. Especially since the Russians seem to be taking the guilt on themselves.

[PRAVDA] There is the idea that Japan is itself developing chemical weapons.

[Kuntsevich] There are grounds for saying that. What I have seen on television has alarmed me. Even before World War II the Japanese were studying chemical and bacteriological weapons. They conducted many experiments on people. They know the living organism's response not by studying the behavior of mice and rabbits (as we do), but from the human organism. There is a hypothesis that the Japanese are studying more serious things than sarin. They have revealed the structure of natural poisons which are hundreds and thousands of times more toxic than sarin.

But what staggered me? The fact that the troops (self-defense forces) have very high-powered structures. They are equipped with portable gasmasks with additional components to enhance their individual protection, full protective bodysuits, and small gas analyzers. The instruments have a dial which shows the presence of sarin. In order for it to register the instrument has to be calibrated using real sarin. It is not important where it is manufactured—in a laboratory, at a plant—or whether it is bought somewhere.

Second, they said that chronomatographic analysis confirmed the presence of sarin. That means there are special laboratories in addition to the military laboratories.

Consequently there is a structure with links with the defense ministry, the police, medicine, and the government. This entire grouping is kitted out. So are these instruments and protective gear being mass produced? So is the science in place?

We can conclude that Japan has a base, it has the cadres, and an intermediate product used for the manufacture of any kind of chemical agent.

[PRAVDA] Has anything changed since last year's disaster and since you took part in localizing it?

[Kuntsevich] The government had not responded, but society got moving and asked if a committee should not be set up. I was asked to join it. And I agreed.

China Buys Diesel Submarines in Nizhniy Novgorod

LD0504165895 Moscow ECONOMIC NEWS AGENCY in Russian 1300 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A diesel submarine purchased by China has been launched in Nizhniy Novgorod. The ship builders of the joint stock company Krasnoye Sormovo are anxious to sell another three submarines. They started working on them at the same time as on the first one. They have been mothballed and are awaiting for their future to be decided. China is prepared to buy another three submarines, which is not very profitable for the plant since 50 percent of the cost of the submarine is paid by the client in dollars and the other half in consumer goods, which are not popular with buyers in Russia.

Government Agrees To New Border Talks With PRC

MM0504133495 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Apr 95 First Edition p 16

[Russian Federation Government Directive No. 414-r, signed by Premier Chernomyrdin and dated 27 March 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] The proposal from the Russian Federal Border Service, as agreed with the Russian Foreign Ministry, to hold talks aimed at concluding a border cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation Russian Federal Border Service and the PRC Defense Ministry is hereby adopted.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government
[Dated] Moscow, 27 March 1995
No. 414-r.

Atomic Subs Among Ships To Be Sold To ROK For Scrap

LD0504124495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1108 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, April 5 (Interfax-Eurasia)—As many as 259 ships, which were assigned to the Pacific Fleet, will be sold to South Korea, well informed sources in the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet reported to Interfax. Earlier it was reported that only 34 retired ships were being prepared for sale.

All in all as many as 127 surface ships, including aircraft carriers Minsk and Novorossiysk, antisubmarine ships Admiral Zakharov and Chapayev, 93 auxiliary vessels

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and 39 submarines, including 6 atomic ones, will be forwarded for re-melting as scrap- iron.

Pacific Fleet Denies 259 Ships For Sale to ROK

LD0604092095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0837 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 6 Apr—The Pacific Fleet headquarters today denied reports that have appeared in some mass media about the sale for scrap of 259 written-off surface vessels and submarines, including nuclear ones, to South Korea. At the Pacific Fleet press center the ITAR-TASS correspondent was told that this information is a "misunderstanding."

Shumeyko Meets Mongolian Prime Minister Jasray

LD0604115295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1044 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the Russian Federation Council, promised to promote the renewal of the legal basis of Russo-Mongolian relations. He said this on Thursday receiving Mongolian Prime Minister Puntsaqiyn Jasray. Chief of the Federation Council's press centre Yuriy Algunov revealed to ITAR-TASS some details of the closed-door conversation.

It was noted that with all the differences in internal conditions and specific forms of transformations, Russia and Mongolia have many points of contact in the approach to reform. In conditions when previous economic ties were disrupted, direct ties between adjacent regions of the two countries—subjects of the Russian Federation and Mongolian districts—become one of promising trends of interaction.

Shumeyko believes a treaty on borderline cooperation could promote this. The Federation Council speaker stressed that the volume and contents of parliamentary ties of the neighbouring countries must be in keeping with the level of bilateral relations. He deems it important to develop contacts with People's Great Hural of Mongolia in every way.

He said Mongolian deputies could participate in drafting legislation on forming financial-industrial groups. He noted that the purpose of economic reform is on the whole similar in the two countries and that due to this an exchange of opinion in parliaments of the two countries regarding legislative ensurance of market reform would be relevant.

The Mongolian prime minister noted that the negotiations he held with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on Wednesday were substantive.

Workers To Stay in Burundi 'No Matter What'

MM0504152995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Gennadiy Charodeyev: "Our Men Are Glad To Give an Undertaking Not to Leave Burundi"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An Il-76 leased by the Ministry for Emergency Situations has flown to Bujumbura, the Burundian capital torn by ethnic strife, for the immediate evacuation of Russian citizens.

In the past month the situation in that African country has worsened sharply. In the past few days alone in Burundi there have been between 500 and 2,000 deaths, according to various figures.

All this time Moscow has been closely monitoring the development of the situation in Burundi. There is concern over the fate of the 17 Russian embassy staffers and family members in Bujumbura. In addition, there are at least 60 Russian specialists and around 40 engineers and workers from other CIS republics employed in various parts of the country under individual contracts.

As Foreign Ministry spokesmen have told the editorial office, the Ministry for Emergency Situations aircraft is supposed to take women and children on board first. The male CIS citizens will carry on working because the "situation warrants only a partial evacuation at present."

According to certain information, for the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians "no orders are not orders" even in the event of a full evacuation. They are already prepared now to give an "undertaking not to leave" for home and are declaring that they will remain at their construction sites and mines, no matter what it takes.

No Russian citizen has yet suffered. The Russian embassy building in Bujumbura is being guarded around the clock by army patrols.

Oslo Proposes Fund for Nuclear Waste Storage

LD0504201495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—Oslo proposes creating an international fund to construct nuclear waste storage facilities in the northwest Russia, Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Siri Bjerke told a news conference in Moscow Wednesday.

Bjerke said her country planned to raise the issue at the future G7 summit in Halifax, Canada.

"The northwest of Russia is a region where the need for new storage facilities for nuclear waste is notably pressing, because the operating ones are nearly 100 percent full, according to the Russian authorities," she added.

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Bjerke emphasized that Russia was to bear all responsibility for any related accidents. "However, this country is facing a difficult transition period and needs international support," she added.

Bjerke had come to Moscow to discuss the practical implementation of a nuclear security plan with the Russian authorities. The plan for nuclear security in the northwest of Russia had been developed by the Norwegian government. Oslo set aside $20 million for the plan involving its participation in bilateral and trilateral projects with Russia and the U.S.

For more details, see Interfax's Diplomatic Panorama of April 5.

Expulsion Aimed at Curbing Spying in Sweden

MM0404150095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russia 4 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Marat Zubko: "Swedes Let People Spy, but in Moderation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stockholm—An official from the Russian trade mission in Stockholm has been arrested. He was not a diplomat and his case could have been heard in Sweden, but he was expelled almost immediately—as a diplomat would have been.

By all accounts this scandal goes beyond the framework of customary cases of this kind. The point is that the Swedish authorities have taken this step shortly before a visit to Russia by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson (18-19 April).

The sides have already exchanged preliminary volleys. Jan Elisson [surname as transliterated], secretary of state at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, summoned Russian Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy and delivered a protest in connection with the illegal activities of a Russian citizen who had been trying to recruit a Swede with a view to obtaining secret documents.

The victim himself, who was picked up on the street, bundled into a car, and taken away for questioning, also protested and said that he was going on a hunger strike. A Russian Embassy spokesman noted in the Swedish press that the trade mission official was arrested without any explanation, and that the embassy was also making a protest in this regard.

These "events of the day" hide certain long-term motives. Following the collapse of the USSR the Swedish authorities expressed the hope that Russia's intelligence-gathering activity would be—if not wound up completely—at least sharply cut back. A couple of years ago they had indeed noted a decline in this kind of activity.

But in the past few months quite different voices have started being raised in Sweden. Thus, last October the security service published a report noting that a number of states, Russia included, "have too many spies in Sweden."

As we can see, the Swedes are not opposed to intelligence- gathering activity altogether, since—as is well-known—it is undertaken by many states (including the Swedes themselves). People in Stockholm believe that Russia's activities in this area are "not at an acceptable level."

This dissatisfaction seems to have been widespread among the Swedish public. And things broke—when the Swedes arrested a Russian agent after a long hiatus—the newspapers were pretty tough about it.

Here, for instance, is what Stockholm's AFTONBLADET wrote in its leader: "The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union is no more. But Russia and its spies still exist." It went on: "The USSR or Russia; Brezhnev, Gorbachev, or Yeltsin—what has happened shows that espionage is to a considerable extent a normal business."

According to a Swedish security service spokesman, the trade mission official had been followed for about a year. The timing of his arrest and expulsion could obviously be seen as an attempt by Stockholm to pressure Russia's leaders and force them to make the Russian intelligence services less active in Sweden.

Filatov Asserts Kohl's Support for Yeltsin

LD0604104795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0953 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS observer Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—Chief of Staff of President Yeltsin Sergey Filatov, who returned from Germany early this week, told ITAR-TASS today that during all his contacts with Helmut Kohl the German chancellor had expressed support for President Yeltsin in his efforts to advance the market-oriented reform and establish democracy in Russia. At the same time, Filatov confirmed that Kohl's acceptance of the invitation to come to Moscow on May 9 "does not mean that the top German officials approve of the actions of Russian troops in Chechnya."

According to Filatov, Kohl decided to come to Moscow and attend celebrations on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory, because he wishes to pay tribute to the memory of soldiers, killed during World War II, and to show his respect to war veterans and the whole of the Russian nation.

Filatov said that a special programme was being prepared for Kohl. The German chancellor expressed the desire to lay a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier and to visit a German cemetery.

Filatov informed Yeltsin, who is now vacationing in Sochi, of the results of his visit to Germany and meetings with Kohl.

This month Filatov together with Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Yarov will be busy organising the Victory

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Day celebrations. They will prepare the president's executive orders on the invitation and reception of delegations and tackle the whole range of problems, connected with the celebrations.

Grachev Meets With Romanian Counterpart Tinca

LD0504181495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1441 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 5 Apr—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and his Romanian counterpart Gheorghe Tinca, who has arrived in Russia for an official visit, focused on bilateral relations in the military sphere during their meeting today that lasted for an hour and a half. Grachev told journalists after the meeting that the Russian side had fully agreed with a package of proposals in the military cooperation sphere put forward by the Romanian minister.

The talks discussed specific issues of mutual supplies of military equipment, armaments, and spares. It is planned to set up the training of servicemen of both countries in Russian and Romanian higher educational establishments. It was also agreed to send Russian experts on business trips to service military equipment in Romania. The sides also agreed to jointly draw up topographic maps and hold training exercises.

Russia also intends to look into the possibility of providing satellite communications for Romania.

Speaking about problems of European security touched upon during the talks, Pavel Grachev has said that Russia's stance remains the same: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should play a coordinating role in ensuring security in Europe.

Gheorghe Tinca stressed in an exclusive interview to ITAR-TASS that "any state, including Russia, can have its own opinion on this issue. Russia's stance with regard to the OSCE being a center of European security has a right to exist, and one should discuss it, without rejecting other opinions."

Commenting on Romania's wish to join NATO, Gheorghe Tinca said that his country did not see NATO as an organization "aimed against anyone else" and that this desire will not affect the relations with Russia. "Romania has sufficient experience and maturity not to be on hostile terms with Russia," the defense minister said.

As has become known to ITAR-TASS, the talks did not touch upon problems of Moldova and the Dniester region.

Grachev Tells Tinca OSCE Should Play 'Major Role'

LD0504172995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1545 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev told his Romanian counterpart Gheorghe Tinca Wednesday [5 April] that it is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than NATO, which is to to play the major role in ensuring stability on the continent.

"The Russian position remains unchanged - the OSCE should play the coordinating role in ensuring security in Europe", Grachev told reporters after a 90-minute meeting with his Romanian counterpart.

Tinca commented in an interview with TASS that "any state, including Russia, can have its own opinion on the issue. The Russian position that the OSCE should be the centre of European security has the right to exist and should be discussed, but other options should not be turned down".

Speaking on the Romanian intention to join NATO, Tinca said that his country does not view the bloc "as aimed against anyone" and that the joining would not affect relations with Russia. "Romania has enough experience and maturity to avoid hostile relations with Russia", he stressed.

During their Moscow talks the two ministers discussed shipments of military equipment, armaments and spare parts, agreed that Russian experts will go to service Soviet-made hardware in Romania, to jointly prepare topographic maps and hold joint exercises. Russia also plans to ensure satellite communications for Romania. An exchange of military students is also planned.

"The Russian side fully agreed with the package of proposals submitted by the Romanian minister in the sphere of military cooperations", Grachev said.

Crimea Issue Linked to Black Sea Fleet Dispute

LD0604112895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0955 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—The situation in the Crimea is an internal affair of Ukraine, but Kiev should try to solve it taking into consideration the norms of international law and the will of the Crimean population, speaker of the lower house of Russian Parliament Ivan Rybkin told students of the Russian Academy of Management on Thursday.

The Crimean issue and the unsettled dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet are closely connected. "The latter problem allows the Turkish fleet to prevail in the Black Sea", the State Duma speaker said.

He stressed it was inadmissible to reduce the Russian half of the fleet "hastily and in a chaotic manner", and put forward an idea of adopting a special law concerning the Black Sea Fleet.

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Political Issues

Rutskoy Confirms Intention To Run For Presidency

LD0504154395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1422 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—Russia's ex-vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy, whose candidacy for the presidency was advanced by the Great Power movement a few days ago, told Interfax on Wednesday that he will begin campaigning "the moment presidential elections are announced."

He doubted, however, that the presidential elections will be held according to schedule.

He said that his statement about the Kremlin preparing a referendum on postponement of the presidential elections for four years, made during the congress of the Great Power movement on Sunday, "is not simply a political statement."

"I personally saw draft documents which define the procedure for 'shifting' the electors' mentality in favor of the referendum, under the pretext that the situation in the country is unstable," he said. He also noted that since his emergence on the political scene he has proved on many occasions that he is no liar, and that his words can be trusted.

He said that if he comes to power, the first thing he would do is to create conditions for social stability. He also stated that within four years he would solve the problems of housing, food supplies, environmental protection and national security.

Asked if he was planning to form an election alliance with other politicians and parties, he said: "Unlike others, I have the right to political independence." He said at the same time that the Great Power movement was open for those "who have not tarnished their reputation with dirty politicking." He said that the people, not "salon patriots, like Gaydar, Shakhray and Zyuganov" were his allies.

Party Official Criticizes Yeltsin Decree on Fascism

LD0504123895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1009 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] St. Petersburg, April 5 (INTERFAX)—First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Labor Party (RCLP) Viktor Tyulkin believes that the recent decree of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on fascism fighting "is aimed against the left-wing opposition."

"From now on the task of the communists includes "preparation for much worse times," he underlined in an interview with Interfax Wednesday. Tyulkin declared about this before the opening of a conference of representatives of different communist parties in St. Petersburg.

According to Tyulkin, in the course of the meeting representatives of the leaderships of the RCLP, of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Russian Communist Party, Union of Communists, "the Lenin opposition" of the communist party of the Russian Federation, communist party of Turkmenistan and representatives of communists of the Baltic states will start "coordinating positions in the struggle against the anti-popular policy of the existing regime."

Tyulkin indicated that the Russian Communist Labor Party plans "to use all forms and methods of political struggle known in the theory and practice, beginning with elections and ending with preparation of an All-Russian political strike." He qualified the situation in the country as "an offensive of the reaction and creation of the regime of dictatorship."

Electoral Commission Warned of Past Abuses

MM0504142695 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 2

["Parliamentary Diary" by Vladimir Isakov: "Tricks Carried Out by Election Riggers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The nearer the next parliamentary and presidential elections come (let us hope that they will go ahead), the more attention is drawn to the political, legal, and organizational aspects of the upcoming election campaign. The new Central Electoral Commission—N.T. Ryabov has been reelected as its chairman—has begun work. The State Duma has given a third reading to the federal laws on elections of deputies and presidential elections. In this connection it makes sense to address certain mysterious and unexplained elements in previous Russian ballots.

The Total Electorate

The total number of voters on the electoral rolls—in other words the eligible electorate—is of fundamental importance in any election. This is how the eligible electorate looked in Russian ballots in 1990-1993:

Date of Ballot	Size of Turnout
Elections 4 March 1990	103,080,178
USSR referendum 17 March 1991	105,643,364
RSFSR referendum 17 March 1991	101,776,550
Presidential elections 12 June 1991	106,484,518
Referendum 25 April 1993	107,310,374
Constitution referendum 12 December 1993	106,170,835
Party List Elections 12 December 1993	106,170,835
Elections of Federation Council members 12 December 1993	100,688,283
Elections of deputies to single-seat districts 12 December 1993	105,594,980

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The above data prompt plenty of questions. One is primarily struck by the differences in turnout in elections held at the same time. Whereas there is a convincing explanation for this difference in the 17 March 1991 referendum—the Russian referendum on the introduction of the presidency was not held in North Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, or Checheno-Ingushetia—there is no such explanation for the "fluctuations" in the turnout in the 12 December 1993 elections (referendum).

Note: The turnout figures for the draft Constitution ballot and the federal district election are absolutely identical, as they should be. Yet the turnout in the regions for the elections of State Duma deputies and Federation Council members differs substantially. In the first case by 0.6 million people and in the second by 5.5 million! How could that be? After all, the ballot papers were issued on the basis of the same electoral rolls!

It is logical to assume that during the 12 December 1993 elections (referendum) there was considerable "dumping" [dobros] of ballot papers. To a greater extent with regard to the draft constitution and elections of State Duma deputies, to a lesser extent when it came to elections of Federation Council deputies (members), who generally represented the regional elite.

N.T. Ryabov, who shortly before this had led the Central Electoral Commission, brought into line the two most obvious figures—the results of the federal district ballot and the final referendum figures—but was unable to entirely square the results. Hence the paradoxical result, which revealed the extent of the falsification.

Is there any need for me to tell you to which column the 5.5 million additional votes on the draft Constitution were added? Do I have to prove to you that the results of that referendum do not and cannot have any legal force?

Number of Ballot Papers Issued

The number of ballot papers issued is another figure which is entered in the electoral commission's records and which is extremely important in order to make a political and legal assessment of the elections.

This indicator looked as follows in the 1990-1993 ballots:

Date of Ballot	Number of Ballot Papers Issued
Elections 4 March 1990	Figures not published
USSR referendum 17 March 1991	79,993,225
RSFSR referendum 17 March 1991	76,652,747
Presidential election 12 June 1991	Figures not published
Referendum 25 April 1993	
Question 1	69,222,858
Question 2	69,222,858
Question 3	69,222,858
Question 4	69,222,858
Constitutional referendum 12 December 1993	58,187,755
Party list elections 12 December 1993	Figures not published
Elections of Federation Council members 12 December 1993	56,279,555
Elections of deputies to single-seat okrugs 12 December 1993	57,889,335

As we can see, here too there were inexplicable quirks. Whereas in the 25 April 1993 referendum the number of ballot papers issued is identical on all questions—it could not have been otherwise; they were after all issued at the same time—in the 12 December 1993 elections (referendum) the situation proved quite different. Issuing people with four ballot papers apiece, the electoral commissions... issued varying numbers of ballot papers. And once again the largest number of ballot papers were issued in respect of the question of the referendum on the draft new Constitution—almost 2 million more.

I invite people wanting to check the above data to arm themselves with a calculator and the BYULLETEN TSENTRALNOY IZBIRATELNOY KOMMISSII No. 1 (12) for 1994. Everything is there—needless to say, minus the final composite figures.

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The Number of Invalid Ballot Papers

The picture here too is interesting. It reflects the number of ballot papers from which it is impossible to establish the voters' wishes. For instance, the ballot paper is scored through cross- wise, a "cross" is placed in the boxes next to two candidates, or no cross is placed at all.

During recent ballots there has been plenty said about valid ballot papers in favor of the "wrong" candidate being transformed into invalid ones during the counting procedure by just adding another "cross."

The statistics enable us to see that these statements have some foundation:

Date of Ballot	Number of Invalid Ballot Papers	Percentage of Those Issued
Elections 4 March 1990	Figures not published	—
USSR referendum 17 March 1991	1,809,633	2.26
RSFSR referendum 17 March 1991	1,633,638	2.13
Presidential election 12 June 1991	1,716,757	2.15 *
Referendum 25 April 1993:		
Question 1	1,468,868	2.12
Question 2	1,642,883	2.37
Question 3	2,316,247	3.35
Question 4	1,887,258	2.73
Constitution referendum 12 December 1993	1,357,909	2.33
Party list elections 12 December 1993	Figuresnotpublished	—
Elections of Federation Council members 12 December 1993	2,668,139	4.74
Elections of deputies to single-seat okrugs 12 December 1993	4,240,555	7.33
		*(oftheturnout)

If you scrutinize the above figure the picture proves quite significant. In the 25 April 1993 referendum the first question (regarding confidence in President Yeltsin) saw the largest number of ballot papers and the smallest number ruled invalid. Naturally, every voter is worth his weight in gold... The picture is different when it comes to the third question—regarding the holding of an early presidential election. This question saw the largest number of invalid ballot papers.

Is that not the nature of the amazing paradox in the referendum that 58.7 percent of the turnout expressed confidence in the president and 49.5 percent voted for his early exposure to an election? Only 0.5 percent separated Yeltsin from a shattering result: But they were the ones who enabled him to trample on the Constitution and fire on the Supreme Soviet with "reliance on the people's trust."

We can see a similar picture in the 12 December 1993 poll (referendum). This saw the greatest number of registered voters—on the draft constitution—and at the same time the smallest percentage of invalid ballot papers. On the other hand during the voting in territorial okrugs the hand had "free rein"....

Were there protests? Of course there were. Such large-scale falsification could not go unnoticed. In Amur Oblast, where outright forgery was detected, a second count was obtained. And the number of supporters of the Constitution dropped from 50.24 percent to below 50 percent.... The draft Constitution did not get through in Amur Oblast. But, despite that, despite the suit filed with the Supreme Court to have the referendum ruled invalid, the Central Electoral Commission sent a cable to the localities asking for ballot papers to be destroyed everywhere "owing to the expiry of their use-by date."

There are the specific features of the Russian electoral system amid the general triumph of "freedom and democracy."

Electronic Checks

In addition to the above misfortunes the upcoming elections in the Russian Federation are threatened by another unpredictable danger—the "Vybory" [Elections] automatic information system set up by the Russian president's Federal Government Communications and Information Agency [FAPSI]. The intention is to try it out during the deputies' elections in 1996 and bring it on stream once and for all in time for the 1996 presidential elections.

It is quite obvious that the fast-acting, automatic electronic information system will create a fundamentally new situation. After all the voting result data collected by this system will arrive by the end of election day when the formulation of legal documents—paper records—will only just have begun. What a wealth of opportunity there will be to "control information" pertaining to election results! The kind of elementary "slip-ups" that happened during the 12 December 1993 elections (referendum) will of course be ruled out now.

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Preoccupied with the new opportunities for election-rigging, the State Duma submitted the following amendment on literally its last day during the third reading of the election laws:

"If an automated information system is employed in elections, the electoral commission shall form a group of commission members with the right of a deciding and consultative vote to monitor the use of the automated information system. All members of the electoral commission have the right to study any of the system's input or output.

"From the moment that the ballot begins until the Central Electoral Commission signs the records the automated information system shall be used solely to monitor the course and results of the ballot by means of data transfer from local to central electoral commissions. During this period any data transfer from the central electoral commission's information centers to local electoral commissions' information centers shall be prohibited, with the exception of signals to confirm receipt of information.

"Data pertaining to the course and results of the vote received via the automated information system constitutes preliminary information with no legal significance.

"The text of the computer printout which contains data input into the automated information system must be appended to the electoral commission record kept with the electoral commission secretary. The authenticity of the computer printout is corroborated by the signatures of the members of the group monitoring the use of the automated information system and the person responsible for information input."

The amendment is designed to, first, ensure that the electoral commission controls all information input and output. The wider the range of people with access to the preliminary information, the harder it will be to distort or falsify that information.

Second, while authorizing the collection and transfer of information "upward," the law prohibits information transfer "downward." This is designed to make it difficult to monitor election information via the information system itself by issuing control figures.

Third, the amendment adopted by the Duma ensures the possibility of subsequent monitoring—the correlation of "automatic" and "manual" information on the election results.

Are these measures adequate to prevent election-rigging? Of course not. After all, in order to massage election results there is no need to use the information system; all you need to do is pick up the government communications hotline: "I have the figures here.... There is trouble in your oblast (republic, kray).... Low percentages.... It should be at least.... If it is not, we cannot work together, right?"

This conversation is of course fictitious, but it is not that far-removed from real life. Should anyone have forgotten, let me remind them: Right after the 25 April 1993 referendum B. Yeltsin said without a jot of embarrassment that economic support for krays and oblasts must be made dependent on the referendum results. In these circumstances is there any point in talking about the law, about ethics, about democracy?

Nevertheless a Word About the Law

At the same time as the laws on the election of deputies and the president the State Duma adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, establishing strict legal accountability for violating election legislation.

Now forgery of election documents (referendum documents), the inclusion in them of information known to be false, falsification, erasure, subsequent additions, compilation and issuing of documents known to be false, and also deliberately wrong vote counting will be punishable by up to three years' imprisonment or a fine of up to 300 minimum wages.

Coercion to perform the above by means of bribery, deception, use of force, or threat of force, along with official abuse of one's position is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment or a fine of up to 400 minimum wages.

The question is whether these norms will be put into practice. And will they help if calls to violate the Constitution and abrogate constitutional elections are once again heard openly from the highest quarters?

Opinion Poll Disputes Russians Want 'Return to Past'

MM0404114295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Mar 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Sociological Service under "In the Mirror of Sociology" rubric: "Do the Russians Want To Return to the Past?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA continues to familiarize its readers with the results of various sociological polls of the population which reflect Russians' current moods.

It is obvious that lately considerable changes have been taking place in the public's consciousness. The extent of such changes can be judged by many parameters—for example, by how people assess the activity of a particular politician, the economic situation in the country, and the problems associated with its future.

Staffers of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology and its regional centers, the St. Petersburg Sociological Service, Yekaterinburg and Kazan Universities' sociology departments, and of other establishments polled around 2,000 people—urban and rural inhabitants—in 12 regions of the country, including the European part, Siberia, and the Far East.

The first of the questions put to the respondents was as follows: "Has your life changed in the last six months? If so, how?"

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In the opinion of 2 percent of those polled life has become "much better," to 11 percent it seemed "a little better," to 31 percent it stayed the same, 23 percent believe that life has become "a little worse," 32 percent believe it has become "much worse," and 1 percent could not say.

In the following replies respondents are expressing their concern over their most worrying problems. Seventy percent point to inflation and price increases, 56 percent to crime, 33 percent to unemployment and the threat of losing their job, 20 percent to pollution of the environment, 20 percent to corruption, etc.

We can see that most of those polled do not have particular cause for jubilation. It can be assumed that the subsequent question and answer sections of interest to sociologists will contain more negativity rather than approval of the present reality. It is no accident that the opposition, which is trying to speak on behalf of the whole people, is trying to convince us that the vast majority of Russians wish to return to "that"—to their former lives under "developed socialism" under the USSR flag—and to abandon market ideas and that they are prepared to attend rallies and demonstrations to that end.

For instance, the main party document adopted at a recent congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation states quite categorically: "The current ruling regime is trying to return the Fatherland's peoples to barbaric, primitive capitalism by deceit and violence." At the same time in all "strata of the population resistance is steadily growing...."

The poll in question asks respondents the following question: "What do you think, is the transition to a free market economy the right or the wrong move for Russia?"

The breakdown of opinions was as follows: Thirty-eight percent believe it is the right move, 33 percent believe it is the wrong move, and 29 percent could not say. The "balance" in favor of the market is not that great but still cannot be denied.

Replies on the possibility of people's participating in "protest actions" were even more revealing. The question was worded as follows: "Will an improvement in the state of affairs in the country be facilitated by...the holding of mass demonstrations and rallies in support of particular demands or not?"

Twenty-four percent of those polled confirmed that yes, it would help, 59 percent rejected this path, and 17 percent could not say.

Here, as the saying goes, no comment is required.

It is possible to react in different ways—skeptically or very negatively—toward the results of particular pieces of sociological research. But being offended by it is just like getting angry at a mirror: Because sociology reflects the situation in society, and getting indignant over the results of a poll is to admit that, talking in the language of a fabulist, the face is indeed lopsided...."

Here is an opinion that rejects nostalgia for the old times: When asked "What do you feel yourself to be—a USSR citizen, a Russian citizen, a CIS citizen, or something else?" only 20 percent of those polled mentioned the USSR, while 62 percent of respondents consider themselves Russian citizens and only 4 percent consider themselves CIS citizens.

National-patriots and radicals like to frighten their fellow countrymen with the following thesis: The Russian Federation's disintegration into "appanage principalities" right after the Soviet Union's disintegration. The sociologists' question is unambiguous: "In your opinion how great is the likelihood of Russia's disintegration into a number of independent states and territories?

Twenty-five of those polled believe there is a great likelihood, 46 percent replied that there is no great likelihood, and 14 percent could not say.

This question also had an ominous ring to it: "In your opinion is there a great likelihood that a military dictatorship will be established in the country?"

Twenty-seven percent of those polled believe that there is a great likelihood of this, 46 percent believe that it is "not very likely," 17 percent consider the situation "absolutely unlikely," and 19 percent could not give a specific answer.

Such are the results in summary form of another piece of sociological research, analyzed from the government newspaper's viewpoint. We by no means intend to pass off what is desired for what is real, "glossing over" present-day real life, which is hard for the vast majority of Russians. But we cannot agree with and we do not wish to pander to those forces in the country which see in its current realties only the blackness of a yawning abyss. It seems to us that the mirror of opinions in the sociological poll cited here has a considerable amount of light tones. At any rate, few people wish to return to the previous "bright past."

Media Issues

Television Tug of War Termed Lobbying Tool

954F1984A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 17, 12-19 Mar 95 p 3

[Commentary by Yuriy Bogomolov under the "Epicenter" rubric: "Television Tug of War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The confrontation between the Kremlin and Moscow is not just a conflict between politicians. It is—and perhaps first and foremost—a clash between powerful financial groups. One is spearheaded by LogoVAZ, which is taking its cues from President Yeltsin; the other—by the Most-Group. The leaders of both "clans" invest money in the mass media and begin playing politics.**

Boris Berezovskiy: "I bet on the president we have today."

"....When we came up with the concept of converting Ostankino into a joint-stock company, we had no notion of

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all the complexity of this idea. In the beginning, we assumed that the independent producers association and the LogoVAZ or AvtoVAZ group would be the shareholders. We encountered not just unwillingness, but a lack of understanding on the part of many. We were told that this was an outlandish idea. But time went by, society developed, and in the end the moment came when it became clear that it was impossible to influence the course of reform in Russia without the most popular channel, which Ostankino's Channel 1 is. All around us the form of ownership was changing from 100-percent state ownership to mixed and private, but the instrument of propaganda remained in its original condition. By inviting as shareholders different commercial structures, we were able to reach a very broad compromise between those who were guided by Russia's Choice, those who were completely centrist, and those who were closer to the national-patriots. Were there more who wanted to join or not? Initially, of course, there were no takers. By the time the matter was practically decided on, there were considerably more people wishing to get in than were needed. Those who realized earlier than others the need and the possibility in principle to solve it at the state level, and those who had the necessary financial means, made it to the finish line. There should be no illusions in this respect. Despite all the talk about the profit this promises, in the first year we will be approximately $100 million in the red. Many could ask why it had been such a juicy morsel in the past and why it is now so unprofitable. Very simple: In the past, budget money flowed from the state purse into a private one. We are putting an end to that. For us, television is not strictly business. We are willing to undertake great expenditures and great risk for the sake of stability in society. In my view, the government is exactly the institution that should represent and protect business, and today we are facing the problem of lobbying its interests.... There should be order in the country. I place my bet on the president we have today. I admit that there are people who potentially could carry out presidential responsibilities better. On the other hand, I do not see such a person in Boris Nikolayevich's entourage."

(Excerpts from the Radio Liberty program "A Leader Answers Journalists' Questions.")

Vladimir Gusinskiy: "What are the guarantees of Ostankino's impartiality?"

"Denationalization of television is good. It will probably also be right to leave one or two channels as state, public channels that will not depend on advertising. In my opinion, the RTV [Russian Television] should become a national broadcaster. Poptsov is a complex man, but he was able to build up a channel from scratch. Today's pilfering of the Russian channel's time by regional stations and the 30-percent state financing is an outrage!

"All other channels must be converted to joint-stock holding and made commercial rather than sociopolitical. Everybody will benefit: the budget (a $400-million saving) and the viewer. And overall, it is commercial television that will depoliticize our society.

"Regarding Ostankino, I have one question: What are the guarantees of its political impartiality? For instance, I assure you that the NTV channel, owned by the Most-Group, is biased only to the extent of personal views of its anchormen and reporters. You have to understand that a political mouthpiece is not a moneymaker. And if Ostankino says flatly: 'We do not take advertising,' then either it does not live on public money or it is a cunning advertising move. And anyway, a too-fast breakdown of structures and relations may have been the reason of Vlad Listyev's assassination.

"Can Boris Berezovskiy build new television? He is a talented man, but his talent is a special one—that of a trader: quick decisions—quick profits.

"I am afraid that high political bias of Ostankino may create grounds for new incidents."

Commentary

The experience of a relatively short period of development of our democracy permits us to detect certain trends. One of them is that an election campaign is preceded every time by intensified struggle for control of television and radio broadcasting.

Until now, however, such battles have been bloodless. In the end, it boiled down to the hurt feelings of fired functionaries, administrative divorces between television channels, and reshuffling of managerial cadres. This time, with Vlad Listyev's murder, judging by all signs, things are becoming much more sinister. The death of a journalist and a manager is a signal that the struggle for possession of television has moved to a qualitatively new level. Which is what I want to talk about.

How clear and romantic was the time when Yeltsin's party stood against Gorbachev's party. Actually, it was then that the unified television and radio complex broke up into two unequal halves: Channels 1 and 2. The confrontation had a clearly ideological coloration. Ostankino, headed by Leonid Kravchenko, was still under the CPSU's control, and Russian Television, headed by Oleg Poptsov, became the domain of democrats.

The straight line of confrontation did not disappear after the August putsch (as should have been expected by the logic of events)—it became twisted and broken.... A television tug of war began between the president and the parliament. This was happening mainly by means of edicts and legislative initiatives.

The disposition of forces was as follows: An approximate equilibrium evolved in the communications battlefield, which did not keep the parliament from suffering a crushing defeat in the spring 1993 referendum. The president's advantage was in that the public opinion was on his side, while the mass media only objectively reflected it.

One way or the other, for a while all conflict collisions associated with the struggle for possession of the most popular medium of communication were of a strictly party-political nature. Money has not yet spoken its word as an independent force with its own political and

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party preferences. So far, it has played a strictly collateral role. Albeit a quite significant one, as soon became clear.

We may consider the point when in the "new political year" (1994) NTV went on air on Channel 4 as a turning point. This meant that from now on private capital appealed directly to public opinion and was assuming responsibility for forming it. Treating television not as a business sphere but as an instrument of lobbying its strategic interests was the point outsiders initially overlooked in the Most- Bank's television project.

Other financial groups only grasped this idea on the threshold of the new election campaign. Apparently, the Public Russian Television (PRT) project based on Ostankino was an answer to it. But its implementation encountered a score of fundamental difficulties.

Private business on television began with bits and pieces. Financial assistance; bribing technical, and then creative, personnel, and eventually the management. As the state approached increasingly closer the line of financial bankruptcy, commercial activities of television agencies intensively expanded. The increased crime-engendering atmosphere of Ostankino stemmed originally from the fact that the partition between the state and private purses there turned out the most transparent.

There is one radical way to clear the atmosphere: to divorce business from the state, which is what was done in the case of NTV. Or in the case of TV-6.

As to all the reorganizations of Ostankino, including the latest one, they are all palliative by nature. Creating a Reklama-Holding pyramid at the end of last year permitted the centralization of monetary income from advertising to a certain extent, but did not solve entirely even this problem. As to the PRT, this also is a centaur.

It is half-state, half-privately owned. And therefore is capable of reproducing again and again the collisions fraught with bloody score-settling. In addition, it is quite clear that the scenario of Ostankino's conversion to joint-stock holding in the form conceived by its initiators represents privatization of the already- privatized.

Privatized spontaneously, retail and wholesale. Nearly every one of the company employees's has long considered himself not a hired hand but its real co-owner in some or other form. That advertising airwaves have long been privatized is more than obvious. But everybody who has had encounters with Ostankino's technical services knows that both the equipment and control rooms have been unofficially privatized.

When vital interests of so many proprietors are affected, bloodshed is the only outcome. In this situation anything becomes a loaded gun....

In such cases, the bullet most often hits not the driving force behind the change, but its symbol. To get the greatest effect.

Vlad is no longer with us, while the problems got tangled into an even tighter knot: both financial and legal. The death of the television star illuminated like a lightning the disposition of forces in the information field. One financial group (the Most-Bank) controls one, relatively small segment of broadcasting (NTV). The other (the LogoVAZ group and those associated with it) is attempting to take over another, more extensive segment of the airwaves. And the third force is not far behind in claiming its part of information space—the parliament, which, judging by all signs, will respond to the challenge of the financial circles and the president. So far it has only made a threatening gesture—Zhirinovskiy proposed a draft law on nationalization of television and radio broadcasting.

And television on the eve of elections has once again found itself between a rock and a hard place. Between the rock of privatization and the hard place of nationalization. The old Russian amusement—the television tug of war—continues.

Poptsov on 'LogoVAZ," Would-Be 'Public TV'

954F1985A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 17, 12-19 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with the head of the Russian Television Company Oleg Poptsov, by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent Yuriy Bogomolov; place and date not given; under the "Television" rubric: "The Gilded Airwaves"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **This MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent had set up an appointment to interview head of the Russian Television Company Oleg Poptsov several days before the tragic death of Vladislav Listyev. The tragic event prompted a change in the planned subject of the conversation.**

[Poptsov] Television is a decisive factor in governing the country. It is necessary to put money into it. We, on the other hand, got only 57 percent of what we need. And this is not taking into account the real monthly inflation. On top of this, we have last year's debt. It will "eat up" 5-6 percent of what we will get this year.

[Bogomolov] What about income from advertising?

[Poptsov] Under ideal circumstances, it can cover no more than 20 percent of expenses. Besides, this income is shrinking.

[Bogomolov] Will the infusions of government funds into Ostankino stop after the decree is issued on the creation of the Public Russian Television [ORT - Obshchestvennoyue Rossiyskoye Televideniye]?

[Poptsov] Theoretically, they should. What will actually happen, I do not know. How the esteemed Mr. Berezovskiy—who, as I see it, currently defines Ostankino's economic strategy—will behave, I do not know either. I am concerned about it. You know that we supported this

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project. But if as a result the ORT team ends up being budget-financed and in addition to this will have strong supplemental aid from the banks, our position will be different.

[Bogomolov] In my view, ORT is television that is public in name and government-private in essence.

[Poptsov] Yes, this is true. The Ostankino model has nothing in common with the European concept of public TV. It essentially creates a price discrepancy. And it creates a field for speculating on the differences. Many people interpret this formula this way: Since it is public (and society is the state), that means that the state should kindly shell out money.

[Bogomolov] Is it true that income from advertising has fallen off lately?

[Poptsov] Very substantially. In particular, this is connected with what is happening in Ostankino. First the company set up an advertising holding company. Now it has decided to abolish it. In the near future—in about three months—Mr. Berezovskiy intends to put all advertising in the hands of the LogoVAZ-Press. One would think, how can that affect our situation? Very easily. Right now Ostankino has refused to accept advertising for a certain period of time. For this period the banks cover all the losses, and then they bet on going bull.... The market gets completely destroyed. Advertising flows back to Ostankino, completely bankrupting the competition. All of this is very dangerous in the conditions when a market economy does not function by firm rules.

Everyone who is playing the market of television advertising must be aware of the entire scope of responsibility.

[Bogomolov] But Listyev was not a key figure in the company's economic decisionmaking.

[Poptsov] Vlad was the head of the VID company. He was a key figure there. In his new job he would be in charge of the programming policy. The desire to separate Listyev from financial decisionmaking was perhaps sincere. But... he is told: You are not involved in advertising, but you are changing the concept, the channel's contents. These programs attracted advertising. Which means that some advertisers get pushed out, and others take their place. It is all tied together. But what I really doubt is that the people who were being pushed out would dare to physically remove him. This is too obvious, since suspicions immediately point in their direction. Everything is more complex. I feel very sad that the latest events, stemming from the confrontation between the Moscow and central authorities, openly politicize Listyev's death....

Going back to strictly television problems, however, I have to say that one destabilizing fact was followed by others. Right now so-called "Public TV" is conducting active behind-the-scenes work on buying up RTV [Russian Television] personnel and entire programs. My colleagues come and tell me about the style of negotiations. A program's author is invited and told at the outset: "We do not care how much your program cost on RTV—we double, or maybe even triple the price." In short, purchase it. I think that the gentlemen got carried away, though. The leadership of the Ostankino board of directors even talks to those who, in their opinion, could replace Poptsov. People who had been invited to such interviews laughingly told me about it. Perhaps someone's order is being carried out.

[Bogomolov] Even without this information there is enough evidence that efforts are being made to force you out of the company.

[Poptsov] True. But this is not the point. The current situation is new in many respects. We need to protect the freedom of speech not only from irritated authorities, but also from financial groups. If we keep in mind that we are witnessing a coalescence of authority and capital, encroachments on the freedom of speech also acquire a different pattern. It is as if they were telling each other: We share the same freedom, and we will figure out together how and from whom to protect it. The most dangerous thing is when the state turns freedom into a commodity that can be purchased.

Military Issues

Grachev Approves Plan for 29 April Military Press Day

MM0504111695 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 1

[Report "from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry" by Anatoliy Belousov: "Go-Ahead for Military Press Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, has approved a plan to celebrate Military Press Day, devoted to the 50th anniversary of the great victory. It will take place 29 April 1995 at the All-Russia Exhibition Center (the former VDNKh [All-Union Exhibition of National Economic Achievements]).

People visiting the All-Russia Exhibition Center that day will receive information of interest to them from the horse's mouth, so to speak—from representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, and the editorial boards of military newspapers and magazines. Naturally there will be songs, and dancers, airborne landing troops, and Army sportsmen will demonstrate their skill. And people with a liking for soldier's porridge can try some.

Vets 'Insulted' by VE-Day Plans, 'Fawining' to West

MM0504154495 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by David Novoplyanskiy: "Barrier in Red Square. Victory Day Has Strong Whiff of Clinton About It"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Last week PRAVDA briefly set out the report carried 29 March by news agencies and services and state television: "So, now everything has finally been decided: A military parade dedicated to the 50th anniversary of victory will take place. On 9 May Great Patriotic War veterans, servicemen from Moscow Garrison units, and students at Moscow Garrison training establishments will march through Red Square.... At 1200 hours the celebration will move to Poklonnaya Gora...."

A similar report was duplicated in print runs running into millions. I will quote, for example, TRUD No. 55: "Two military parades will be held 9 May in Moscow—in Red Square and on Poklonnaya Gora. The Russian president made this decision in the light of Defense Ministry proposals. Colonel General Vladimir Toporov, Russian Federation deputy defense minister, informed the troops selected for the parade of this at a news conference yesterday in the garrison mess." It went on to say that it had been decided to hold in Red Square "a parade of Great Patriotic War veterans and rear services workers, with the capital's military units, subunits, and military educational establishments participating. Four thousand veterans and 2,000 servicemen will march across the paving stones of the country's main square."

The parade outside the Kremlin walls is a natural tribute to the people's traditions, to their history. It is not only veterans who cherish them. It is therefore also natural that it was decided not to keep the veterans apart, not to isolate them from the other participants in the jubilee celebrations. Then, following long discussions at the highest level, we were finally informed of the extremely curtailed parade in Red Square. I was forced to recall last week's reports because suddenly even this mini-parade....

Following the loudest public announcements a modest, unobtrusive one appeared 2 April. The Foreign Ministry (can you guess what the Foreign Ministry has to do with it?) decided to deny the reports about the participation of Moscow Garrison units in the Red Square parade: It will be attended exclusively by veterans. They will be left in their "own" square in an isolation that is far from proud but is, of course, offensive and insulting. They will be in the position of an aged poor relation who has to be invited to a celebration but is not allowed to sit at the common table. Is it only we Great Patriotic War veterans who are deeply insulted by this sudden turnaround? Can people to whom memories of the war and the millions killed are infinitely dear really remain indifferent to this?

You cannot help wondering: Who is now the boss in "the main square of the country"? Of our great country, which won World War II with our allies. The Russian Federation Government? But it made the Defense Ministry responsible for organizing the parade, and the final version provoked no objections. The Russian Federation president? But he personally announced on television that the veterans' wishes had been taken into account and that it had been decided to hold two parades, the first being on the morning of 9 May in Red Square.

Furthermore, various countries' journalists were informed at a news conference that "this decision was made by the Russian president" and were told in detail about the upcoming Red Square parade, which would be attended not only by veterans. The wide publicity did not provoke denials or corrections on the part of the numerous presidential services desperately competing to be vigilant. Nobody has stated that the president is retracting his words or that the news conference organizers erred somewhat. So who ultimately is the real boss in our main square and who, forgive me, is saying: to hell with the Russian president's publicized decision and our various committees and generals? Or has the youth newspaper got it right, proclaiming with bitter irony: "Victory Day Has a Strong Whiff of Clinton About It"?

In fact, speaking plainly now, without any references to excavations in the center of Moscow, the real reason has been, as the saying goes, spelt out to us. The whole point is that the esteemed overseas guest does not want to see Russian servicemen in the world-famous Red Square. Let only veterans march—they have been given kind permission; whereas nonveterans—that is dangerous, fraught, and, in a word, undesirable. Yet I dare say that an accommodation could have been reached. In the unforgettable war years the Allies managed to agree on problems that were much more serious and substantial than the problem of 2,000 Moscow Garrison servicemen marching past the Kremlin. But this is a special problem.

Its crux is the servility of the current Russian leaders, who have destroyed the country and who are groveling to and fawning on the West. Their ingratiating, toadying tone is nothing new. It is easy to understand those who are now asking whether they have gone too far down this road.

It is a matter of days to the victory jubilee. But the war veterans are waiting in vain for what has been promised. Their miserly pensions have still not been indexed. The new privileges prescribed by the Law on Veterans have not been granted. Tens of thousands of World War II veterans are still waiting for their promised housing. Even the extremely limited participation of old soldiers in the capital's celebration ceremonies has not, as we can see, passed off without a slap in the face, an attempt to isolate the column of veterans from everybody else.

The president has many times publicly stated that there were no victors in World War II. Blasphemous words. Essentially they debunk our people's outstanding victory and insult their dignity. It seems that this disavowal of victory is being reinforced by practice, which is hard to conceal with fine "jubilee" phrases and gestures made for effect.

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Federal Assembly

Duma Adopts Law on Beginning Chechnya Peace Talks

LD0504131495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1232 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—The Russian State Duma adopted a law under the first reading Wednesday which instructs the government to begin peace talks with Chechen militants and ensure a ceasefire without any preliminary conditions.

228 lawmakers voted for the document, while 56 opposed and four abstained.

The lawbill also envisages that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin should head a special commission at the Russian president which is to determine "the order of interaction" between the federal and local authorities.

Duma Overrides Yeltsin Veto on Citizens' Savings

LD0504115495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1009 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 5 (Interfax)—Russia's State Duma has overcome the president's veto, imposed for a second time on the draft law on the restoration and protection of the citizens' savings, earlier approved by both houses of the Russian parliament. This time the law was supported by 337 deputies (the required minimum is 300).

After Yeltsin vetoed the draft law on February 4, it was approved for a second time by both houses "with due account taken of the president's proposals," Chairman of the Committee for Public Associations and Religious Organizations Viktor Zorkaltsev (the Communist faction) told the deputies.

He said that the adoption of the law "only guarantees that the state recognizes its commitments to 70 million citizens, whose savings lost their value when the economic reform began in 1992."

In his opinion, Yeltsin's fears that the law will destabilize the financial and economic situation in the country are unfounded.

"The law is of a general character and does not contain specific ways of implementation," he said. He emphasized at the same time that the law "will give the deputies a free hand to begin drafting seven other laws on ways of repaying the state debt to the citizens," said Zorkaltsev.

Duma Suspends Ostankino Privatization, Bans ORT Broadcasts

LD0504123795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1209 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—The Russian State Duma adopted a law Wednesday [5 April] suspending the privatisation of the major Russian "Ostankino" TV channel which was o'kayed by the Russian president and banning the broadcasts of the new semi-private public Russian television /ORT/ [Obshchestvennoye Rossiyskoye Televideniye] company which replaced it.

The law called "on special order of privatisation of organisations of the state television and radio in the Russian federation" was passed five days after the ORT began its first broadcasts.

According to the Duma decision, the ORT can no longer wire its programmes on the first TV channel and budget appropriations to the company, in which the state possessed 51 percent of the stock, were stopped.

The document passed by 276 votes in favour and only two against, says that until a special federal law on the issue is passed "the privatisation of state television and radio, including the transfer of their property into authorised capitals of joint-stock companies is suspended". It also cancels any privatisation of TV and radio property carried out before the new law was adopted.

President Boris Yeltsin had o'kayed to sell 49 percent of the stock of the "Ostankino" TV channel to private companies and to transform the channel into the public Russian television. The new company began its broadcasts on April 1.

The privatisation of the "Ostankino" caused tensions among the Russian political elite and business circles and in the TV company proper whose staff said it was against privatisation. Director General of the Public Television and famous TV host Vladislav Listyev was killed by contract assassins after occupying the post for one month. Many observers linked the killing to the privatisation of the channel, however the murder has not been yet exposed.

The Duma proposed to the president and the government to bring their decisions on privatisation of the state television, including the ORT, in correspondence with the new law.

The law was drafted by Chairman of the Duma Committee on Privatisation Sergey Burkov. Lawmakers were to consider it under the second reading Wednesday, but agreed to Burkov's proposal to pass the law as a whole.

Duma To Discuss Vote of Confidence in Government

LD0504150095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1429 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 5 ITAR-TASS—Russia's State Duma lower house will discuss a vote of confidence in the government on Thursday [6 April], according to Natalia Konstantinova, the press secretary of the Duma's committee for CIS affairs.

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She said the question had been raised by Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the house committee for CIS affairs and ties with compatriots abroad. The appeal to the house signed also by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Sergey Baburin, Anatoliy Lukyanov and other Duma members, the government of the Russian Federation is accused of signing accords with Ukraine that infringe on Russia's state interests.

Natalia Konstantinova explained that "the Duma council on April 6 will put the motion on the house agenda for an extraordinary consideration within a week from the moment it was submitted", that is prior to April 13.

No-Confidence Vote To Go Ahead

LD0504195495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—Chairman of the Duma Committee on Commonwealth Affairs and Relations with Compatriots Konstantin Zatulin said that the 90 deputy signatures necessary to demand discussion of a no-confidence vote in the government at the next Duma plenary sitting have been collected.

Zatulin told Interfax today that the reason for this is the cabinet's inability to draft a clear and well-coordinated stand on key aspects of foreign and domestic policies.

He cited as an example the recent Kiev agreement on the Ukrainian state debt to Russia, signed by Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets. "This agreement ignores the national interests of the Russian Federation and considerably cuts 1995 budget revenues," said Zatulin. (Kiev's payments on interest from its debt were to reach $484 million in 1995 - Interfax). Thus, relations between Moscow and the International Monetary Fund are endangered, because the IMF issued the $6.25 billion stand-by credit to Russia on condition of the Duma-approved budget.

Zatulin is dissatisfied with the fact that the government twice ignored the no-confidence vote passed by the State Duma on Interior Minister Viktor Yerin.

Today Zatulin will pass over the statement signed by Duma deputies to the Duma Council. The latter is expected to discuss the statement tomorrow. According to Duma procedure, the Council is to put the no-confidence item on the agenda of the next Duma plenary session, within a week.

According to Zatulin, the statement was signed by Sergey Baburin, Yuriy Kalmykov, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Stanislav Govorukhin.

Rybkin: No Confidence Vote May Dissolve Duma

LD0604102595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0935 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin warned his colleagues that the a vote of no-confidence in the government which can be included into the agenda of the lower chamber Thursday [6 April] may result in the dissolution of the Duma itself.

"If the Duma votes no-confidence in the government the future developments should go strictly according to the Constitution", Rybkin told reporters and explained that the president will have either to sack the government or to dissolve the lower chamber.

Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs Konstantin Zatulin said he had collected the necessary 90 signatures of lawmakers to initiate the motion of no-confidence in the government. According to Zatulin, the government sacrificed the national interests in the agreements signed with Ukraine by First Deputy Premier Oleg Soskovets.

"In case the Duma is dissolved we shall participate in the new elections", Rybkin went on and said that the absence of the law on parliamentary polls will not be an obstacle.

Elections will then be held according to the presidential decree which fixed their rules for the 1993 polls, the speaker said.

Rybkin Denies Knowledge of Plans To Postpone Elections

LD0504175995 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin has no knowledge of any plans on the part of the presidential entourage to postpone the parliamentary and presidential elections. At the same time, he has pointed out that it is quite possible under the Constitution to hold a referendum on imposing a moratorium on elections, and on extending the mandates of the president and the Federal Assembly. Rybkin said that such referendums have been or will be held in some Central Asian states.

Zhirinovskiy Proposal on Crimea Invitation Approved

LD0504123695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1009 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 5 (Interfax)—Russia's State Duma gave its backing to the proposal of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], to include the issue concerning invitation of the delegation of Crimea's Supreme Soviet headed by its speaker Sergey Tsekov into the State Duma's Wednesday agenda.

As many as 266 deputies voted for Zhirinovskiy's proposal under the needed minimum totalling 226 votes.

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Zhirinovskiy declared that taking into consideration the crisis between Kiev and Simferopol, the State Duma should "render moral support" to the Crimean parliamentarians.

Zhirinovskiy Says Russian Army Will Free Crimea

LD0504170495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1453 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 5—Russian nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy predicted on Wednesday [5 April] that the policy of official Kiev towards the mostly Russian-populated Crimea will result in "the occupation of the Crimea by Turkish troops".

"Then the Russian Army will have to free the peninsula because Ukrainians will be hiding behind Zhitomir", he told a press conference Wednesday hinting, evidently, at the considerable Jewish population of the west Ukrainian city.

The Crimea belonged to Turkey before 1774 when Russian Tzarina Catherine the Great forced it to recognise the independence of the peninsula and annexed it in 1783. In 1854-56 Russia fought the Crimean War with Great Britain, France and Turkey. In 1954 former Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev handed over the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine.

Zhirinovskiy spoke of the peninsula as the "primordial Russian land" and accused the government of "capitulating in all issues to Kiev".

"The developments in the Crimea show that the Ukrainian leadership tries to eliminate the autonomy of the peninsula by force", he said.

Regional Affairs

Moscow To Sign Power-Sharing Treaty, Accords With Yakuts

MK0504130195 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 2

[Report from Khabarovsk by Oleg Kryuchek under the "Treaty" rubric: "Yakutia Wants To Share Property and Powers with Moscow. 17 Documents To Be Signed in Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Viktor Zhuravlev, press service chief of the Yakutian president, has said that currently the government authorities of the autonomous republic are carefully finalizing texts of a number of documents. The issue is a Russian-Yakutian treaty on the delimitation of powers and also 16 other documents to be signed at sectoral and departmental level that will stipulate the rights and obligations of the metropolis and the autonomous republic. Mr. Zhuravlev said that presently the most urgent issue is the allocation of property rights because current economic relations often give rise to complete confusion. Still, bringing Yakutia's political status in line with that of, say, Tatarstan is also an important objective.

According to Viktor Zhuravlev, obligations regarding the supply of the Northern Region's population with food and fuel will be divided as follows: Moscow will only subsidize the transportation of freight to the North through a specialized fund, while the republic itself will be responsible for delivering the freight to its destination. The press secretary of the Yakutian president emphasized that the center should release the money on time, not when navigation is in full swing. Mr. Zhuravlev could not, however, give a specific date when the treaty between Russia and Yakutia is due to be signed.

Chuvash President Seen Under 'Surveillance'

MM0504163095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Large Escort for the President of a Small Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cheboksary—A senior Russian official, an exceptionally gentle man known for being a big liberal, recently had a friendly talk with Chuvash president Mr. Fedorov: "Why did you want to do that? Tatarstan—of course; Bashkiria—no question; Chechnya—say no more. But you? If we send in a tank division, Chuvashia will fight for you, will it?"

A good joke, of course. It is the kind of joke you get in the Kremlin these days.

Attached

There was no armed guard, in the prison camp sense—"Halt!" "Hands behind your back!" "No talking!"—behind Fedorov, of course. They were merely attached. Six guards—from senior lieutenant to major. And one presidential assistant (that is, his, Fedorov's, assistant)—a lieutenant colonel.

The six had been selected from local special services' officers and attached to the aforementioned person by General Barsukov, chief of the Russian Federation Main Security Administration. The seventh, also from Cheboksary, was appointed presidential assistant by Russian First Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Mikhail Yegorov.

Fedorov was informed by coded telegram from Moscow that an entire detachment of guards and supervisors had been attached to him.

Some time later the republic president invited the chief of his new security guard (the old guard had been removed) and his new assistant to his office—to get to know them. They came, the major and the lieutenant colonel, Vyacheslav and Nikolay, Alekseyevich both, the one 37 and the other 38. Tall, strapping, regular guys, reasonably communicative, alike as two peas in a pod. "I

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noticed," Fedorov told me, "that they seemed embarrassed by their role, a highly delicate one, you must admit...."

The same meeting was recalled with approximately the same feelings by one of the attached officers in conversation with me: "We were introduced; we sat down...." "How did he greet you?" "Now how do you greet an educated person? You appreciate what is necessary...."

Evidently grateful for this appreciation, they confided in Fedorov: Yes, the task was to collect and report information on the president of the republic; detailed instructions on the subject were provided by Russian First Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Mikhail Yegorov.

This is service. A very specific task, regulated by the "Standard Regulations for Assistants To Leaders of Federal Organs of Executive Authority and Organs of Executive Authority in the Components of the Russian Federation on Matters of Fighting Crime (approved by 8 September 1994 Russian Federation Government Decree No. 1014)."

According to this document, these assistants' main tasks "are to organize protection for organs of executive authority against criminal encroachments, infiltration, and influence by organized crime, to identify and stop corruption in these organs, and to collect and analyze information necessary for the fight against criminal communities...."

An attached assistant is entitled:

"to request and acquaint himself with normative acts and other documents of organs of executive authority and enterprises, organizations, and institutions subordinate to them, including documents containing statistics and information of a commercial nature;

"to carry out checks on statements and reports on involvement in corruption and other offenses by state employees of organs of executive authority, obtain the requisite explanations and information from them, look at their personal files, and implement other measures provided for in legislation...."

Even on the official list of designated powers and rights there is endless scope for doing what you will. The standard implementation of the "Standard Regulations" is surveillance and reporting on people.

The assistant to the president of Chuvashia for the fight against crime, whose name and patronymic the president simply cannot remember, has been working for more than three weeks now. He has his own office. He has his own car. He is well paid.

What has the president of Chuvashia done to "attach" to himself the eyes and ears of the federal authorities?

Own Bread

Fedorov flatly refused to attend the enlarged government session held in the Kremlin on 24 March. The republic president had a more than valid reason for not attending this "major party-economic aktiv meeting," as he put it, "aside from his unwavering disdain for such meetings: Just before the meeting he had had an operation on his leg, which was badly injured back in August during a soccer match between teams from the governments of Chuvashia and Moscow." (Incidentally, unlike sports injuries, political injuries sustained in duels with the capital's wizards merely strengthen the local players, helping them to gain points and win on their own ground).

Fedorov considered it rude to ignore Boris Yeltsin's out-of-town meeting with the leaders of the Russian republics, set for that day—he flew to Moscow; he appeared, leaning on a stick. He saw, heard, and came away with the following impression: "The market for the conduct and actions of the regional leaders is open on the eve of the elections. Supply and demand are great."

By the way, he himself is categorically opposed to the established fashion of power-sharing between the center and the regions. "I am not demanding any special status for Chuvashia," he confirmed yet again at the meeting with the Russian president. "I merely want the federal authorities to fulfill their basic commitments to the republic."

Fedorov nonetheless succeeded in indicating the distance between Cheboksary and Moscow. Not by political statements but by a program of people's reform, the gist of which is expressed in the Chuvash proverb: "Chuvashia eats only its own bread." At the moment not only its own. But the subsidy ration of 12 percent last year has been cut by one-third. It was not Moscow that cut it. The republic ceased to need it and stopped requesting it.

Team Game

Its own bread—Chuvashia is inventively and vigorously setting about the worthy task of dispensing with bread from elsewhere in two years' time.

By presidential edict Fedorov made all new firms producing consumer goods or engaged in processing agricultural products exempt from republic and local taxes.

More than 400 new enterprises and entrepreneurial structures have been registered in the republic. A number of well-known Russian banks, such as, for example, "Menatep," "Oneksimbank," "AvtoVAZbank, "Transnational Bank," and "Rossiya-Mals" have opened branches in Chuvashia.

Some 14.5 billion rubles [R] have been allocated in the form of preferential credits for the implementation of the most effective (of the 300 considered) business projects; 66 enterprises, variously owned, have received them.

Some R18 billion were obtained during the year through tax and budget regulation—this money has gone into the social sphere.

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Foreign experts and analysts are tending more and more to rank Chuvashia as one of the most dynamically developing Russian regions. A special FRG federal, service for foreign trade information report says, in particular, that "the republic, which by previous assessments of the investment climate and risk was only in the middle of the list, is now moving ahead all the time among the 89 regions in terms of these assessments."

Fedorov has formed a Cabinet of Ministers made up of young (Economy Minister Igor Mironov, for example, is 29), capable, and, it is said, competent people. He appointed his friend and namesake, State Duma Deputy Boris Fedorov, economic adviser and former Russian industry minister Viktor Kisin vice premier and Chuvash Republic representative in Russia.

Anyway, having provided this kind of "material" on himself, the president of Chuvashia, unless he is an idealist and romantic, should have turned himself in to the Kremlin without waiting for a summons: I did it, take me.... Instead of this, addressing a recent republic State Council session, Fedorov said with audacious candor: "Once again I want to appeal to those who fear that the current Chuvashia leadership's position is too vigorous or independent...: If you think that given the situation and the problems good results can be achieved for the republic by conducting the old—unprincipled, immoral—policy, by being servile to Moscow, you are badly mistaken.... They only reckon with people who have a position, who have strength, and we must be capable of resisting any unprincipled policy on the part of the center, in particular an immoral one."

It was clear at last: "A separatist!"

Capture and Neutralize

The first event revealing Fedorov's yen for separatism was the 5 January Cheboksary meeting of the leaders of seven republics—Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Mordovia, Mari El, Karelia, and Chuvashia. The joint communique by the meeting participants incurred Moscow's wrath. First, they categorically condemned the war in Chechnya and demanded its immediate cessation. Second, they decided that the Council of Republic Heads should resume its activities. Third, they proposed establishing a Congress of Peoples of Russia to carry out a "democratic search for and to formulate and implement decisions on very complex ethnic issues."

Why did you give this collection of people hospitality in Cheboksary? Why did you participate yourself? What plans do you have? The enquiry came later, because at the time Fedorov did not give the Kremlin time to catch its breath—the day after he said good-bye to his guests Fedorov sent a letter to Boris Yeltsin:

"Today I received a report on the death in Groznyy of private Radiy Biktimirov of the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops, born in 1975, a conscript from Chuvashia. It is my people's fourth 'war' funeral in a month....

"I urge you, Boris Nikolayevich, not only to remember the resolve and firmness that are needed in politics, but also to display restraint, wisdom, and farsightedness in the present situation.... At any rate, today the arsenal of politics, law, diplomacy, and morality is far more productive and promising for the Russian state than the instruments of war—killing and destruction."

Five days later Fedorov issued an edict "On the Protection of Servicemen." Without trying to justify desertion in any way, the document merely notes that "existing legislation lacks proper legal foundations" for the use of the Army and Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops to resolve interethnic and regional conflicts. Therefore the Russian officers and men fighting in Chechnya "cannot bear the corresponding legal duties and responsibility." There followed recommendations to the Chuvashia government to "give the necessary assistance to servicemen and families who have suffered as a result of armed conflicts."

And that is it. Boris Yeltsin's strong reaction—he issued an edict revoking the Chuvashia president's edict—gave undue notoriety to this document, which was very restrained in its tone. According to Fedorov, and not him alone, the head of state had thereby violated Article 85 of the Russian Constitution, which provides for conciliation procedures to resolve differences between Russian Federation organs if the state authorities and similar organs in the Federation's components differ. If an agreed decision is not reached, only the Russian Constitutional Court can pass the final verdict. "So my edict remains in force," Fedorov said.

Equally spectacular—the whole republic observed it—was the exchange of edict fire on the Chuvashia internal affairs minister. Having removed one, Fedorov appointed another. The Russian president was not slow to respond—he issued an edict suspending these cadre decisions. On the grounds that the new republic internal affairs minister's candidacy had not been agreed with the relevant federal minister, as required by Article 7 of the law "On the Police." But Viktor Yerin had been given official prior notice of the proposed appointment. He had remained silent for two months. Interpreting his silence as consent, Fedorov appointed the person he wanted and then—contrary to Yeltsin's express wishes—he issued yet another edict confirming the cadre change.

During these two months the president of Chuvashia rapidly rose to number 49 in the top 100 Russian politicians, having recently shared places 95-98. Although now under escort....

Talking in a Whisper

It appears that Fedorov has summoned his attached officers twice already: "Listen, I can see it is a burden for you, and I don't like it much either.... Now why don't I write or tell someone, Korzhakov, Barsukov, or whoever that I dop not need this kind of security, these assistants." They looked aghast and whispered: "No way; it

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would only be worse. They would report that you were planning something." Fedorov tried to talk on the same subject with his government head and ministers.... The general opinion was that he should be patient and keep his head down. A letter on top of this naive request could result in budget sanctions. This was whispered too. In the top people's office here they only talk aloud when they have the radio on full blast.

Only the Politically Unreliable Are Guarded

GUO [Main Protection Directorate] chief Mikhail Barsukov's intention to guard governors and the presidents of Russian republics was first commented on by Krasnoyarsk Kray administration chief Valeriy Zubov in IZVESTIYA in January: "I think this is entirely superfluous. There is no real fight against crime in the country, so these measures look like routine camouflage, a red herring."

Nikolay Fedorov is of the same opinion.

But if this privilege—to work and live surrounded by guards—extends to all the regional leaders without exception, isn't the president of Chuvashia suffering from a persecution complex? Well, no, by no means all Russian provincial leaders are affected by state concern for the security of top officials. "It is just physically impossible," Sergey Devyatov, head of the GUO press service, said in an IZVESTIYA interview. "There is no intention to open GUO branches in every republic and oblast. It is done selectively, at the request of the president himself or the governor. And only where the political and crime situation is particularly bad and there are fears for the safety of the local leadership."

Nikolay Fedorov did not ask the GUO to provide protection. The temperature of political life and the level of crime in Chuvashia at the moment, thank God, are well below the Russian national record levels.

What is it all about, then?

The GUO provides an official explanation: "The current measures are being iinplemented on the basis of rticle 12 of the law 'On Security,' which provides for the establishment and development of forces and means for safeguarding the security of organs of legislative, executive, and judicial authority and their top officials. The GUO is not behind the organization of structures to protect top regional officials and is certainly not pursuing any goal associated with surveillance of local leaders."

Keeping a watch on all the top oblast and republic people one after another is not only "physically impossible," as the GUO believes, (probably having prudently assessed its current resources), but unnecessary. Political investigation—there is good reason to describe this practice as such—is used solely against those provincial leaders whose reliability, as the federal leadership see it, has either been hopelessly undermined or is questionable.

News from Yekaterinburg: An item allocating 1.5 billion rubles to finance a "protection service" suddenly turned up in the oblast draft budget, which was being discussed by the oblast Duma. What kind of service? Who would it belong to? What would its functions and powers be? The deputies did not get a clear answer to any of these questions either from the oblast Internal Affairs Administration or from the oblast financial administration. The administrative organs department officially stated that it had nothing to do with the appearance of this article. According to local observers, the disgraced ex-governor Eduard Russel, now chairman of the oblast duma, with a chance to retrieve his old job by winning the election in the summer, will probably be the main person to be protected.

In the same way as Fedorov. The 36-year-old former Russian justice minister, an independent politician, supported by the democratic opposition, with clout and influence in the Volga regions, capable of aspiring to state roles not only within the confines of Chuvashia....

...People like that without protection?!

Miners Strike May Trigger Energy Crisis in Primorye

LD0604075195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0708 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Krivolapov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok April 6 TASS—Fuel reserves are close to being exhausted at most power plants of the Primorye region. The miners' strike brought coal production to a standstill and reduced to a minimum the already low energy generation. Labour collectives of Yakutugol and the Khonorskiy colliery demanded that the power plants pay their debts immediately, otherwise they would stop the shipment of coal. Power sector workers of the Khabarovsk region are threatening to go on strike because of the growing non-payments.

According to the information from the Primorskugol joint-stock company, all coal mines in the area are at a standstill, only open-cast collieries continue to function, but not at full capacity. Miners from the Luchegorsky colliery are going to declare a strike on april 12, if the wages debt is not paid. Partizansk miners still refuse to go up to the surface from their coal-face. In the opinion of Primorskugol senior executives, "it is difficult to say how the situation will develop, because it got out of control."

Specialists from the Dalenergo joint-stock company told ITAR-TASS that they were using state fuel reserves and their own small reserves of fuel oil for keeping the Primorye power sector afloat.

Coal Miners Begin General Stike

LD0604060595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0551 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Vinogradov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Partizansk, Primorye Region April 6 (TASS)—A general strike of coal miners has begun in the Primorye region (Maritime territory). The protest action of workers of all the five coal mines of Partizansk, who are demanding the immediate payment of the government's debt—four-month wages, was joined today by workers of the ore-dressing factory, a motor-transport depot and the railway. Deputies to the regional Duma are going to suggest to labour collectives of the transsiberian railway and sea ports that they also join the strike.

The situation is tense at the Avangard mine, where a group of miners have been on hunger strike since March 29. Initially 27 miners refused to go up to the surface from the underground locomotive depot. Now there are nine people left there at a depth of 200 metres. The rest were forcibly taken up to the surface in a grave condition and urgently put to hospital.

Anatoly Masibuta, head of the Partizanskoe mine management office, told ITAR-TASS that he did not rule out a possibility of the strike developing into a spontaneous rebellion, accompanied by arson.

Today in the morning people started getting together and holding spontaneous meetings, at which they are demanding the immediate solution of the wages problem. The local administration of the Primorye region also urged the Russian government to do it.

In order to avoid riots and unrest on the part of the people in despair, the miners themselves are creating voluntary police-like teams to ensure order. Together with the police, they will guard coal mines.

Chairman of the territorial miners' committee of Primorye region Pyotr Kiryasov arrived in Moscow today. He is going to insist on a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays for resolving the key problems facing the coal industry.

Igor Lebedinets, speaker of the Primorye Duma, reiterated the intention of members of the local Duma to suggest to labour collectives of the transsiberian railway and sea ports that they join the strike.

Novosibirsk's Environmental State Examined

95WN0128A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 24 Mar 95 p 18

[Interview with Aleksandr Mukhin, state inspector of the city Committee for Ecology and Natural Resources, by Sergey Bobrov; place and date not given: "Radiation in the City. A Matter for Days Long Past? Before Chernobyl We Lived Peacefully, But Now..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Chernobyl forced us to open our sleepy eyes. Since that terrible tragedy, we have finally found the time to put in some effort to learn whether the ground we walk on, the river we swim in, and the sandbox our children play in are really that dangerous from the standpoint of radiation.**

So, here is a conversation on the radioecological situation in Novosibirsk. Our questions are answered by a chief specialist—Aleksandr Mukhin, state inspector of the city Committee for Ecology and Natural Resources.

[Bobrov] Aleksandr Ivanovich, is it really true that a study of the radiation pollution situation was started here only a few years ago? Before Chernobyl we lived, and we were not distressed?

[Mukhin] Yes, this work was only started in 1988. Up to that time the Department of Radiation Hygiene of the oblast SES [Sanitary-Epidemiological Service] conducted episodic work, and the center for monitoring environmental pollution performed observations only—principally in direct proximity to the NZKhK (Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant). But observing and studying, you will agree, are two different things.

Berezovgeologia conducted the first aerial photography of part of the city's territory in 1988. This revealed the sections of radioactive pollution that were the largest in area and most intense in the rate of exposure doses of gamma radiation: The NZKhK tailings dump and a number of territories near the plant and the Inya Vostochnaya settlement. The lost source in the Zaton area, which radiated up to five roentgens per hour, was found. Aerial photography and a ground search that encompassed practically the whole territory of the city were continued in subsequent years. As a result, the number of disclosed bad sections of the city reached 196. To date, almost all of them have been decontaminated. Intensive sources with a rate higher than 10 milliroentgens (milli—a thousandth of a roentgen, micro—a millionth) have been taken to the Radon special concern, and the rest have been stored at the NZKhK tailing dump. Of the large sections, two remain. One is at the mouth of Yeltsovka-2, right in a valley. The rate of radiation there is small—40-60, and in places up to 80 microroentgens per hour. Obviously the chemical concentrates plant dumped radioactive water here at one time. A decision has now been made to bury the section on the spot; that is, a sand pad with a thickness of 3-3.5 meters will be deposited here.

There is one other large section—the northern part of the territory of TETs-4 [Central Heating and Power Plant]. The work is more complicated here. At one time this was the site for unloading uranium material—spur tracks of the NZKhK passed here. Now there is talk about the TETs fencing off this territory and the NZKhK carrying out decontamination with its own forces. A plan is being prepared.

[Bobrov] But is it impossible to bury, as in the case with Yeltsovka?

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[Mukhin] There was such a proposal, but inasmuch as the rate of the exposure dose here reaches 2,500 microroentgens per hour, in this case we would be laying down a delayed-action mine for our descendants. The fact is that the half-life of radium-266 (which is the main polluter in this section) is 1,600 years.

Detailed photography was conducted last year on the so-called Kulatskiy settlement and in the area of Uchitelskaya Street. In addition, another 22 sections were revealed. Four of them have already been decontaminated, and a plan is now being prepared for the rest. I think that all the work in this area will be completed in the summer.

[Bobrov] How did pollution of the city territory come about? Apparently no atom bombs were exploded here...

[Mukhin] Because of secrecy measures, the NZKhK previously did not explain to anyone what it was working on and how. Part of the territory of the plant over time went to the Promstalkonstruktsiya, and the soil was used here and there for garage foundations and for landscaping. But people were not told anything; that is, there was a complete lack of control. However, the NZKhK cannot be blamed for everything. On the left bank, for example, the main polluter is the tin industrial complex. There was a time when a concentrate with an increased content of natural nuclides—uranium and thorium—was shipped there. But the dosage of the sections here is significantly lower. Or take this example. Everyone remembers that several years ago sections of radioactive pollution were found on the territory of the building institute. There was actual burial of radioactive production wastes. An optical-mechanical plant was located here earlier, where compounds based on radium salt were used for making luminescent figures on dials and other purposes.

[Bobrov] Are there cases of finding radioactive sections in dwelling places?

[Mukhin] Actually, this does happen. For example, four houses were found among the 22 sections revealed last year: at 4 and 10 Tambovskaya Street, 3 Tselinaya Street, and 17 Dekorativnaya Street. The radiation background there is increased, although according to the norms of the Gossanepidemnadzor [State Committee for Sanitary-Epidemiological Oversight] it is close to the PDK [maximum permissible concentration]. But there is a potential danger for the inhabitants. Now the NZKhK (the radioactive material in a solution came from there) must develop a program to decontaminate these homes.

[Bobrov] Do the owners know?

[Mukhin] Yes, they do. There was no panic, although an erroneous report appeared in the mass media of an alleged 400-fold increase above the norm. As a matter of fact, the dosage at 4 Tambovskaya Street reaches 400 microroentgens per hour; that is, an excess by a factor of 2.7.

[Bobrov] But what generally is the average radiation background in dwelling houses. It surely is not uniform?

[Mukhin] In brick homes the background is increased a maximum of up to 20-22 microroentgens per hour—if it is made of red brick. If the brick is made of silica—14-16. The background is less in panel homes—11-12 microroentgens.

[Bobrov] Radon gas makes a special contribution to the radiation problem. How dangerous is it?

[Mukhin] Radon is an inert gas, and it is not dangerous in itself, but the products of its decay are. The chain is: Radon-222 results from the natural decay of radium-226, and it in turn breaks down into decay products that penetrate the body in very small particles and in the form of aerosols. In principle, radon is everywhere, after all, natural radionuclides are present in the soil, in rocks—in everything. What its concentration is—this is another matter.

[Bobrov] Radon is a gas. Consequently, the higher the floor, the lower its concentration?

[Mukhin] Absolutely correct. Incidentally, a federal radon program has now been adopted. Our oblast program is also being prepared. One of its components is the conduct of detailed radon studies in the city. We still do not have control of the situation in full measure.

[Bobrov] It is said that Novosibirsk is situated on a granite foundation. This rock has increased radioactivity. Does this mean that the natural radiation background in the city is increased?

[Mukhin] Yes, Novosibirsk is the only one of the large cities of which a large part (70 percent) is built on a granite layer. The border of the foundation follows approximately along the Inya River; that is, Krasnoobsk, Levyye Chemy, Akademgorodok, and practically the entire Pervomayskiy Rayon are situated outside the granite area. Actually, the radioactivity in granite is increased. An excellent example: Take the Mochishche quarry—there the radiation background is up to 60 microroentgens per hour, 30-40 on the average. But the general radiation background in the city is normal—up to 16 microroentgens per hour.

[Bobrov] Among Russian cities, where is Novosibirsk with respect to pollution?

[Mukhin] I would put Omsk in first place, although Novosibirsk is still the only large city in the country on whose territory an enterprise of the Ministry of Atomic Energy—the NZKhK—is situated. But this plant has a standard of production and a strong radiation safety service. Pollution from the NZKhK in the city is not occurring now. All that happened in the 1950's and 1960's.

Pollution is lower in Krasnoyarsk, and it is even safer in Tomsk. Their closed city satellites are beyond the borders of the city territories.

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[Bobrov] There are a lot of rumors about Akademgorodok...

[Mukhin] They are erroneous. Yes, some institutes there are associated with radioactive materials, but the level of control is high. Kalininskiy Rayon is far more polluted.

[Bobrov] A few words about the everyday dosimeters that are produced by our enterprises. Can they be trusted?

[Mukhin] They can be used only as alert devices, more or less. Professional instruments are needed to go further.

[Bobrov] What should a person do if he has suspicions of a radioactive source, for example, in an apartment?

[Mukhin] Turn to the city or oblast sanitary-epidemiological oversight center.

[Bobrov] Is the city radioecological picture really that cheerful? You say: Yes, it happened, but there is nothing terrible now...

[Mukhin] Of course, there was a danger, and it remains. At 5 Makarenko Street, for example, there was pollution literally on the children's playground... But in general a lot of factors in aggregate affect the individual: both the air and pesticides. At least the direct harm from radiation is much less than that from the wastes of the power industry and motor vehicle transportation...

Maritime Kray Miners To Strike; Charges Traded

MM0604083595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Natalya Ostrovskaya: "Maritime Governor Passes Starving Miners' Problems to Moscow and Departs for London"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladivostok—A hunger strike by miners has been going on in the Maritime Kray village of Avangard since 28 March. The situation as of 5 April is that 15 strikers remain underground at a depth of 230 meters. The other 12 have been raised to the surface in a grave condition and taken to a preventive treatment clinic in neighboring Uglekamensk and hospitals in Avangard and Partizansk.

The people who have now been underground for 10 days are under around-the-clock observation by physicians. However, the medics have already started writing notes releasing themselves from responsibility for the lives and health of the miners on hunger strike. The latter, for their part, are not deviating from their main demand—that all the kray's miners be paid their wages, which they have not seen since December of last year. And indeed the participants in the hunger strike themselves have decided that they will be the last to receive the money.

The first kray-wide miners' strike will begin today, 6 April. However, certain mines, for example "Tsentralnaya" in Partizansk, have been at a standstill since 17 March. Specialists are worried about sudden cave-ins.

As has become the custom in Maritime Kray, local politicians have tried to wring as much as they can out of the critical situation. Thus, the previously inconspicuous Maritime Kray Duma has raised its voice. Its chairman Igor Lebedinets stated on behalf of the entire local population that as a sign of protest over the center's policy, which is disastrous for the region, he will close the Transsiberian railroad and block all Maritime Kray ports.

But Moscow, in the person of Petr Karpov, deputy chief of the Federal Administration for Insolvency (Bankruptcy) Matters, who recently visited the kray with a serious commission, is not accepting the complaints, believing that the center is only guilty of not being able to satisfy all appetites. According to him, the main demand should be put to the main consumer of the local coal—the "Dalenergo" joint-stock company, to which, incidentally, according to Ministry of Finance information, 290.44 billion rubles was transferred last year. Therefore it was a disgrace for them not to have settled accounts with the destitute miners. It was also mentioned that the price of coal is not as low anywhere in the world as it is in Russia in general and in Maritime Kray in particular. Is this not why the mine administration in the village of Lipovtsy concluded contracts to supply its coal to Japan at a humiliating price (even in comparison with internal deliveries)—$28 per tonne? Just in order to have the hope that the punctual Japanese, unlike "Dalenergo," will settle up on time.

Incidentally, 6 April, the day of the start of the kray-wide miners' strike, Maritime Kray Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko is flying off to London, where he will participate in a session of the annual sitting of the Board of Governors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 7 through 12 April. The governor intends to read a report describing opportunities for investing in the Maritime Kray economy.

Commentary by our correspondent I. Karpenko:

The arrears in payments by coal consumers have now reached R2.5 trillion. The electricity industry, the Maritime Kray miners' main debtor, now accounts for the lion's share of these arrears—42 percent. Indeed, the debts owed by the power industry are not only not being decreased, they are constantly growing. The problem of nonpayments is extremely acute not only for the miners, but also throughout the entire Russian economy. How does the government intend to resolve it? At a recent government conference with the miners, First Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays gave the following answer to this question, put by an IZVESTIYA correspondent:

"The situation as regards nonpayments is extremely complex. The problem can be divided into two halves. One, of course, can be blamed on the economic mechanism as a whole. We need major decisions here, which are being intensively worked on at present. The second half of the problem is basic slobbery, or else straightforward theft, which is covered up by the universal problem

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of nonpayments. This is happening in Maritime Kray too, and our approach will be very severe here...."

It is true that many leaders connected with the coal region have already been dismissed from their posts in Maritime Kray, and "competent organs" have started dealing with the machinations over the nonpayments. A routine sitting of the government commission on nonpayments was held 5 April.

Over 1 Million People To Be Resettled From Far North

LD0604105495 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Apr 95

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A meeting of the government today discussed the program for constructing housing for citizens leaving regions of the far north. The program envisages the construction of 27 million square meters of housing by the year 2005 to resettle over 1 million people. It is planned to implement the program in two stages. In the first stage, up to the year 2000, housing will be provided for pensioners, invalids, and those working in budget- financed organizations who have lived in the north for at least 10 years. The second stage envisages providing housing for all categories of citizens who have worked at least 10 years in the far north. [passage omitted]

In 1995 it is planned to resettle 7,000 families from the north, while there are 157,000 families wishing to leave the northern regions. It is not difficult to work out that at this rate it will take 22 years to resettle everyone wanting to leave.

Khabarovsk Radio, TV Center To Stop Broadcasting

LD0504194895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow NTV in Russian at 1500 GMT on 5 April in a 2-minute item from the "Segodnya" news program reports that beginning 12 April, TV broadcasts will be stopped throughout Khabarovsk Territory. "Segodnya," citing POSTFACTUM, reports that on 5 April the work collective at the Khabarovsk Territorial Radio and TV Broadcasting Center decided to stop broadcasting since they have not received their wages for three months. The appropriate notification has been sent to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

Yeltsin Tour Concerned With Crimea, Chechnya

MM0504145995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Vasiliy Kononenko: "B. Yeltsin Is Not Only Relaxing Intensively, But Is Also Preparing Himself for Political Action"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President B. Yeltsin's departure for Kabardino-Balkaria, where he intends to familiarize himself with the socioeconomic situation in this North Caucasus republic and people's reactions to the situation in Chechnya, will most likely take place at the beginning of next week. S. Medvedev, the president's press secretary, who has returned from Kislovodsk, reported this to your IZVESTIYA correspondent.

From what he said, and also according to information from other sources, the head of state is worried about events occurring not just in Russia but also abroad, where the interests of the Russian-speaking population are being violated. In particular, he is intently following the development of the situation in Crimea and is studying the disposition of political forces on the peninsula, and legal and other interpretations of decisions adopted by the Ukrainian authorities in respect of Crimean autonomy have been presented to him. It is expected that B. Yeltsin intends to express his attitude to Crimean matters in the next few days. In this connection, sources in the Kremlin believe that the chances of a visit to Kiev by the president in mid-April are extremely small.

Furthermore, the president was informed about claims being cited in the Russian mass media to the effect that the Kremlin is elaborating plans for the cancellation or postponement of the parliamentary and presidential elections. According to S. Medvedev, B. Yeltsin called these statements "complete nonsense." The president does not even intend to provide any explanations on this subject. Although the presidential entourage has a sufficiently clear understanding of the intentions of the authors of such statements: The election campaign has begun, and a potentially strong candidate needs to be presented in the most unattractive light.

During his stay in Sochi, B. Yeltsin also intends to hold a meeting with Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin and the power ministers, where questions of economic stabilization in the country and measures to put the speediest end to the military operations in Chechnya will be discussed. It can be assumed that this conference was needed to create a favorable political background in connection with the approaching 50th anniversary of the Victory over fascism with the participation in it of leaders of foreign countries.

Reportage, Commentary on Situation in Chechnya

Russian Tanks Pullout From Gudermes, Shali

LD0504231395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1900 GMT broadcasts two-minute video report by correspondent I. Krondo on the beginning of the pullout of tank units from the area of Gudermes and Shali in Chechnya to their permanent bases. The video marked VoenTV [Military TV] shows men on tanks, soldiers walking in the country, smoking

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during repose, an officer in uniform captioned as A. Skorodumov, comm[illegible] of the Northern Grouping of the Russian troops, who [illegible] pessimistic about the future developments.

Shelling of Shali 'Diehards' Resumes

AU0504072795 Paris AFP in English 0608 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] KHAJI-YURT, April 5 (AFP)—Russian forces resumed their overflights and shelling of separatist positions in southern Chechnya early Wednesday [5 April] after a three-day interruption caused by fog.

The mist which had blanketed the region since Sunday, lifted Wednesday and at 0830 (0430 GMT) the Russian guns opened up on Shali, a town 30 kilometres (20 miles) south of Groznyy the capital.

Chechen separatists moved their temporary headquarters out of Shali some days ago when it became clear the town would soon be overrun in the Russians' southward advance. However groups of diehards are still holding out amid the ruins. [passage omitted]

General: Army Halts 'Active Combat'

LD0504123595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1009 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 5 (INTERFAX)—The federal army in Chechnya has actually stopped active combat operations in Chechnya having seized the cities of Gudermes and Shali, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, Chief of the General Staff of Russia's Armed Forces, declared in an exclusive interview with Interfax Wednesday [5 April] in Moscow.

Kolesnikov also said that there are no large hearths of armed resistance to the federal forces in Chechnya now.

"I would not say that Dzhokhar Dudayev's formations stopped resisting but this resistance is of a chaotic and unorganized nature," he underlined. In his estimate, illegal armed formations in Chechnya are experiencing a sharp deficit in ammunitions.

Now the Interior Ministry units accomplish "the major functions aimed at restoring constitutional order" in this North Caucasian republic, Kolesnikov continued.

Blockade of possible routes of movement and withdrawal of Dudayev's formations is the major task of the federal forces now.

Kolesnikov added that a combined regiment of the Pacific Fleet mariners continues fulfilling its tasks in Chechnya.

Stepashin To Inspect FSK Work

LD0504211495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1302 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mozdok, 5 Apr—Sergey Stepashin, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FSK], arrived in Mozdok today.

The FSK head is making this trip with the purpose of inspecting the activities of his service in Chechnya and the progress of staff recruitment for subunits of the FSK directorate in Chechnya.

Denial of Dudayev Forces Dagestan Move

LD0504220695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1541 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gadzhiy Shamov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Makhachkala, 5 Apr—As the military action in the Chechen Republic approaches the northern border of Dagestan, the number of refugees from the fighting area grows. Since the beginning of April 3,000 to 5,000 people have been coming daily to Khasavyurt, Kizlyar, and other rayons adjacent to Chechnya.

Rumors are abroad among the local population that Dudayev's armed militants are trying to relocate gradually to Dagestan, taking positions in mountain regions. In this connection the republic's Ministry of the Interior made a statement today, stressing that these rumors are unfounded. "Not a single Chechen militant has been arrested either on the border or on the territory of the republic," the ministry declares

Federal Aviation Resumes Shelling

LD0504192895 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian aviation resumed today shelling of mountain villages in southwest Chechnya, France Press reports. This happened after a three-day relative lull. There is a possibility that a new cease-fire in the conflict area would be negotiated tomorrow. This was said by Ramzan Muzayev, press secretary to the Chechen mission in Moscow.

[Begin Musayev recording] A meeting, arranged at the initiative of Kovalev for 6 April, with Aslan Maskhadov and field commanders has, in our view, several aims in mind: to establish the directions the field commanders should follow, to see how they feel, to check whether they have centralized leadership and well organized. Russian military could not pursue any other goals since they haven't been given any powers to conduct talks by Russia's political leadership. Of course, [word indistinct] we have partially exchanged POWs, corpses, lists, and wounded. We are solving local tasks in the places where the military units come into contact.

At the same time our radio has been told by informed sources in Nazran that the towns of Gudermes and Shali in Chechnya are not controlled by federal troops in contrast to what the Russian commanders say. They are controlled by home guards. According to the source, the

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Russian Army is located a few km from Gudermes and Shali, from where it shells them periodically. [end recording]

Large-Scale Operations Complete

LD0504224995 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Having taken the towns of Argun, Gudermes, and Shali, Russian federal troops have completed large-scale military operations. Units of the Russian army have now occupied practically all strategic sites which allow them to monitor the major part of Chechnya's territory. Some units have already started to withdraw to places of their permanent deployment [k mestam svoyey postoyannoy dislokatsii]. It is true though that only tanks are going back now.

[Begin A.Skorodumov, commander of the "Northern" group of Russian troops, recording] I cannot give any forecasts, [word indistinct] moment will come because it is impossible to destroy every militant. Our troops, which will be stationed here, will find it very difficult, very difficult. Success will come only if the group which is stationed here has a good commander, only if commanders do not allow our soldiers and officers to relax... [report ends mid-sentence; end recording]

Chechen Command: No Moscow Talks

LD0604050495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0200 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night the staff of the Chechen command were to make a decision on the possibility of talks with the federal forces. This was reported to Moscow Echo radio station by Movladi Udugov, Dzhokhar Dudayev's media representative. He noted that for the moment the supporters of Chechen independence see no possibilities for dialogue.

Kolesnikov: No Guerrilla War

MM0604103595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "There Will Be No Guerrilla War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "In our opinion there will be no wide-scale guerrilla war in Chechnya," stated Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of general staff of the Russian Federation armed forces.

The general makes this conclusion on the basis of information on the mood of the Chechen people.

Chechen Leader on Guerrilla Warfare Plans

AU0604123395 Paris AFP in English 1222 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Report by Isabelle Astigarraga]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Vedeno, Russia, April 6 (AFP)—Chechen separatist fighters have launched a mountain-based partisan war against Russian forces after losing the battle for the breakaway republic's major towns, the Chechen military leader said Thursday [6 April].

Small Chechen units clashed Thursday with Russian soldiers at Achkoy-Martan, 40 kilometres (24 miles) southwest of the capital Grozny, as well as at nearby Samashky and Bamut, all in the west of the republic, Chechen commander in chief Aslan Moskhadov told AFP.

He also reported skirmishes in the east of the republic around Shali, 30 kilometres (18 miles) southeast of Grozny, and Gudermes, 40 kilometres to the east, the two main towns taken by the Russians last week.

AFP correspondents saw Wednesday Russian shelling around a number of villages in the southeast, principally Oiskhara, southeast of Gudermes, while other villages were attacked by Russian aviation.

Fighting was also going on Wednesday around a former tank base just west of Shali, and early Thursday fighters returning from the town said Russian tanks and artillery were continuing to shell Chechen positions.

"The Russians want the world to believe the war is over, that now that they have taken the towns there are only a few bandits left in the mountains who do not count for much," said Moskhadov.

"The truth is the war has changed: It is now a partisan war which we will lead from the mountains. If the Russians think they can have dealt with us by May 9, so that they can celebrate the 50th anniversary (of the end of WWII) in Moscow with (U.S. President Bill) Clinton and the others in peace, they are deluding themselves."

"They will not dare come into the mountains, and we will not be staying here quietly. We will go down and fight them as long as we have men left," he added.

"We are still fighting even in Groznyy," he went on. "My men are continuing to kill a few Russian soldiers every day."

Indeed some fighters in Vedeno, the village in the Caucasus foothills where separatist forces set up their base after the fall of Shali, said early Thursday they had returned from Groznyy.

"Of course there isn't fierce fighting going on there. We do not have any artillery, planes or helicopters. But we can fight and they cannot say they really control the town," said Shirvany, 34. [passage omitted]

Economic Issues

Davydov Previews Talks With Paris Club

LD0504163395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1308 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—Russia is to repay $1.2 billion to the Paris Club this year

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out of its total debt of about $36 billion, Russia's Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davydov told Interfax in an exclusive interview.

He said that the first round of the official talks on the issue with the Paris Club would be held in Paris on April 19 to 21. During the talks Russia would work to secure an agreement "on a long-term restructuring of the debt for a period of at least 25 years," said Davydov.

In his opinion, such an agreement might be signed in the first half of 1995.

Subsequently, talks will begin on the restructuring of the Russian debt to the London Club (which, in various estimates, ranges from $25 billion to $28 billion out of Russia's total foreign debt of $120 billion).

He said that earlier an agreement had been reached on the repayment of the interest on the debt to the London Club for 1992-93, and 1994, totaling $500 million. For this purpose, the Bank of England has opened a trust account to which $100 million has already been transferred. The rest of the sum ($400 million) will have been repaid by the middle of the year. Davydov said that in 1995 Russia will repay about $1 billion to the London Club.

He also said that the main source of the said payments was the IMF stand-by credit, whose first tranche of $1 billion was to arrive in April.

In 1995, agreements on the settlement of the former Soviet Union's debts are to be concluded with the remaining creditors, including individual countries and private creditors, he said.

He announced that in March, during a session of the commission for debts, which he is heading, the procedure for repaying unguaranteed commercial debts to individual foreign creditors, estimated at $7 billion, was discussed. Registered bills worth this sum will be issued to "settle this problem completely," said Davydov.

Chernomyrdin on Plans For Agricultural Reform

LD0504210595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—The Russian Government "intends to develop its agricultural reform and primarily to continue the reforms of land relations and development of the land market as the foundation of the agricultural reform as a whole," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told the All Russian Meeting of Farmers in Moscow today.

He said that, according to the medium-term program for activities in 1995-1997, among the most urgent tasks of the cabinet were granting certificates for ownership of land to all landowners. Chernomyrdin said more land auctions would be held. He added that the Russian parliament would discuss a draft law permitting sale of land "now occupied by enterprises."

Chernomyrdin said that various measures would be taken for keeping insolvent agricultural enterprises afloat. He said the network of wholesale and sale on exchanges would be developed in the agro-industrial complex. He said other measures would also be implemented in order to develop the reforms.

Chernomyrdin warned the meeting's delegates that "the budget policy will be tough." He repeated that despite budget problems the cabinet had managed to assign for the needs of the agro-industrial complex 35 trillion rubles "from all financing sources."

"Russia must stay within a tough budget for 1995 and win against inflation," Chernomyrdin said. He said that inflation must be defeated in order to lower prices and attract investments into industry as well as to raise its efficiency.

Chernomyrdin said that neither the economy as a whole, nor a single sector of the economy, including the agro-industrial complex, could survive with an inflation rate like the present one.

He said he believed that things would go better if the country managed to get through this year.

When asked whether the Russian prime minister was among the Russia's richest people, Chernomyrdin said he "does not have the right to possess and does not have a single share of Gazprom." He said that his revenues were not so high and that he was prepared to make them known.

Chernomyrdin Cuts Oil Export Tax, Raises Excise Duties

LD0304120995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0952 GMT 3 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 3 (PIA-Interfax)—The Russian Government has cut the oil export tax from 23 to 20 ECU and raised the excise duty for oil extracted in Russia from 22,000 to 39,200 rubles. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed the appropriate order on March 29.

A high-ranking official at the Fuel and Energy Ministry told the Petroleum Information Agency that the new rates came into force on April 1.

He added that the order provides for further raising the excise as export taxes decrease. For each reduced ECU in taxes, companies will have to pay 3,400 rubles more in excise duties. If government pledges to reduce the export tax to 8-10 ECU in the second half of the year and cancel it on January 1, 1996 are carried out, one can expect the excise to grow to 70,000-75,000 rubles per tonne in the second half of 1995 and to 100,000 by the beginning of 1996.

Experts believe the government decision, stemming from the IMF requirement to increase revenues, only adds to the tax burden on the oil industry. If excise

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duties are raised, only 8-10 percent of them will be collected at the end of the year, experts believe. In 1994, when the average excise rate was 14,750 rubles in May and 21,000 in December, only 20 percent of federal taxes was collected.

The excise duties for use of Russian natural resources were introduced by presidential decree on August 14, 1992. In May 1994 a government order differentiated the rates depending on geological and geographic conditions and listed the companies exempt from taxation. The average rate was set at 14,750 rubles. Later the rate was pegged to the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar and reached 22,000 rubles in December.

Minister on Late Sowing, Fuel Deliveries

MM0504140595 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "In the Corridors of Power" rubric: "Quotations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksandr Nazarchuk: "In a number of parts of Russia the preparations for spring sowing have been made very belatedly. There is a real threat that considerable areas will not be sown in full owing to the peasants' lack of funds, fuel, and fertilizers."

Mr. Nazarchuk, Russian minister of agriculture and food, declared this yesterday at teleconference session of the Russian Federation Government's Commission on Operational Questions devoted to the conduct of spring field work in the country. According to the minister, in order to rectify the critical situation it is necessary to deliver approximately 250,000 tonnes of gasoline and 580,000 tonnes of diesel fuel to the countryside as quickly as possible. Since the fall of 1994 Russian peasants have applied only approximately 350,000 tonnes of mineral fertilizers to the fields—10 times less than the 1990 level.

From the editors. Two weeks ago a directive by Viktor Chernomyrdin formed the Russian Government's Commission on Carrying Out Spring Sowing. As follows from this document, its functions include precisely the coordination of the activities of federal and territorial organs of executive power in ensuring the sowing campaign. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI entitled its comment on the creation of one more structure overseeing the countryside "The Staff Exists, and There Will Be a Battle." Alas, the allusion proved prophetic.

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International Affairs

OSCE Official Attends Talks on Crimea

LD0504192295 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mykola Shulha, Ukrainian nationalities, migration, and cults minister, and Max van der Stoel, Organization for Cooperation and Security [OSCE] in Europe high commissioner for national minorities, met in Kiev today to discuss the issue of participation and cooperation by ethnic minorities in Ukraine in the process of nation-building. The Crimean Tartar people, in particular, are concerned at the situation on the Crimean peninsula as regards the retention of its autonomy, Max van der Stoel said. Mykola Shulha, in his turn, said Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's stance and official statements, including the report by the president of Ukraine at the Supreme Council on 4 April, were to allay these fears.

The talks between the minister and the OSCE high commissioner also looked at the prospects of Ukraine's accession to the Council of Europe.

Envoy Understands Kuchma's Decisions

LD0604095995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0836 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 6 Apr—"I understand decisions of the Ukrainian Parliament and a presidential edict with regard to the 'Crimean issue.' I visited Crimea many times and saw that there was legal chaos in the autonomy, which was unwilling to implement Ukrainian laws," OSCE ethnic minorities commissioner Max van der Stoel said during his meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma today. The commissioner positively assessed efforts by Ukrainian leaders to resolve "the Crimean issue" by peaceful means. He said that the OSCE would also be doing everything possible for this purpose in order to maintain Ukraine's territorial integrity. He told Kuchma that he intended to hold several meetings with Russian leaders to discuss the possibility of Moscow "behaving in a more restrained manner with regard to 'Crimean issues.'"

First Deputy Defense Minister Meets WEU Delegation

LD0504220995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1436 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Sergey Balykov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 5 April—The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and First Deputy Defense Minister of Ukraine, Lt-Gen Anatoliy Lopata, and members of a delegation of the Assembly of the Western European Union (AWEU) led by the AWEU President Sir Dudley Smith today discussed problems of ensuring regional and European security as well as elimination of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons left in the Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR.

The leadership of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry answered questions from the AWEU delegation members who were interested in issues related to stabilization of the situation in the Crimea, Russo-Ukrainian relations, and Ukrainian foreign policy.

UNDP Approves First Social Assistance Program

LD0504210895 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1835 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 5 Apr—The press center of Ukraine's Foreign Ministry has reported that the Governing Council of the UN Development Program [UNDP] approved the first social program of assistance to Ukraine, which envisages the expansion of technical cooperation between our country and that organization. A number of projects geared to promote the implementation of economic reforms and improve management in the field of environment protection will be carried out in Ukraine with the assistance of the world community. The idea is to render our country assistance in solving social problems, reintegrating Crimean Tatars in Crimea, establishing a system of control over the ecological state of the Dnieper river basin, and carrying out Chernobyl-related projects.

The UNDP social program of assistance to Ukraine was worked out by relevant government structures with the active participation of the UN mission in Kiev. During the consideration of the program by the UNDP Governing Council, Borys Hudmya, deputy head of Ukraine's permanent mission at the United Nations, emphasized that the proposed projects fully correspond to the national strategy of developing international technical cooperation. At the same time, the volume of financial resources provided by the UNDP to carry out these projects is insufficient and it should be significantly increased in future.

Foreign Minister Comments on Japan Visit

WS0504114195 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 28 Mar 95 p 3

[Commentary by Foreign Minister Udovenko on the Ukrainian Government delegation's recent visit to Japan]

[FBIS Translated Text] We devise a concept of primary tasks for every visit of this level. The Ukrainian president was received in Japan with full honors by the highest-ranking officials. The motorcade for our head of our state moved along streets decorated with Ukrainian and Japanese flags.

The principal task of the visit was to give a new impetus to Ukrainian-Japanese relations in the political, and

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primarily, trade and economic spheres, given that our bilateral relations were occasional and evidently insufficient until now. Therefore, the establishment of direct relations is of particular importance. For instance, I met the Japanese foreign minister for the third time, and we did not waste time getting acquainted; we directly moved to doing business.

What was achieved by the visit? First of all, all of Japan turned its attention to Ukraine. Take, for instance, the president's meeting with the Association of Japanese Entrepreneurs. You should have seen the interest with which the latter listened to and received Leonid Kuchma's speech, in which he provided an in-depth and convincing analysis of the great potential of business between Ukraine and Japan. In the speech he cited specific [Ukrainian] industries and enterprises in which Japanese investments could be made: The processing of agrarian products, metallurgy, chemical industry, space research, aircraft building, and shipbuilding. Additionally, it was stressed at every meeting, including top-level ones, that Ukraine is not a beggar nation, that it possesses great potential, and that Ukrainian-Japanese trade and economic relations are profitable for both sides. One of the things that Ukraine and Japan have in common is the fact that both states are neighbors of big powers. We have such a neighbor in the east, the Japanese—in the west. Therefore, both we and Japan have experience in maintaining relations with a great neighbor and in looking for ways to cooperate with them. During the negotiations in Tokyo, I spoke in particular about our intention to create Ukrainian-Russian financial-industrial groups. Why, for instance, does not one of the Japanese firms initiate a joint project with the Mykolayiv aluminum plant or the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant?

I believe that the financial and legal basis of Ukrainian-Japanese relations established during L. Kuchma's visit opens promising prospects for cooperation. I am primarily referring to the Joint Declaration signed by our president and the Japanese prime minister. Together with the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, we signed an Exchange Letter [Obminnyy Lyst]. This document recognizes Ukraine as a rightful successor to the agreements reached between Japan and the former Soviet Union. There is an entire list of such agreements to which the two sides will adhere.

I would also like to mention our delegation's trip to Kyodo. As we know, this is an ancient town which was Japan's capital in the past; it has maintained fraternal ties with the capital of Ukraine for over 20 years. Another important step was made this time in the development of relations between the two states: We have reached an agreement on cooperation between Kyodo prefecture and Zaporizhzhya Oblast.

I would like to mention another remarkable event in the relations between our states. An official ceremony of opening the Embassy of Ukraine to Japan was held during our visit. The Ukrainian flag was hoisted above the embassy building. The embassy started active operation a few months ago following the appointment of M. P. Dashkevych to the post of ambassador to Japan. Intensive work to prepare the Ukrainian president's visit is evidence of its activities.

Returning to the issue of the results of the visit, I would like to emphasize the fact that Japan declared its readiness to provide a variety of financial and engineering assistance programs to Ukraine. Thus, through the World Bank, Japan is going to allocate $150 million as targeted assistance to our state, and another $50 million to purchase sorely needed chemical products for Ukraine's agriculture. Aside from this, the two sides signed an agreement on specific assistance in the fields of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident.

Protocol on Ethnic Minorities Signed in Budapest

AU0604083595 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 4 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Stepan Vash: "Ukraine-Hungary: Protection of Rights of Ethnic Minorities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fifth session of the Ukrainian- Hungarian commission for issues of ensuring rights of ethnic minorities has ended in Budapest. Proceeding from its results, the cochairmen of the commission—Mykola Shulha, Ukraine's minister for issues of nationalities, migration, and cults, and Csaba Tabajdi, Hungarian parliamentary state secretary of the Prime Minister's Office—signed a protocol summing up the results of work of the commission for the past period and offering recommendations on resolution of the main problems of ethnic minorities and cooperation in the sphere of education and culture. The commission drafted proposals for the governments of the two countries on the protection of rights of ethnic minorities, further development of interstate cooperation, and resolution of current problems of harmonizing the life of ethnic minorities in Ukraine and Hungary.

Ukraine's Ambassador to Hungary Dmytro Tkach took part in the commission's work. Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn received Mykola Shulha. Ukraine's minister for issues of nationalities, migration, and cults applauded the signing of the Hungarian-Slovak agreement on principles of good-neighborly relations and cooperation. "This agreement," he stressed, "shows that Hungary extends the practice developed with Ukraine to other countries." The meeting also discussed specific issues of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine and Ukrainian—in Hungary.

Anti Aircraft Forces Delegation Visits Romania

LD0504202295 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1450 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—A Ukrainian military delegation led by Major General Viktor Tkachenko, the

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commander of Ukraine's anti aircraft Defense Corps, began its three-day working visit to Romania today. UNIAN was informed of this at the press service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense.

The visit is taking place in accordance with the plan of cooperation between the Defense Ministries of Ukraine and Romania for 1995.

Members of the Ukrainian delegation and their Romanian counterparts will discuss ways of improving the exchange of information about antiaircraft defense, and will exchange experience of organizing combat training. At working meetings they will also analyze the fulfillment by the sides of the protocol on bilateral cooperation in the field of aviation and anti aircraft defense.

National Affairs

Kuchma Addresses Parliament, Sets Tasks for Reform

MK0504122995 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Skachko under the "Power" rubric: "Ukrainian Government Is Dismissed. Deputies Welcome the President's Speech With Applause"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On 4 April, the Ukrainian Supreme Council resumed its plenary session to consider the fate of the Cabinet of Ministers. Having given information on the government's activities, Oleg Demin, parliament's deputy chairman, said that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers had not reacted, in any way, to the economic stabilization program approved by the parliament in June of 1994; had ignored parliamentary decrees; had failed to develop new approaches to state budget formulation; and, therefore, had contributed to the aggravation of the crisis and further decline in the living standards of the population. According to Demin, the government was still lacking an integral program aimed at overcoming the crisis and promoting further social and economic development of the country, and it should resign as a group. The majority of deputies voted for a parliamentary decree to that effect. [passage omitted]

Then, President Leonid Kuchma presented his annual report to the Ukrainian Supreme Council. [passage omitted]

According to the president, the Ukrainian economy is faced with three main interdependent tasks: market-based transformation of the national economic complex; speeding up of all reform processes; and priority financial stabilization. Kuchma said that the main reason for the economic crisis in the country was the delaying of market reforms. "If this had been done three years ago, today our economy would be at a level an order of magnitude higher," the president said. He also noted that the state leadership would not be able to avoid unpopular decisions in the future, either.

Kuchma said that the principal strategic instrument of the reform was structural rebuilding of the economy, using a combination of macro- and microeconomic controls, while giving the reform a social character. The core of the new social policy, in Kuchma's words, will be targeted aid to the disabled and handicapped people. [passage omitted] Kuchma specified the tasks for the country's leadership and the society at large in the process of economic reform. In his words, the reform will only be successful when the entire nation is newly united by the shared idea of saving the economy. Kuchma also proposed a path to political reform, with the adoption of a law on power as the first step. The president proposed that this law be adopted within a week, and that then the functions of authorities be determined and a government be formed on the basis of the new law. According to Kuchma, the logical next step should be the adoption of laws on the Cabinet of Ministers and on powers of local authorities, and the speeding up of work on the new constitution, which should give the country a stable power and should be "endorsed by direct expression of people's will." The president did not specify, however, in what manner the constitution was to be adopted. Commenting on the problem of consolidating the nation, Kuchma noted: "Ukraine must be the motherland of all those people who have thrown in their lot with it; and, in addition, it should be their sole—not their second—motherland." To that end, the president proposed that the use of the term "Ukrainian people" become a permanent custom, and added that only a strong law-governed democratic state "can stop the ongoing crisis of power and the economy."

Another condition for success, in Kuchma's opinion, would be strengthening of Ukraine's international position based on equitable relations with all countries of the world, with the priority still given to the relations within the CIS. In president's words, those who identify the CIS solely with Russia are lacking foresight, since the CIS is a union of 12 independent states which develop individually but retain integration links. "Today, any restoration of the USSR is objectively impossible unless coercive methods are used to re-form it. History cannot be reversed," Kuchma concluded.

The Ukrainian president suggested that the judicial power be strengthened by setting up a joint commission including representatives of the government, parliament, and the Supreme Court which should propose a plan for judicial and legal reform. In president's words, in the last year, none of the graduates of Ukrainian law institutes went to work at law-enforcement bodies; at the same time, criminal cases suggest that a new wave of criminals is receiving a better education abroad. Deputies greeted the report with applause, but their response of course varied. Specifically, left-wingers traditionally accused the president of capitalizing society, whereas radicals reproached him for being insufficiently market-oriented.

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Democratic Parties Picket Parliament, Seek Resignations

LD0504141595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1254 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev April 5 TASS—Several hundred representatives from the Ukrainian democratic forces picketed the building of the Supreme Soviet here today. They demanded the resignation of the parliament's leadership.

"The law on power and self-government, tabled by President Leonid Kuchma, has still not been adopted through the fault of Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz and the Supreme Soviet's presidium," ITAR-TASS was told by Vitaliy Zhuravskyy, leader of the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party. He blamed the parliament's leadership for failing to "lay the legislative foundation for the implementation of the Ukrainian president's reformist policy".

Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the "Ukraine" democratic association, believes that the Supreme Soviet, which dismissed the cabinet of ministers on Tuesday [4 April], is blocking the implementation of the president's policy of radical economic reforms and is eager to revive the communist regime in the republic.

Chairman of the "Rukh" party Vyacheslav Chornovil was even more categoric. He told ITAR-TASS that "the leadership of his party would sue Supreme Soviet Speaker Oleksandr Moroz and his first deputy Oleksandr Tkachenko". According to Chornovil, "the party possesses evidence, proving that these leaders were involved in corruption and are guilty of other violations of the law".

Ukrainian Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz made a statement the other day, accusing the "Rukh" leadership of being a primitive instrument in the hands of those who are eager to interfere with the work of the Supreme Soviet and its leadership. According to Moroz, this is a "well coordinated political provocation", intended to remove the present leadership of the Supreme Soviet and to liquidate the parliament. The president's turn will come after that".

Moroz also warned in his statement that a court suit would be filed shortly against the mass media and individuals, who had smeared his honour and dignity by their publications, containing groundless accusations against the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Tatars Support Kuchma's Decree on Crimea

LD0504155195 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2100 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Speaking in an interview to Ukrinform's correspondent in Simferopol and commenting on the Crimean Supreme Council's resolution urging the Ukrainian parliament to veto President's Kuchma's decree on Crimea, the deputy chairman of the Crimean Tatar Majlis assembly and Crimean Supreme Council presidium member voiced his support for the enactment of 31 March which, as he said, testifies not only to Ukraine's very consistent actions but also to Mr. Kuchma's readiness to immediately pose as the guarantor of Ukraine's territorial integrity.

'Statehood': No Confidence in Speaker, Deputy

LD0504221095

[FBIS Editorial Report] Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian at 1835 GMT on 5 April reports that the parliamentary grouping "Statehood" has circulated a statement among the members of Ukraine's parliament in which it voices no confidence in Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz, and First Deputy Chairman Oleksandr Tkachenko, and proposes that the above leaders resign.

The grouping's accusations are based on the mass media reports about the involvement of the speaker and his first deputy in the embezzlement of state funds. The grouping is going "to step up its work in constituencies to expose the Mafia groups and their criminal activity," the statement says. "Statehood" thanks the Prosecutor General's office and the Supreme Council's Commission for Measures against Organized Crime and Corruption for their principled stand in the cause of protecting the interests of the Ukrainian state, the agency says.

Academician Ihor Yukhnovskyy, the leader of the parliamentary grouping "Statehood," signed the statement. It was issued in connection with the fact that on 7 April the Supreme Council is expected to hear a report by its Presidium and a report by the Prosecutor General's office, UNIAR says.

Crimean Parliament Urges Voters To Oppose Kiev

LD0604074295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, April 5 (INTERFAX - UKRAINE)—The Crimean parliament will lift the moratorium on holding a referendum on the status of the peninsula if conditions are created for implementing the referendum's results, Crimean parliamentarian Aleksey Melnikov told a rally on the central square of Simferopol today.

According to law enforcement bodies, the rally involved 300-400 people though the rally's initiators tripled the number.

Residents of several Crimean towns came to the square carrying slogans saying, "Kiev, Brother, Sober Up, Don't Fall Into Agony. Crimea Is Russian Land And Not Your Colony," "No Franchuk," "Crimea Does Not Need The Charity Of Occupants."

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Melnikov said he was in favor of annulling the Belaya Vezha agreements on the dismissal of the USSR. He criticized actions of "nationalists" aimed at "fighting against the Crimean Supreme Soviet."

Melnikov said that Crimea was the only "healthy place on the diseased body of Ukraine." He said Crimea had maintained a "feeling of friendship with the ex-USSR people and is fighting against nationalism."

Parliamentarian Natalya Grudina urged voters to create organizational committees and collect money for holding a nationwide referendum on the status of Crimea.

Parliamentarian Vladimir Troshin said only mass actions of protest by Crimean residents could help Crimea to preserve its statehood. He urged voters to picket the building of the Crimean parliament on April 6.

Kuchma Appeals To Supreme Council To Approve Budget

LD0604090195 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0735 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Statement by President Leonid Kuchma to the Ukrainian Supreme Council in Kiev, read by Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] I appeal to you, people's deputies of Ukraine, in connection with the second reading of the 1995 draft budget. This is a decisive moment in the economic development of the country and society on the whole. Either we manage to reach agreement and, having gone through the first most painful but necessary steps in reforming the economy, create conditions for its revival, or throw ourselves back to the times of hyperinflation and landslide fall in output and living standards. We have no right to make a mistake, for its price would be too high.

Only the quickest possible approval of the budget will enable us to take jointly determined steps to implement the policy on Ukraine's social and economic development in 1995 fully and in all mutually agreed areas. This will decide whether we receive foreign financial aid that we need so much in 1995. Failure to approve the budget will lead to the destabilization of the social and economic situation and the disruption of the anti-crisis measures which are being taken. Recent developments haven proven the possibilities and effectiveness of much needed agreement and mutual understanding.

Today you are facing an important choice. I hope that the sense of responsibility for the future of the nation and the deep understanding of the condition our economy is in will enable you to make a responsible decision.

[Signed] Leonid Kuchma, president of Ukraine

Kuchma Letter Proposes Amendments to Budget

LD0604092195 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0740 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Letter from President Leonid Kuchma to the Ukrainian Supreme Council in Kiev, read by Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Here is a letter from the president to the Supreme Council of Ukraine:

The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, at its meeting on 3 April 1995, discussed and analyzed proposals and comments by the Supreme Council standing commissions regarding amendments to the 1995 draft budget submitted to the Supreme Council. Since most of the amendments and proposals which came from standing commissions and individual deputies require a detailed study and careful calculation, as well as new legislative acts, I believe it is appropriate to work on them while taking into account the implementation of the budget in the first quarter of this year and updating macro-indices of the social and economic development this year. This will result in a draft law on amendments to the law on Ukraine's 1995 state budget.

Before this work proceeds, I would ask the Supreme Council of Ukraine to discuss and approve the 1995 draft state budget submitted by me on 7 March this year, with the following amendments:

1. Taking into account the unsettled issue regarding this year's repayment of the state foreign debt created in the previous years, and in order to prevent possible breakdown in the supply of fuel and energy, [I propose] to increase spending on foreign debt repayment by 60 trillion karbovantsi by reducing the following types of expenditure: state capital investment into the structural reform of economy, decreased by 20 trillion; budget loans, decreased by 25 trillion; repurchase of 1990 government bonds, decreased by 15 trillion karbovantsi.

2. To increase the amount of funds allocated under the state procurement contract as loans to procurement and processing enterprises and agricultural procurement organizations by 24.3 trillion karbovantsi by reducing the following expenditure: the Cabinet of Ministers reserve fund by 10 trillion; financing legislative authorities, reduced by 200 billion; financing executive authorities, reduced by 2.1 trillion; Ministry of Defense expenditure, reduced by 10 trillion; financing of the customs, reduced by 1 trillion; financing of local tax inspectorates, reduced by 1 trillion karbovantsi.

3. To introduce this year a stabilization tax, by adding a separate article to the draft law on Ukraine's 1995 state budget, the text of which is attached.

Approval of these proposals will make it possible to make timely decisions concerning the funding of national economy, social, and cultural institutions, and social protection of the population envisaged by the draft state budget for 1995.

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Thank you for your attention.

Crimean Political Events Surveyed

954F1991A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Bobrovitsa under the heading "Sketch of the Political Struggle of Recent Days": "Close Engagement: A Storm in Crimea in the Spring. Political. Enough To Frighten Off Vacationers?..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol—**The Supreme Council of Crimea has expressed no confidence in and relieved of office Prime Minister A. Franchuk and Deputy Prime Minister A. Senchenko. The remaining members of the government collectively tendered their resignations in protest, but parliament rejected them. The Supreme Council appointed as the new prime minister A. Drobotov. In the evening of the same day Ukrainian radio and television broadcast an explanation of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine to the effect that with the abolition of the Constitution of Crimea the parliament of the autonomy had lost the right to form the government and that all the Crimean reshuffles are for this reason invalid. But on Friday the Supreme Council of Ukraine did not find the Ministry of Justice's arguments convincing and agreed that the Supreme Council of Crimea had the right to dismiss and appoint people to the office of prime minister. On Saturday, following a session of the Supreme Council, there was a meeting of the new Government of Crimea, at which Speaker S. Tsekov was present. Following the meeting, A. Drobotov answered journalists' questions.**

'Waves' and 'Rocks'

According to all the indications, the past week had to have been stormy. The opening of the session was marked by a reinforcement of the picket line of supporters of Yu. Meshkov, about 200 of whom had gathered. "Kiev has trampled the will of Crimeans" was the inscription on the slogans. "Re-fe-ren-dum!" the demonstrators chanted. The appeal of Yu. Meshkov to the United Nations, the OSCE, the world community, and journalists was distributed. More than 10 statements and appeals were being passed around—some defended the president, others accused him of all mortal sins. The deputies have at this time only just assembled in session, but the waves of public-meeting emotions outside parliament have already come beating down as hard as they can....

Let us, however, take a look where political passions virtually do not reach.

The Yuzhnaya Poultry Factory is the main poultry-breeding enterprise on the peninsula. At the best times it fed many countries of Europe with eggs and poultry meat. Some 250 million eggs, 3,500 tonnes of meat, and approximately 4,000 tonnes of milk are still produced here annually even now. More than 18,000 Crimeans live on the grounds of the factory, and approximately 3,000 persons work on the farm. What do they think about politics?

People in the Perovo community, the first division of the enterprise, reminded me by their composure and solidity and peaceability and confidence of rocks, against which the political waves and public-meeting passions are breaking. A.F. Dmitriyev has been a manager here for about 30 years now. Tall and sober-minded, he takes his time and arranges his words as though laying parquet flooring. What he values most in life is stability: "Previously Crimea was distinguished by the solidity of power. It was not surprising—all of Moscow would spend its vacations here. Now it is as though it has fallen into a black hole—just political squabbles, and things are getting worse and worse for the people. Even pay of 3 or 4 million rubles is with us sufficient for 10 days' subsistence....

"I stroll down to the egg shop and listen to the radio," poultry worker V. Samuseva says. "I do not understand what is going on. Before our leaders would try to make things better, now everyone is soliciting for himself authority and some jurisdiction or other, one set of authorities is not enough for everyone, apparently. If only they would just finally stop the divvying up...."

"It is our heads that will be aching until there is harmony among the authorities," electrician V. Makukhin concludes.

"The main thing for the economy of Crimea is stability," Deputy V. Verchenko, director of the poultry factory reasons. "We cannot operate as in Italy, where the government changes six times a year. Our economic potential is entirely different. We need, finally, to choose candidates who are outside of politics, who satisfy primarily the economic requirements of the peninsula, who can find a common language primarily on economic matters, and who are in politics, like Caesar's wife, above suspicion.... For example, our farm has concluded a contract with the Netherlands on the modernization of the poultry factory's farm to the tune of $800,000, and it will be implemented only when there is a stable political situation on the peninsula and our partners are sure of the further success of their plans.... Another most important sector of Crimea—the resorts—needs stability also, I believe. We learned this last year—a small 'Crimean war' was organized, and instead of 10 million vacationers, we received only 3 million. It is time to learn the lesson that business must be outside of politics. And this will depend on the prime minister candidates...."

Diplomacy Outside of Politics?

Politics today is, it would seem, the most shameful business, and everyone refuses to have anything to do with it, but still everyone obliquely somehow finds himself involved in it.

"We decide consular, not political, issues," M.I. Glushkov, chief of the Consular Department of the Embassy of

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Russia in Ukraine, explains to me. "According to the Vienna Convention, we receive Crimeans. They come on various business—concerning pensions, the restoration of papers, the adoption of citizenship, departure.... We will not only be in Crimea but also in Kharkov, the Donbass...."

But even the very experienced diplomat Mikhail Ivanovich did not expect this situation, evidently. Hundreds of people were waiting in the reception line. The line had shortened somewhat after two days, it is true, but it was chiefly elderly people that had come. It is hard-going with them—everything has to be explained twice, slowly, and in a roundabout way. "But what is most difficult," M.I. Glushkov says, "is that our mission is being misrepresented." Truly, it has been perceived as incitement to the adoption of Russian citizenship, as a provocation, as participation in this political skirmish of the authorities.

I met M.M. Glubokovskaya here. She used to live in Sevastopol, but in 1988 moved to Severokurilsk on contract as a doctor. Last year she returned home... to a different state. A foreigner, since she had taken Russian citizenship where she had gone to work. Her pension is not now coming from Russia normally, and she will not, she says, be given a privatization certificate. She came to the consulate for advice....

Simferopol inhabitants T.K. Morozova and her daughter Irina have been living here since 1953 and were not reconciled to the handover of Crimea to Ukraine and have firmly decided on becoming citizens of their real homeland. "Ukraine," they say, "is not defending our interests. There are approximately 2 million of us in Crimea, and we have no wish to be a national minority."

I asked M.I. Glushkov: What are the consequences resulting for them from the adoption of Russian citizenship? He said: "They will have the status of foreign citizens on the territory of Ukraine."

V.I. Shevchenko, a deputy of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, whom I met in Crimea, had come from Kiev specially to see what was happening here. He said: "If people make a conscious and firm decision, this will evoke only respect, although not according with common sense, perhaps. But do the diplomats understand today that they are exposing both these people and our two states to a possible future conflict? Some time will elapse, and these people will not get, naturally, what they expected to get from Russian citizenship. What will they then say to the leaders of their motherland and also the Supreme Council of Crimea? This is no longer diplomacy, it is politics."

A. Drobotov: 'I Shall Not As Yet Alter Government Policy...'

Following the meeting of the government with the participation of Speaker S. Tsekov, A. Drobotov answered journalists' questions. He said that the main result of the first meeting had been the decision that the government should handle the economy, and the Supreme Council, prudent policy that does not impede the economy of Crimea. The government, A. Drobotov observed, has already been formed, in the main, it has remained chiefly as it was, there are only individual vacancies. He said that the decision of the Supreme Council to reject the resignation of the entire government was sensible. A. Drobotov rejected journalists' assumptions that the previous policy of the government needed to be changed and said that he had no intention of altering it, although he replied that he was not yet prepared to say what the main directions of its efforts would be. He said that it could be maintained that as a result of the entire discussion Crimea had one prime minister, and it was he, A. Drobotov.

He observed that the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine was entitled to its point of view, but that there is also the point of view of the legislature of Ukraine, which is decisive. "There is one awkward aspect," A. Drobotov said, "in that A. Franchuk was relieved of the premiership at a time of illness. I have met with him, and we agreed that we had done nothing bad to each other. But he has his view of the ongoing processes." A. Drobotov said that the Ostankino report that a general of the militia had barred him from the prime minister's office was false and provocative, that it had surprised him. A. Drobotov himself had given the instruction for the prime minister's office to be locked and sealed and had barred entrance to it. He had given instructions at the meeting of the government for the office to remain unoccupied until "Anatoliy Romanovich arrives, and we sort things out together...."

Former Crimea Deputy Views Current Events

954F1992A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by V. Vilyant, "deputy of the last Supreme Council of Crimea (he disagrees with the term 'former deputy,' former means recalled, stripped of authority)": "Let's Set the Tone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Introductory paragraph illegible]

Democracy Kiev-Style

May the means which the Ukrainian Parliament has employed in relation to Crimea be termed democratic! I think not. Had the deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine respected the will of Crimeans, they would have proposed that we pronounce on the institution of the presidency and President Meshkov, whom we elected. Especially since a poll on the expediency of presidential power and the conformity to his position of the president could have been timed to coincide with the elections of the local councils.

Nor is it too late for this to be done even now, it is even essential, in order to ensure that subsequently the finger

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not be pointed throughout the world at Ukraine for having dealt undemocratically with the president of its sole autonomy.

In addition, there should be a say, albeit 40 years on, on the nondemocratic nature of the handover of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. Crimeans were at that time driven, if you'll excuse the expression, like a herd of rams from one bank of the river to the other, without their being asked whether they wanted this or not. There may be no doubt that had democracy not been violated at that time, neither Ukraine nor Russia nor Crimea would now have headaches.

And here we have once again an example of democracy Kiev-style. The leaders of the Supreme Council of Crimea were handed documents concerning the further fate of the republic only 10 minutes before the start of the discussion on this issue.

Separatism Crimean-Style

Are Crimeans to blame for the fact that they had to mount a struggle for their economic independence in order to be masters in their own republic? Are not the peoples of many autonomous republics of both Russia and other countries of the CIS also opposed to the unjust distribution of benefits that they have earned acting the same way? And Ukraine itself took this same route and is still cursing the Moscow center. So why has the label of separatists been pinned on the Crimeans?

I recall that former Crimean Speaker N. Bagrov even told the former leaders of Ukraine that were Crimeans to live as well as in Russia, the question of Crimean separatism would disappear.

But Ukrainian politicians were pursuing a different goal—to rid themselves of Crimean statehood in any way. Now such an occasion has presented itself, and advantage has been taken of it so that others not try to repeat it. Why explain to other regions, which also are not averse to enhancing their independence, that Crimea is a special region. That it is the showcase of Ukraine among the Black Sea countries and that all showcases should be acceptable to the eye and create a good impression about what is inside. Further, Crimea has one further particular feature of considerable importance—it was previously a part of Russia, and Russian-speakers constitute 80 percent of its population, and they will always look to Russia. The Ukrainian national radicals are by their actions here turning Crimeans away from Ukraine. Remember Khmara's visit to Sevastopol or the threats of the "Crimea will be either Ukrainian or uninhabited" type. And now a new blow to our social dignity. The time when the hearts and souls of Crimeans will be lost to Ukraine forever is probably not far off. The stronger the pressure that is put on us, the fewer our affections for the state in which we live. And this will be an irreversible drift toward Russia.

The Fleet Black Sea-Style

I believe that I am entitled to speak about the fate of the fleet since I am an erstwhile graduate of a military academy, where I studied particular features of the military art. So, then, the problem of the Black Sea Fleet should be resolved with regard to the requirements of military science. We should, say, hold a military-scientific conference with officers and admirals and hear the opinion of specialists. They believe that the division of the fleet is a most glaring mistake. It is already losing its former supremacy even over the Turkish Fleet, which has as of late been supplied with new ships and equipment.

After all, preservation of a unified fleet could also be of economic benefit to Ukraine. The Crimeans are proposing that all the facilities at which the Black Sea Fleet is based be handed over to Russia on a long-term lease. Everyone would benefit from such a step since Russia would provide for the security of itself and Ukraine and Crimea.

And Ukraine, having written off its debts, could strengthen its economy and square its shoulders. After all, with such crushing debts it is in no position to ensure its own independence. And, further, a principal obstacle in the way of an expansion of cooperation and the strengthening of friendship between Ukraine and Russia would be removed.

I anticipate sharply worded discussion of this idea on the part of Ukraine's national radicals. Their views are well known: Maintaining "foreign armed forces" on the territory of an independent state is impermissible. But there is the following argument for this. At the end of the war the Japanese sheltered beneath the military umbrella not simply of a foreign power but yesterday's enemy and quietly occupied themselves with their economy. When they had strengthened economically, they started to speak with the Americans as equals. Have they lost their independence, one wonders. On the contrary, they have reinforced it very strongly.

Not All Is Yet Lost

Crimean statehood has suffered considerably. But we could be back at square one, at the status, that is, of a regular oblast, unless the deputies defend the interests of the autonomy. I refer to the deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine from Crimea, who for the second convocation in succession are in free sail, as it were. It would be good were there to be regular meetings between deputies of the republic and the country to ensure that the latter might have a more profound grasp of the essence of the decisions adopted by the Crimean members of parliament. We need to invite deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine to sessions in Simferopol, to the deputies' commissions. They need to render account to the electorate from the viewpoint of the defense of Crimean interests.

I propose in this connection that KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA inaugurate the Platform of the Voter and the Deputy column, where a critical assessment of the activity of the Ukrainian deputies from Crimea should

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be heard, particularly if some of them are starting to play it false or to "lie low." And let journalists of Crimea's parliamentary newspaper be present in the Supreme Council of Ukraine when our issues are being discussed.

A serious aid in the work of the Ukrainian members of parliament could be an analysis of their activity at plenary sessions and in the commissions. It would then immediately be clear who's who. On the other hand, we need to furnish our colleagues in Kiev with material engendered in the Supreme Council of Crimea. We should, generally, organize relations with our Ukrainian deputies such that they feel that they are in the field of our constant attention, in the field of vision of all Crimeans.

Concluding my thoughts, I have to cite here also another opinion, which at first sight just about nullifies all that I have been talking about. "What can they, deputies of Ukraine from Crimea, do there?" skeptics ask. I shall make so bold as to disagree with the latter and cite the example of the Kurultay faction. It also is small, but cohesive, operates with enviable competence and forcefulness, and achieves its ends.

In a word, the Crimeans in the Supreme Council of Ukraine should set the tone also. Crimean, preferably, for it would please many.

Deputy on Reasons For Crimea Action

954F1960A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 25 Mar 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Lavrinovich, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission on Legal Policy and Judicial- Legal Reform, by Aleksandr Sokol; place and date not given: "Laws and Reality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Legislative acts of the Supreme Council of Ukraine concerning the situation in Crimea are the subject of commentary by Aleksandr Lavrinovich, deputy chairman of the parliament's Commission on Legal Policy and Judicial-Legal Reform, in an exclusive interview given by him to PRAVDA UKRAINY.**

[Sokol] Aleksandr Vladimirovich! During the course of discussion of draft laws on Crimea, dissatisfaction was expressed at the fact that they were distributed to deputies late. Some people are attempting to present the matter as an issue hastily prepared, resulting in the adoption of resolutions that have not been well thought out. What would you have to say about this?

[Lavrinovich] Such an opinion, like any other, has the right to exist, but it does not conform to reality. Over a month ago the Presidium of the Supreme Council directed three commissions to prepare this issue. And indeed, every commission examined it. As the head commission, ours was the last to do so. It is our job to take into account the opinions and statements of the others. We have worked together with government leaders, the organs of judicial authority, and the General Procuracy—people who have the right and obligation to resolve such problems.

Our commission convened on 13 March, and the session, on 17 March. The session date was determined some two weeks prior or thereabouts. True, it was postponed, but that does not alter the substance of things. Everyone knew—officially—when this question would be examined. You can see that there is no cause for alleging hastiness. The documents were indeed delivered on the eve of the session. However, each deputy had an opportunity to familiarize himself with them, to study them.

We must also mention the special provisional commission on Crimea, instituted in September of last year. Representatives of all deputy groups and factions, i.e., of all political forces existing in the parliament, joined its membership. We did a great deal of work right in Crimea. We can say that one deputy was constantly present there. The commission did not just study documents—it visited various organizations and met with people. I am sure you can appreciate the thoroughness of its report. Indeed, deputies talked about this.

[Sokol] Well, let us now move directly to the legislative acts. Why did the Ukrainian parliament annul the autonomy's constitution? Why, for example, were not greater efforts made to bring it into conformance with Ukrainian legislation?

[Lavrinovich] The Crimean Constitution of 6 May 1992 does not even mention that Crimea is an autonomy. It asserts that Crimea is an independent state, with corresponding attributes—its own armed forces, citizenship, and all the rest. True, a supplemental statement was later inserted that Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine....

Moreover, in May 1994 the Law on Restoration of the Constitutional Foundations of Statehood of the Crimean Republic was adopted. Crimeans are now experiencing the consequences of their actions. And not they alone. Understandably, this constitution was annulled. Why was this specific action taken? Because all measures short of annulment had been exhausted. Efforts to bring the constitution into conformance with Ukrainian legislation, to suspend it temporarily, failed, unfortunately, to bring about the necessary results.

Now the Supreme Council of Crimea has the opportunity to adopt a new constitution. This constitution, and amendments and additions to it, are subject—in accordance with the Law on Status of the Autonomy just now adopted—to confirmation by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. This is a very substantive change. It precludes the possibility of contradictions between Crimean and Ukraine-wide legislative acts and creates the conditions for establishment in the state of a uniform legal sphere devoid of conflict.

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[Sokol] This is good. But "confirmation in Kiev" is not very attractive. Does there exist anything similar in world practice? And does this measure conform to democratic principles?

[Lavrinovich] Such regulations do conform to democratic principles and are practiced in the world, although the phenomenon of administrative-territorial autonomy is extremely rare in international practice. But in Crimea, this is what we have. As we know, it was created by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. According to legal norms, this is the body that should determine the extent of its authority and decide which rights are delegated and which are not. Then there need be no discussion of the standardization of Crimean and Ukraine-wide laws—the autonomy makes legal decisions within its own authority, its own competence.

[Sokol] What legislative acts should be the guiding force in Crimea prior to adoption of a new constitution?

[Lavrinovich] First and foremost, the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, in particular, the recently adopted Law on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which stipulates all the basic rights, authority, and obligations of the organs of state power and government on the peninsula. Additionally, there are other documents of the Ukrainian Supreme Council which determine the status of governmental structures operating here.

[Sokol] Why was there a need to adopt a new law on the autonomy?

[Lavrinovich] The previous law was not precise in everything, and a supplementary law on demarcation of authority between the autonomous republic and Ukraine was never implemented in light of the fact that the Crimean Constitution was not brought into conformance with Ukrainian legislation. A new law was adopted based on these two laws.

[Sokol] How does it differ from the preceding law?

[Lavrinovich] In the fact that it does not permit the autonomy to adopt resolutions contradicting Ukrainian legislation.

[Sokol] In what way?

[Lavrinovich] The law contains a complete listing of what the autonomy has the right to do. It also stipulates—and this was already mentioned—that the Constitution of the autonomy and amendments to it are ratified by the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

[Sokol] What can you say about the Crimean presidency? Why was it eliminated?

[Lavrinovich] Primarily because this institution of power is in contravention of the laws of Ukraine. Ukrainian legislation does not envisage two presidents. But the organs of highest state authority failed to suppress all the presidential hullabaloo when it unfolded on the peninsula. They did not want to exert force, and strove to avoid exacerbating the situation and to afford Crimeans the opportunity of resolving their problems on their own. As a result, an illegal president emerged in the autonomy.

I would like to stress one thing in this regard. Democracy requires that the authority precisely fulfill its obligations. The fact that for a long time the authority failed to react properly with respect to Crimea is evidence not of truly broad democracy, but of democracy's main postulates not being fulfilled. Had decisive measures been taken at that time, democracy would have been preserved and we would not be facing our present situation.

[Sokol] Why was it impossible to retain the institution of the presidency? Why did they have to eliminate it?

[Lavrinovich] In order to establish an effective system of government in Crimea, to prevent the situations we saw arise last year and the beginning of this year. Look at what happened—opposition to Kiev, internal struggles. Problems dealing with people's lives and the functioning of the economy fell by the wayside. In the latter months everyone rushed to redistribute state property. Based on this, an already adverse crime situation became aggravated. Consider the fact that this year alone, in a period of just over two months, 19 contract murders were committed on the peninsula!

I would propose that people do not need this kind of presidency. It only does damage. And Crimeans themselves have come to understand this.

[Sokol] Well, how do you envision the mechanism for eliminating this institution? Apart from cutting off its financing....

[Lavrinovich] I have an idea as to how all this can be done. But the state has appropriate executive organs for this purpose. I think they know how to act.

[Sokol] One of the parliamentary decrees contains a directive to the General Procuracy of Ukraine to resolve the problem of filing criminal charges against Yuriy Meshkov—for exceeding his powers or official authority. What do you have to say on this account?

[Lavrinovich] I do not wish to analyze this issue. It is the kind of situation where certain legal subtleties can lead to this or that interpretation. This happens when the political aspects of a situation rise to the fore.

[Sokol] Could you please give me a specific response—are there grounds in this instance for a criminal investigation?

[Lavrinovich] Of course there are. The man permitted himself to function in direct violation of Ukrainian legislation. But I do not wish to speak categorically here. I am just saying that criminal liability should be enforced. This is something that must be professionally examined by those whose duty it is to pursue these matters.

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[Sokol] Elections to local councils were scheduled on the peninsula. The parliament adopted a resolution to conduct these elections according to Ukrainian law. Local law was annulled. Why?

[Lavrinovich] It did not conform to Ukrainian legislation. The list of discrepancies is very long.

[Sokol] Perhaps they were decent innovations....

[Lavrinovich] I wish it were so! Unfortunately, we are talking about something else. For example, the local law permitted foreign citizens to participate in elections and to be elected. You can understand that this is not permissible. Only representatives of parties of Crimean status were permitted to be nominated for council chairman positions. Ukraine-wide structures were cut off....

The elections constitute an extremely important struggle to Crimeans. They already have bitter experience in this regard. We do not need further mistakes.

[Sokol] The Ukrainian Supreme Council has stipulated a number of measures aimed at establishing law and order in the economic life of the peninsula. In particular, this deals with the conduct of privatization and the sale of real property to foreign commercial structures. The activity of all banks, without exception, must be improved, brought under control. Illegally militarized and armed formations must be disbanded. What can you say with regard to these measures?

[Lavrinovich] They are vitally important for Crimeans. We cannot just rely on people coming in from Kiev and accomplishing everything necessary. Joint efforts are required. The local populace simply cannot remain passive. All planned actions are in its interests.

[Sokol] We see exerting an influence on the situation in Crimea—and this is a secret to no one—certain political forces and leaders of Russia, as well as a lack of resolution of problems involving the Black Sea Fleet. What can you say about the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Council with respect to these problems?

[Lavrinovich] Documents of the Supreme Council cite issues that are subject to resolution by other laws or normative acts—Ukraine-wide, Ukrainian-Russian. The parliament has issued appropriate directives in this regard—to the government, to a number of ministries. The most important of these is to draw up by 10 April of this year a draft agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the legal status of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukrainian territory and that of Black Sea Fleet servicemen who are Russian citizens, as well as their family members.

This problem must be resolved as quickly as possible, insofar as we have troops of another state and their family members—foreign citizens, in our territory. We are obliged to determine their status with a view toward ensuring their standard of living, their rights, their relationship to their native country, etc. This absolutely must be accomplished.

Now—with respect to the parliamentary directive to eliminate violations of the Ukrainian Law on Citizenship observed in Crimea. The fact of the matter is that some inhabitants of the peninsula have taken advantage of changes in Russian legislation and obtained Russian citizenship, while simultaneously retaining Ukrainian citizenship. Such a situation cannot continue. It will be resolved through the introduction of appropriate changes in the Ukrainian Law on Citizenship.

[Sokol] What kind of changes?

[Lavrinovich] Changes must stipulate one thing—an individual who has obtained foreign citizenship loses his Ukrainian citizenship. Our law contains a provision on the possibility of dual citizenship. But on the basis of interstate agreements! For the time being, Ukraine does not have any—not with any state.

[Sokol] Would you please clarify just how Russian legislation has opened up the way for dual citizenship on the peninsula?

[Lavrinovich] The Russian Federation introduced legislative amendments as a result of which internal Russian law afforded the right to citizens of foreign states to acquire Russian citizenship while retaining the citizenship they already have. Such a legal standard is unknown in world practice.

[Sokol] The parliament directed the appropriate ministries to introduce a proposal—within the framework of existing CIS mechanisms—concerning the regulation of official and working trips of people's deputies and representatives of the authority to states of the Commonwealth. The problem is understandable, of course. How would you comment on the decision that was made?

[Lavrinovich] It is a very intricate problem. It requires regulation on the legal level, and on the political and moral levels as well.

It is impossible to prescribe norms of conduct for every official, for all situations, in all territories. Furthermore, you do not adopt a law, for example, prohibiting the discarding of trash on the rug in the presidential palace. There are standards of conduct that must be understood by everyone.

But if certain political figures do not understand that it is impermissible to travel to a foreign state and there express appeals advocating the elimination of this state, or show how its power structures ought to function, then the legal aspect of this issue should be addressed. Such standards are practiced throughout the world. There have been instances where high-ranking foreign guests, even a president, have been subject to immediate deportation for expressing anti-state appeals regarding their country of presence....

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Legal standards of this kind are undesirable in mutual relations between friendly countries, especially countries that were recently within one state.

[Sokol] One final question. Reality shows that the Crimean Supreme Council manifests no loyalty to decisions of the Ukrainian parliament. What actions are possible if these decisions are not carried out?

[Lavrinovich] People who do not execute the laws and decisions of the highest state authority must think about whether or not they are suitable for the positions they hold. In such a state of affairs, others must come in and take their place.

[Sokol] In other words, the Crimean Supreme Council will be dissolved?

[Lavrinovich] Yes. The Supreme Council of Ukraine has the right to effect early suspension of this organ's authority and set new elections, just as it may eliminate the autonomy. These are links of a single chain. But I do not believe we will have to resort to extreme measures.

Crimean Council Deputy Chairman Interview

954F1949A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Vladimir Klychnikov, deputy chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, by Viktoriya Rabotnova; place and date not given; under the rubric "Firsthand": "Vladimir Klychnikov: We Have To Be More Modest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Klychnikov] Our republic has a right to a constitution, and we have already begun working on its new draft. We will try to persuade the Ukrainian parliament that the Crimean constitution ought to be approved here rather than in Kiev. In what form we will be able to pass the fundamental law is so far unclear. But we believe that it will be a normal document, of good legal quality.

[Rabotnova] And how do you see the future of Yuriy Meshkov?

[Klychnikov] We have enough headaches now without worrying about Yuriy Aleksandrovich. In any case, it was not we who abolished the office of the president—it was the Ukrainian parliament. All questions should be directed to him.

[Rabotnova] But slightly more than a year ago, during the presidential elections in Crimea, you were one of Meshkov's most ardent supporters...

[Klychnikov] A lot has changed since then. Essentially, Meshkov himself did everything to destroy the institution of the presidency—and this, in my opinion, is much more serious than the personal fate of Yuriy Aleksandrovich. For its part, the Crimean Supreme Council will do everything possible to restore the post of the president in the autonomy. Perhaps not now, but at least in a few years.

[Rabotnova] The Crimean Supreme Council has dismissed the head of its government. Was this decision linked with the accusations of pro-Ukrainian leanings leveled at the former prime minister?

[Klychnikov] There is absolutely no politics involved here. The prime minister was dismissed for quite concrete violations in the utilization of budget funds, and forgery of documents. We explained our position to the Ukrainian parliament, and it was met with understanding.

[Rabotnova] Since we have begun talking about violations, you will probably insist that charges be brought against the former prime minister?

[Klychnikov] Absolutely. Our commission will continue its work; we intend to petition the general procuracy and the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

[Rabotnova] Do you count on any help from Russia?

[Klychnikov] The Republic Movement of Crimea from the beginning supported independence for the peninsula. It is another matter that we are Russians, and therefore were leaning more toward Russia. Although the idea was not to quarrel with Ukraine but to become a bridge between the two republics... We never had aid anyway, but while in 1991 we had hope, now we look at the situation much more soberly. The State Duma has issued a statement in connection with the latest decisions of the Ukrainian Supreme Council. But this statement produced more irritation than good. This is understandable: The current Duma has very little clout, and we do not expect any practical steps from it.

[Rabotnova] You say that you saw Crimea as a bridge between Ukraine and Russia. Is there still a chance that you will be able to preserve this role?

[Klychnikov] I think there is. A lot depends on us. If we behave more calmly, I would say—more modestly, not exaggerating our role, aware that the parties to the negotiations are Ukraine and Russia, not ourselves—we can count on rapprochement between the two republics as early as this year.

Supreme Council Commission Member Changes

954F1983A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 95 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Council of Crimea: "On Changes in Composition of Permanent Commissions of the Supreme Council of Crimea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Council of Crimea DECREES:

1. In compliance with Point 3 of Article 56 of the Law of the Republic of Crimea "On Regulations of the Supreme

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Council of Crimea," Deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea Volodymyr Nikolayevich Klychnikov and Aleksandr Ivanovich Frolov shall be relieved of their duties as members of permanent commissions of the Supreme Council of Crimea because of their election as deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council of Crimea.

2. Deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea Lennur Yag Arifov shall be relieved of his duties as a member of the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea on Education, Science, Culture, Youth Affairs, and Sports because of his election as chairman of the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea on Mandates, Deputy Ethics, and Organization of the Work of the Supreme Council.

3. Deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea Aleksey Alekseyevich Melnikov shall be included on the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for State Construction, Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, and Viktor Petrovich Mezhak—the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea on Economic and Budget-Financial Policy, considering their applications.

4. On the basis of his application, Deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea Vadim Konstantinovich Mordashov shall be relieved of his duties as a member of the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea on State Construction, Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order and shall be included on the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea on Mandates, Deputy Ethics, and Organization of the Work of the Supreme Council.

[Signed] Chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea S. Tsekov
Simferopol,
23 March 1995,
No. 404-1

Crimea MVD Official on Amended Police Law

954F1983B Simfereopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Police Colonel V. Seredenko, chief of the Administration for Maintaining Public Order of the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea, by A. Chernov, worker of the Public Relations Center of the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: "With Weapons in Hand..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The crime situation in Ukraine leaves something to be desired. For purposes of stabilizing and stepping up the fight against crime, the Supreme Council of Ukraine has adopted a supplement to the law "On the Police," which considerably strengthens the guarantee of the personal safety of police workers and members of their families. This is discussed by the chief of the Administration for Maintaining Public Order of the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Crimea, Police Colonel V. Seredenko:*

[Seredenko] Now the police worker has the right to take out his firearm if he thinks that in the circumstances that have developed there might be a need to use it. When arresting criminals or violators of the law and also individuals the worker suspects of crimes or legal violations and when checking the documents of the suspected individuals, the policeman may hold his firearm ready, which will be a warning of the possibility of using it.

An attempt on the part of an individual who is being detained by a policeman with a firearm in his hand to approach him, thereby reducing the distance between them, or to touch the weapon gives the policemen the right to use the firearm.

[Chernov] What specifically does the change in the law do for the workers of internal affairs organs?

[Seredenko] It simplifies the actions of the policeman. It is no longer required to give a voice warning: "Stop or I will shoot!" or to fire a warning shot. The appearance of the firearm is warning that it might subsequently be used. It is very important for citizens living on the wrong side of the law to be aware of this. These measures provide the possibility for policemen to protect themselves from contact with an individual (from among the criminal contingent) who is physically better trained. Here again we take into account the possibility of establishing a safe distance and maintaining it with the help of a gun.

[Chernov] Why was this decision adopted?

[Seredenko] In my view, because the main burden in the matter of fighting crime lies on the shoulders of the police: The number of serious, audacious, and cruel crimes is growing; the police are sustaining losses of personnel; and there is an immense quantity of firearms and special equipment in the hands of the citizens. There are also a number of other factors which, in my view, prompted the state structures to make this serious decision.

[Chernov] Will this not lead to excessive cruelty on the part of the police, to put it mildly?

[Seredenko] It is impossible to rule out mistakes. Even today it is the task of the commanders and chiefs to prevent them or, rather, to teach all workers in extreme situations to use weapons with the least harm to the life and health of citizens who are not party to the commission of legal violations and crimes, and to develop in everyone the maximum amount of restraint and self-control.

[Chernov] Who will be affected by the supplement to the law "On the Police"?

[Seredenko] All police workers. Those in uniform and those working in the office. At the present time all police workers are permitted to carry their standard issue

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weapons. Staff police workers must give a voice warning before taking out their weapons: "I am a police worker and I will use my weapon!"

[Chernov] Is it true that the main conclusion from our brief discussion is "Beware of the policeman"?

[Seredenko] No. The conclusion and the purpose is to explain to everyone that in the mass of today's liberties and freedoms there is also a need for strict measures to ensure the personal safety of the defenders of the law—police workers. And the state has resorted to these measures.

Crimean Justice Ministry on Citizenship

954F1989A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 1

[Statement of Ministry of Justice: "Explanation of the Ministry of Justice of Crimea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the numerous appeals of inhabitants of the Republic of Crimea pertaining to the acquisition of citizenship of the Russian Federation and various publications on this matter in the news media, the Ministry of Justice of Crimea deems it necessary to explain the following.

Questions of citizenship in Ukraine are regulated by the law of Ukraine "On Citizenship of Ukraine" of 8 October 1991 with the revisions and addenda made on 28 January 1993 and 14 July 1994. The analogous law in the Russian Federation was adopted on 28 November 1991.

In accordance with the law of Ukraine on citizenship, there is single citizenship in Ukraine, in Russia the acquisition of citizenship of the Russian Federation by foreign citizens is permitted on condition of the renunciation of the former citizenship, unless otherwise specified by an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

It should be noted that the said laws of Ukraine and Russia allow of dual citizenship in principle, but only if there are bilateral interstate treaties. At the present time there is no treaty on dual citizenship between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Deciding for himself the question of the acquisition or relinquishment of the citizenship of this state or the other, a citizen should know that a person's affiliation to the citizenship of a particular state is of important practical significance since material legal consequences for him are connected with this: the extent of his rights, liberties, and obligations and the granting of diplomatic protection of the state.

Thus only citizens of Ukraine are in Ukraine enfranchised at the time of elections to organs of state power and local government, may work in public service, are entitled to privatize housing and the property of state-owned enterprises, and so forth.

In terminating citizenship of Ukraine, citizens forfeit the said rights, and their legal status on the territory of Ukraine is regulated by the law of Ukraine "On the Legal Status of Foreigners."

As far as the legal position of a person who has adopted citizenship of the Russian Federation is concerned, it is regulated by the corresponding legislative instruments of the Russian Federation.

Justice Minister Interviewed on Crimea

954F1989B Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Vasiliy Onopenko, minister of justice of Ukraine, by UKRINFORM correspondent Yelena Pozdnyakova; place and date not given: "'A Legal Appraisal Is Made When It Is Appointed by a Decision of the Court'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Supreme Council of Ukraine recently adopted the laws "On Abolition of the Constitution and Certain Laws of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" and "On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" and a number of decrees concerning the alignment of legislation of the autonomy with the constitution and legislation of Ukraine. But the disputes surrounding the problem of Crimea are not subsiding. The questions of an UKRINFORM correspondent are answered by Vasiliy Onopenko, minister of justice of Ukraine.**

[Pozdnyakova] Vasiliy Vasilyevich, are you, a lawyer, worried by the situation in Crimea?

[Onopenko] Very much so. There is every reason to be, unfortunately. It may be said that the Crimea issue has ceased to be an exclusively Crimean, exclusively Ukrainian, issue. People are already applying to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine from overseas and requesting explanations. I have to say that the Ministry of Justice is entrusted with providing explanations on this legal problem or the other, on this legal situation or the other. We are witnessing flagrant violations of the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws, specifically those adopted quite recently by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. Here is a recent example. On 22 March of this year the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted the decision to relieve of office the prime minister and deputy prime minister of the Government of Crimea.

[Pozdnyakova] Could this problem not have been resolved in legal form? This is surely what would have happened had it been a question of a citizen whose rights and legitimate interests had been violated.

[Onopenko] The reinstatement in work of a specific person may be decided in legal form on the basis of the labor laws. But this is a different situation for we are talking about the formation of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. And this is a different political and legal aspect.

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The explanation of the Ministry of Justice referred to specific legal documents. In my opinion, it was proven very cogently that the premier and vice premier had been relieved of office in violation of legislation for it was a question, after all, of the formation of the government of the autonomy not of a specific individual. In this case the government should be formed according to current legislation of Ukraine.

[Pozdnyakova] As we all know, the Supreme Council of the autonomy has instructed its structures to make a legal appraisal of the laws adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. Can this step of the autonomy's parliament be taken seriously? What will the Ministry of Justice's further actions be?

[Onopenko] Yes, I am aware that the authorities of Crimea are attempting to conduct some legal appraisal. I have to state that this is a contrived issue. International law makes no provision for such an appraisal.

A legal appraisal is specified by national legislation for criminal, civil, or some other proceedings. An appraisal is made when it is appointed by a decision or ruling of the court. We are talking, however, about an appraisal of an actual situation. There can be as many appraisals as there are lawyers. But I would like to emphasize that it is the Ministry of Justice that is entrusted with the obligation of making a legal appraisal, of the events in Crimea included. The situation is far simpler than it seems to those who would like to complicate it. Even the freshman student of the law faculty understands that the authorities of Crimea are in flagrant breach of the Constitution of Ukraine and current legislation.

[Pozdnyakova] What liability is specified in this case?

[Onopenko] You need to read the decree of the Supreme Council "Procedure of Implementation of the Law of Ukraine 'On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'" and this law itself. Specifically, in the law "On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" Article 13 specifies that the powers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea may be suspended early in the event of it having violated the constitution and laws of Ukraine and of not having brought its decisions into line with them.

The dismissal of the premier is a fact which could, essentially, signify the corresponding reaction in the Supreme Council of Ukraine. There are further conditions whereby the powers of the Crimean authorities may be suspended.

[Pozdnyakova] Some people are terming the Supreme Council of Ukraine's response to the Crimean affairs inadequate.

[Onopenko] The Ministry of Justice has been tracking, as they say, the development of the situation in Crimea since 1993. It has pointed repeatedly to the contradictions of Crimean legislation relative to the constitution and laws of Ukraine. The republic press has raised these problems repeatedly. The power structures have been furnished with memoranda. The ministry has only certain powers and operates within this framework. We have not remained silent. We have, specifically, given explanations.

[Pozdnyakova] Of what kind precisely?

[Onopenko] Last week alone the Ministry of Justice gave three explanations. The first on dual citizenship, the second on the legislative acts adopted by the Supreme Council on 17 March, and the third on the dismissal of the premier, with which we began the interview.

[Pozdnyakova] Following his return from Kiev, Sergey Tsekov, speaking in the autonomy's parliament, said that the Supreme Council of Ukraine had violated a whole number of its own laws. And for this reason he did not consider himself bound to comply with the decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. Are there grounds for such statements?

[Onopenko] I heard Sergey Tsekov's speech, but this is a contrived problem. In adopting the latest legal documents on Crimea the Supreme Council of Ukraine did not deviate from the law one iota. For a lawyer everything is unequivocal here. Name the specific rule of Ukrainian, yes, Ukrainian, law in regard to which there are contradictions concerning the legislative acts that have been adopted. This may be discussed at the level of everyday converse. But it is necessary to speak in legal language and render a legal opinion. In this case it is impossible to share Mr. Tsekov's opinion.

[Pozdnyakova] Please clarify the situation as regards Yuriy Meshkov. He was formerly afforded the opportunity to be elected, and his legitimacy evoked no misgivings, consequently. But now, following the abolition of the office of president, what is his legal status, what is the legal way out of this situation?

[Onopenko] As far as Yuriy Meshkov is concerned, it is not a question of his dismissal from office. The institution of the presidency in the autonomy was eliminated. In accordance with the constitution, the Supreme Council was entitled to adopted such a decision.

[Pozdnyakova] Is there a record of the institution of criminal proceedings against Yuriy Meshkov? What awaits the ex-president?

[Onopenko] Truly, such a record has been made, but it should be perceived as a recommendation. Criminal proceedings in regard to Yu. Meshkov may be instituted by the procuracy, if there are grounds for this. But we need to see what the facts are and only after this make a final decision. It is still too early to talk about this today inasmuch as the General Procuracy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea has not, as far as I know, instituted such proceedings against Yu. Meshkov.

Law on Power Negotiations Described

954K0533A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 14 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Oleksandr Lavrynovych, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Commission on Issues

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of Legal Policy and Judicial-Legal Reform, by Olena Hubina; place and date not given: "Oleksandr Lavrynovych: 'The Economic Problems Will Not Be Resolved Until the Problems of State Power are Solved'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The overwhelming majority of the countries that have parted with their socialist past have already been able to adopt new constitutions, focusing on reform of the political power structures. Ukraine is a unique country in this regard, since it is still living under the Constitution of 1978. President Leonid Kuchma proposed that substantial changes be made in state power at the end of last year, to be incorporated into the draft law "State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine." It has been accepted by the Supreme Council for a first reading.

Why has it taken so long and been so hard to adopt a law on power? That is what we discussed with the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Commission on Issues of Legal Policy and Judicial-Legal Reform, Oleksandr Lavrynovych.

[Lavrynovych] However many times it may be repeated from podiums at all levels that the resolution of economic problems is the most important thing for Ukraine, they will not be resolved until the problems of state power are resolved.

What in general makes passing this law a necessity? First and foremost, in order that the economic reforms that the president was talking about in October can be implemented. The prevailing model of administration in Ukraine is unable to bring those reforms to life. The present power structure in Ukraine is inefficient, and in certain areas entirely unworkable. This pertains to the fact that we have no division of functions, rights, and responsibility for the decisions that could be made by each branch of power. There is no system of clear-cut mutual controls for various state bodies. Corruption is thus flourishing here at all levels of power, and there is no effective mechanism at all to institute some plan of action from the highest to the lowest level.

Every state resolves these statutory tasks through the adoption of its own constitution. Ukraine is truly unique in this regard. It has been impossible to bring together two thirds of the deputies as adherents of some single conceptual model, either in the last parliament or the present one.

Last year we began looking at a draft law on state power and local self-government. Even after its acceptance for a first reading, we received more than 900 proposals that could have affected the process of forming the remaining items.

The work of the coordinating commission that was created by the Supreme Council has been very intense, fruitful in compromises, with effective and businesslike collaboration among the representatives of nine deputies' groups. I never expected that before. On 6 February, after meeting with the administration of the president, we have a clear-cut and integral version that was overwhelmingly supported by all of the groups of deputies. There was a divergence of opinion on only four items. One, for example, pertains to the very idea of self-government itself: The leftist camp did not want to consider it at all. Only soviet power, they said.

[Hubina] And the other three items?

[Lavrynovych] They pertained to the possibility of the dissolution of the Supreme Council, the place of the procuracy, and the system of courts.

[Hubina] There were also disagreements in political approaches here?

[Lavrynovych] There are obviously political-administrative motives, since even the views of the noncommunist groups diverged. It was proposed, for example, that the place for the procuracy was under executive power, as it is in most of the nations of the world. Sometimes it is under the judicial, but nowhere is it independent. It should also be taken into account that the head of executive power here is also the head of state, and is the guarantor of the upholding of the laws of Ukraine. But one of the principal functions of the procuracy is precisely to oversee the upholding of legislation. It is thus logical that it has to be subordinate to the executive. That is the version, incidentally, that was submitted to the session.

[Hubina] You talk about the fruitful collaboration of the nine groups of deputies. Does that not signify that the Supreme Council, which is composed of people of various political views and stances, comes together when the discussion concerns a possible limitation of its rights?

[Lavrynovych] I think that is not the case. There are people in the Supreme Council, myself among them, who are not defending the interests of either the legislative body or the presidential branch of power, but are rather defending their own political views and the interests of the state. If a proposed scheme to resolve the structure of state power and administration is effective and optimal from my point of view, even if it restricts the interests of the Supreme Council, then I would staunchly defend such a situation. I feel that the existence of a body such as the Supreme Council in its current form is a great drag on the development of Ukraine, and a great harm that directly affects the life of every citizen. What else can you say about a body that wants to have its own vertical structure in parallel with the executive, from the Supreme Council to the rural council? But there cannot be two vertical structures that intervene in everyday life. I would like to see the Supreme Council become the parliament of Ukraine, and perform the functions that are inherent to a legislative body.

[Hubina] What remains of the fundamental provisions of the proposed law on which the president does not want to yield?

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[Lavrynovych] The president has categorically insisted that the existing structure of the upper levels of executive power be preserved. The deputies' groups approved an altered version that envisaged the existence of a unified government in Ukraine, a clear-cut vertical structure for executive power from the head of the executive, the head of the government, down to the local bodies. After several rounds of negotiations with the administration of the president, the presidential version itself was submitted to the session. But I think it will be the problem that will provoke the greatest debate in the sessions.

[Hubina] The deputies would like to see the president himself head the government?

[Lavrynovych] We favored the existence of a single body of state executive power. So that there is not simultaneously a Cabinet of Ministers and subdivisions of the administration of the president that duplicate each other. That is not the optimal system of power. That could never operate efficiently, in my opinion.

But the structure that was put forth at the session envisages the preservation of the Cabinet of Ministers and the position of prime minister. The administration of the president of course remains as well. Only the nature of the formation of the cabinet changes, with its entire composition headed by the prime minister named by the president individually. The Cabinet of Ministers has the right to adopt its own official acts that are signed by the prime minister therein. There exists the possibility of the concurrent adoption of edicts by the president. The only step forward from the present system is the fact that the Cabinet of Ministers is deprived of the right of legislative initiative. That right remains with the head of executive power alone.

[Hubina] What vertical structure is planned from the top down? Does it envisage the dissolution of the councils at all levels?

[Lavrynovych] One great positive feature of this law is that it puts an end to soviet power. The councils that have been elected and exist today will not be dissolved, but their functions will be markedly altered. The rural, town, and city councils are the level of local self-government. A body for regional representation is envisaged at the oblast level, the functions of which are extremely different from the functions of the local level. We are talking about the adoption of long-term programs for the development of regions, the approval of the budget, and the monitoring of its fulfillment, as well as a monitoring function over the state administration.

[Hubina] So legislative functions are retained at the highest levels?

[Lavrynovych] They remain with the Supreme Council.

[Hubina] You said at the beginning of our discussion that the law on power is also connected with the opportunities for economic reforms. Can it be expected that after its adoption, the path to reforms will open up? It that too simplistic a depiction?

[Lavrynovych] It is simplistic. The idea of the law, of course, includes the pursuit of economic reforms. But from my point of view, the type of structure of the supreme executive power that the president is advocating will not promote the incarnation of his program of economic reforms.

[Hubina] Oleksandr, I would like to touch on another problem—the law on power and the Constitution that exists today. How will they coexist?

[Lavrynovych] That is a big problem. The last article of this law says that other laws that are adopted in Ukraine may not contravene it, and that the legislation of Ukraine that was adopted earlier is in force only insofar as it does not contradict the norms of this law. Constitutional functions are clearly placed on this law.

We have proposed the following way out of the conflict with the currently prevailing Constitution—to adopt, in conjunction with the law on state power and local self-government, another law as well, a law invalidating certain articles of the prevailing Constitution. While the first law is able to be passed by a simple majority, the second requires two-thirds.

[Hubina] But doesn't another legal collision arise if the first law passes and the second does not?

[Lavrynovych] No one is saying it out loud right now, but it is a realistic situation. How can it be assessed?

First, the legislation of Ukraine has been steadily violating the Constitution since 1991, including the law under which this Supreme Council was elected. There is an element of precedence here.

A second aspect. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR of 1978 was accepted by the Soviet Union as a constituent element of the state that existed at the time. A rubber-stamp body that was not democratically elected and could not mirror the rights of the people living in Ukraine, or express its will. The question arises of whether that document of 1978 can be more legitimate than the other, which was adopted by a majority of the representatives of the people of Ukraine, elected democratically in an independent state.

[Hubina] What are the prospects for the consideration and adoption of the law?

[Lavrynovych] The work is over, and the technical aspect of the matter is all that remains. The draft legislation could realistically be considered in just a week. At least it is possible before the end of March.

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I do not think that it will simply be passed. But since it takes many steps forward, both with regard to the delimitation of the functions of power and with regard to the further resolution of the existence of two vertical structures, and has several provisions on the creation of an independent judicial system, I would like to see it adopted.

[Hubina] But what are the possible actions if it is not passed? At least the presidential items?

[Lavrynovych] There could be various actions. But I think that the president of Ukraine could best answer that question.

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Belarus

Leader on Conventional Weapons Destruction

LD0504184295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1631 GMT 5 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Alyaksandr Lukashenka told an expanded collegium meeting of the Belarusian Main Border Troops Department Tuesday [4 April] evening that he had decided to pause the destruction of conventional weapons "without any consultations with the Russian leadership" and "without agreeing on it with the republic's key ministers." It was a purely individual decision, he said.

Lukashenka believes that the republic's having a large amount of military hardware to be destroyed has "both military, political and economic aspects." "It is good when Belarus has weapons that can be sold, but it is bad when the republic is burdened with their reduction," he said. Lukashenka called "economically unjust" the situation when Belarus has to destroy the weapons at its own expense. "We did not create this hardware. The United States and NATO, forcing the former Soviet Union to maintain the arms race, are to blame for its presence on the republic's territory," he emphasized.

Lukashenka remarked that Russia did not fulfill its pledges it had given Belarus as to the destruction.

Lukashenka regarded some former socialist countries' intention to join NATO as a "possibility of creating a disbalance of forces in Europe, likely to lead to military confrontation." He added he was not referring to the threat of an armed conflict.

"Militarily and politically, Belarus has two options: either we protect our national assets with Russia, or we make the republic a corridor for the passage of confronting giant military formations," he said.

Lukashenka assured the border guards that he will stand for the need to guard the republic's border jointly with Russia as long as he stayed president.

According to Lukashenka, he had initiated the Russian-Belarusian treaty "On joint efforts in guarding the state border of Belarus." He dismissed the opposition's allegations on "Moscow's imperial manners" in the issue. "I pushed Russia towards taking the step, because Belarus alone cannot properly guard the borders with Poland and the Baltic states," he added. The treaty will promote bilateral integration, while the border guards will go ahead of economic integration in this case, he emphasized.

Lukashenka said the deployment of border troops on the border with Ukraine will not yet be discussed in the near future. "I am talking the Ukrainian president into joining the border and customs efforts Russia and Belarus are undertaking. However, it has proved fruitless so far," he admitted.

Lukashenka said this year the border guards will not experience undermanning. In this issue "there should not be democracy and idle talk. Every man has to fulfil his sacred duty as defender of the fatherland and serve in the army," he stressed.

Lukashenka promised the border guards financing the construction of housing for officers. The border guards will keep from 50 percent to 100 percent of the value of goods confiscated on the border, he said.

According to Lukashenka, Belarus represents a "stable and monolithic state where controllability is preserved." At the same time, he intends "to toughen the power" to ensure such stability in future "despite the opposition's accusing me of dictatorship."

"It is better to impose order today by peaceful means than do it tomorrow through a gun back-sight," he added.

Parliament Chairman Views NATO Expansion

AU0504150295 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Apr 95 p 3

[Interview with Parliament Chairman Myacheslaw Hryb by Zoltan Szalai in Warsaw; date not given: "An Expanded NATO Will Not Increase Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to opinions in Belarus, the expansion of NATO toward Central Europe would not increase the security of the countries involved, because this would encourage the creation of a new Eastern military bloc, Belarus Parliament Chairman Myacheslaw Hryb told us. Our Warsaw correspondent first asked Hryb, who was in Warsaw on transit, about Minsk's reservations regarding the NATO membership of Visegrad countries.

[Hryb] NATO and the Warsaw Pact were created under specific historical conditions, at the time of the Cold War. However, these times are over, so the question is why would it be absolutely necessary for the Central European countries to join NATO? From whom should these countries be defended? The expansion of NATO would not increase the security of these countries. On the contrary: this could lead to an opposite reaction, namely it would encourage the creation of a new military alliance in the East. Minsk would like to avoid this, but we could not disregard the fact that, with the Central European countries becoming NATO members, Belarus would again find itself in the forefront of the political-ideological struggle. Nor would Belarus' NATO membership represent a solution because, in that case, we would find ourselves in the same situation from the East. We would like neither this nor that; we want to remain neutral.

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[Szalai] During President Yeltsin's visit to Minsk, you signed a document on the joint defense of the borders. Does this mean that the borders of Belarus will again be defended by Russian soldiers?

[Hryb] No, not at all. According to the agreement, Russia took upon itself to guarantee our borders from the east, north, and south. On the other hand, Belarus is defending the Russian borders from the west, namely from the direction of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. We defend our borders with our own units; there will be no Russian soldiers at our borders.

[Szalai] Parliamentary elections will be held in Belarus on 14 May. What results do you expect?

[Hryb] It is very difficult to make predictions. It seems to me that neither the left nor the right succeeded in creating political blocs in Belarus. Although there have been attempts for this, they failed to come to an agreement on joint candidates. Therefore, there will be two oppositions in the new parliament: a right-wing and a left-wing opposition. At the same time, I am convinced that the bulk of the parliament will belong to the political center.

[Szalai] Lately, it seems that Belarus is increasingly divided into two parts: the strongly anticommunist National Front is leading in the western part of the country, a party that stresses independence, while the eastern part of the country is more pro-Russian....

[Hryb] There are historical reasons behind the differences between the eastern and western parts of Belarus: while the former belonged to the Soviet Union as early as in 1919, the latter was part of Poland until 1939. Therefore, the desire for independence has always been stronger in the western part. When we adopted the new constitution four years ago, we declared that Belarus is an independent and sovereign country. Thus, this issue no longer has any political importance today. As for economic development, close cooperation with Moscow indeed has priority. We have close ties with Russia, and this cannot, and should not be changed overnight. This does not mean, however, that our relations with countries to the west are neglected.

Minsk Criticizes Poland's Plans To Join NATO

LD0504172295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1535 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By BELINFORM correspondent Igor Ruban for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk April 5 TASS—Belarus does not approve of Poland's desire to join NATO, Byelorussian Parliament Chairman Mechyslaw Hryb said at a news conference in Minsk on Wednesday [5 April].

Hryb stressed that Poland's accession to NATO has a direct bearing on Belarus. "The republic may become a frontline of confrontation between the two systems. The people of Belarus already suffered from such confrontation in the past," he said.

Speaking just a day after Byelorussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka criticised Poland's drive for an alliance with NATO, Hryb warned that "if NATO expands, this may prod Eastern countries to establish a similar military and political bloc."

Government To Conclude Agreement on Taxation With Russia

WS0504080695 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers has resolved to conclude an agreement between the Governments of Belarus and Russia on avoiding dual taxation and preventing the avoidance of paying income and property taxes. Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich, member of the Cabinet of Ministers Collegium, was authorized to sign this agreement.

Hryb Denies Offer of Ambassadorship to U.S.

LD0504203895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1631 GMT 5 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] First Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy Tsepkalo dismissed in an Interfax interview that Supreme Soviet Chairman Mechyslaw Hryb was offered the position of ambassador to Washington.

Tsepkalo said he did not know anything about it. He is believed to be highly trusted by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

Tsepkalo believed that the Belarusian ambassador to Washington must be a career diplomat, fluent in English, such as Sergey Martynov, the present ambassador, whose work is highly appreciated by his superiors.

Hryb himself said that the president did not make such an offer and he could not accept it anyway because he had promised to stay with the Supreme Soviet until its term expires.

Hryb told Interfax that he will go to Lithuania Thursday [6 April] for a two-day official visit. He said he will meet Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and Sejmas Chairman Ceslavas Jursenas.

Hryb said he will not start discussion of the probable expansion of NATO by including the Baltic countries, in particular Lithuania, but if Lithuanian officials raise this issue he is prepared to explain his objections to admission of new member states to the North Atlantic Alliance.

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Moldova

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen Visits Moldova

LD0504212795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU, April 5 (Interfax)—Moldovan Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli, Foreign Minister Mikhail Popov and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, now on an official visit to Moldova, met in Chisinau this morning.

The Chinese foreign minister highly appraised Moldovan achievements in the international arena. He said China welcomed the policy of the Moldovan leaders aimed at strengthening the statehood, sovereignty and independence of the country.

The Moldovan government's press service told Interfax that the Moldovan prime minister had thanked China for support in the international arena and for assistance with dealing with the effects of natural disasters which had hit the republic last year.

China intends to grant to Moldova humanitarian aid worth $110,000 this year.

Meets PM Sangheli, Views Relations

AU0604072695 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1924 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, INFOTAG, 5/4/1995—The problems of bilateral relations between Moldova and China were discussed today by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Mihai Popov and Qian Qichen.

They pointed out that the two ministries are supposed to take active part in implementing the accords on developing cooperation in all spheres, which were reached during President Snegur's visit to Beijing in autumn of 1992.

Qian Qichen, who is also the deputy chairman of the Chinese State Council, has stated that his country is interested in developing such cooperation, and unquestionably supports Moldova's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. He invited Mihai Popov to visit the People's Republic of China.

The Chinese foreign minister met with Moldovan Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli today. Sangheli expressed gratitude to the Chinese leadership for the support on the international arena, for the assistance it has been rendering to Moldova in liquidating the consequences of last year's natural disasters, and for the humanitarian aid worth $110,000 which China is going to render to Moldova in 1995.

Qian Qichen highly appreciated Moldovan successes on the international arena, having pointed out that China welcomes the Moldovan policy of strengthening the country's statehood, sovereignty and independence.

President Snegur Receives Russia's Shumeyko

LD0504195795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU, April 5 (Interfax)—Moldovan President Mircea Snegur received Chairman of the Russian Federation Council (Russian Senate) Vladimir Shumeyko today.

Shumeyko was in Moldova on a two-day visit.

The Moldovan president's press service said the parties had discussed bilateral relations and stressed that they were in favor of lifting all obstacles for bilateral cooperation and restoring mutual confidence.

Snegur said he was in favor of the Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament) ratifying the bilateral treaty on friendship and cooperation signed in 1990 and an agreement on withdrawing the Russian 14th Army from Moldova.

Shumeyko Terms Chisinau Policy 'Wise'

AU0504204195 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1924 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, INFOTAG, 5/4/1995—On Wednesday [5 April], Moldovan President Mircea Snegur received the chairman of the Council of the Federation of the Russian Federal Assembly, Vladimir Shumeyko, who was on a two-day official visit in Moldova.

Shumeyko also met with the chairman of the Moldovan Parliament Petru Lucinschi, Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli, and Foreign Minister Mihai Popov.

The Joint Communique, adopted on the results of the official visit, reads that the sides spoke in favor of soonest-possible enactment of the framework Treaty on the Principles of the Inter-State Relations, signed on September 22, 1990, and additional protocol signed by the two Presidents in Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan) on February 10, 1995.

Having emphasized the importance of efforts being undertaken both by the Russian Federation and the OSCE Permanent Mission to Moldova in settling the Dniester dispute, the sides have agreed to use the authority of the CIS Parliamentary Assembly for settlement of the Dniester problem without delay.

During negotiations in Chisinau, Shumeyko and Moldovan officials underlined the necessity of ratification, by the Russian side, of the Army Withdrawal Agreement.

The sides also agreed to work out in near future a protocol on developing inter-parliamentary relations between the Moldovan Parliament and the Council of the Federation of the Russian Federal Assembly.

"Wise and correct"—that's how Vladimir Shumeyko named the Moldovan official policy. He pointed out that

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Russia is satisfied about the state of the bilateral relations, and is seeking to further develop them.

Answering a question of Russian journalists about "Romanization in Moldova," Moldovan Parliament Chairman Petru Lucinschi said at today's press conference that "Romanization is a slogan used by the most extremist forces in Dniester, who are seeking to intimidate population there and thus to justify their own actions."

Lucinschi failed to satisfy journalists' curiosity who asked him where he will hang the picture featuring the Moscow Kremlin given to him by Vladimir Shumeyko. Shumeyko turned the situation into a joke, having remarked that the gift is one more proof that "Lucinschi is Kremlin's agent in Moldova."

Russia stands up for settling the Dniester dispute in the framework of integral Moldova, said Vladimir Shumeyko. At today's press conference on the results of his two-day official visit to Chisinau, Shumeyko has outlined three aspects in the Dniester problem—the international legal, political, and moral.

From the viewpoint of international legal norms, Russia has recognized and has been strictly observing the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Moldova, whose integral part Dniester is. As for internal administrative-territorial set-up, this is entirely in the competence of Chisinau, he said.

"From the political viewpoint, one should say that certain political forces both in Russia and Dniester are nostalgic about the former Soviet Union, and hope to revive it by supporting each other. That is exactly why the recent arrival of several deputies to Tiraspol should be regarded as their personal initiative, and by no means as Russian official stance. Sober-minded politicians realize that history cannot be re-wound. There will be no new Soviet Union, and we should build new political relations" he said.

In the moral aspect, Russia shall support ethnic Russians without interfering into the policies of the states they live in. In this regard, he pointed out that there are neither discrimination nor violations of Russians' human rights in Moldova that is why out of 532,000 ethnic Russians living in Moldova only 17 thousand expressed wish to assume the Russian citizenship.

"We shall keep on helping our compatriots through the local Russian community. We cannot speak about any infringements on their human rights. And though the Russian language has neither the status of an official nor of a language for inter-ethnic communication, the new Moldovan Constitution guarantees to it the right for using, protection and development, and every person may freely use it in all spheres," Shumeyko pointed out.

He named as "emotions" the statements of the Dniester parliament chairman who said that "Tiraspol shall not allow for the 14th Army withdrawal." Vladimir Shumeyko has stressed that this will not be an "army withdrawal" as such, but, in fact the evacuation of armaments, because only 85 servicemen out of the 6,500 men in the 14th Army were recruited in Russia, with all the rest being Dniester residents.

Shumeyko abstained from giving any forecasts concerning the ratification of the framework Withdrawal Agreement and other related documents, but expressed confidence that after the tragedy in Chechnya the Russian parliamentarians will vote in favor of the armament removal from Dniester.

At the same time, he let understand that the implementation of the signed documents may begin even before they are ratified by the State Duma, having remarked that there are lots of examples of the kind in the world.

Shumeyko Confirms 14th Army Pullout

LD0504160095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1526 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau April 5 TASS—Despite the protests from the leaders of the Dniester region, the 14th Army will leave Moldova, Chairman of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko said.

In an interview with ITAR-TASS on Wednesday, Shumeyko said the property of the 14th Army belongs to Russia as the legal successor to the former Soviet Union and no one has the right to dispose of it.

In his view, the army's arsenals of weaponry in the Dniester region are much bigger than it needs. "We have seen in Chechnya what enormous stocks of weapons in the conflict zone may lead to," he said.

Shumeyko believes it is possible to avoid resistance of the local population to the withdrawal of troops if Chisinau and Tiraspol come to agreement in resolving the Dniester problem.

"In this connection, we have proposed that the Moldavian leadership declare political amnesty for all participants in the conflict. We believe this will considerably ease people's concerns that forcible actions will begin after the withdrawal of Russian troops," he said.

Earlier, the Dniester region leaders said they would not allow the Russian troops to leave and did not rule out the possibility of actions of protest on the part of the local population which disapproved of the idea of the withdrawal of the 14th Army in the March 26 referendum.

Sangheli Says Chisinau Protests Destabilize Situation

AU0504123295 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1807 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 4/4/1995—The manifestations in Chisinau are directly

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related to the local elections of 16 April and are only organized with an aim to destabilize the situation and to influence the results of the elections, Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli stated. Speaking at the government sitting today, he said that the Chisinau events have influenced greatly the results of the recent Dniester [local] elections and the situation in the rebel region, on the whole. "We were on the verge of positive settlement of the problem, and an ordinary summit was arranged to discuss the Dniester status... [punctuation as received] Now we are far away from all that again. Tiraspol has returned to its former attitudes, and the situation in the Dniester rural areas has generally deteriorated due to the slogans being heard in the Chisinau streets."

Sangheli said that relations with foreign countries in economic, banking, and financial fields, that used to develop fast only very recently, have slowed down dramatically, and even frozen, not only on the governmental level but even between individual companies and joint ventures. Foreign partners are waiting for the situation to clarify, and are postponing scheduled visits.

In his opinion, the demands to raise stipends are peanuts compared with the far-reaching strategic goals pursued by the opposition. "Their objectives are perfectly clear to us," Sangheli stressed.

The prime minister said that appropriate legal proceedings were initialed in connection with the manifestations, and called the law-enforcement bodies "to be more energetic in fulfilling laws."

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Kazakhstan

Reportage on U.S. Defense Minister Perry Visit

'Satisfaction' With Bilateral Cooperation

LD0504113695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1058 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, April 5 (Interfax)—Kazakhstan and the United States are satisfied with bilateral cooperation, including that in the disarmament sphere, president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev and U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry stressed in Almaty today.

Perry noted with satisfaction that Kazakh dismantling and withdrawal of strategic missiles and nuclear materials is being done two-three months ahead of schedule, press secretary of the Kazakh leader Dulat Kuanyshev told Interfax.

In his words, Perry reaffirmed the U.S. view of Kazakhstan as an important strategic partner and the hope that Nazarbayev will prove to be the leader of democratic processes in the Central Asian republic and the whole region.

Nazarbayev and Perry called for indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Today the U.S. visitor is expected to meet Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin and heads of the State Committee for Defense Industries to announce U.S. initiatives for aiding Kazakh defense industry conversion.

Security, Defense Cooperation Discussed

LD0504201895 Almaty Kazakh Radio First Program in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev received U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, who arrived in Almaty on an official visit 4 April, at his residence today. During a long conversation, they discussed international and regional security issues and the development of bilateral relations in the defense sphere.

They analyzed the progress that has been made in implementing agreements stipulating secure and reliable dismantlement of the nuclear weapons left on the territory of our republic. It was noted that there was a need to intensify cooperation in the sphere of defense conversion. The sides were unanimous that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty should be prolonged indefinitely and unconditionally.

Nursultan Nazarbayev declared that Kazakhstan was ready to expand and extend its defense cooperation with the United States under the charter on democratic partnership and the memorandum on mutual understanding in the sphere of defense and military relations, which were signed in Washington in February 1994.

William Perry was briefed on the development of the republic's domestic political situation in light of the announcement of a national referendum on extending President Nursultan Nazarbayev's term in office. In turn the U.S. defense secretary said that to his country Kazakhstan represented a country of great strategic importance. In his view, our republic has made major historic achievements in recent years and rightfully holds a notable place in the world community.

Those taking part in the meeting on the Kazakh side were Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin, Security Council Secretary Tulegen Zhukeyev, Defense Minister Saghadat Nurmaghambetov, and Foreign Minister Qasymzhomart Toqayev.

Also today, William Perry held talks with Saghadat Nurmagambetov, and later with Amangeldy Kazhybayev, chairman of the government committee for the defense industry. A wide range of issues concerning military and conversion activity were discussed at these talks. At a news conference held afterward the U.S. defense secretary expressed satisfaction with the results of his visit to Kazakhstan and spoke in favor of further developing and extending bilateral partnership, including cooperation in maintaining regional security and stability.

Perry Discusses Nuclear Arms Issues

LD0504135595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1326 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Amangeldy Akhmetalimov and Gennadiy Kulagin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almaty April 5 TASS—Today's meeting between President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and U.S. Defense Minister William Perry who is currently on a visit to Almaty, focused on problems of international and regional security, and the development of bilateral relations in the sphere of defense.

During a long talk the two sides analyzed the course of the implementation of agreements on the safe and reliable dismantling of nuclear weapons which still remains on the territory of the republic, and noted the need to intensify cooperation in the field of defense conversion. Both sides were unanimous that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty must be prolonged unlimitedly and unconditionally.

According to President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan is prepared for widening and developing defense cooperation with the United States in keeping with the charter on democratic partnership and a memorandum on mutual understanding in the field of defense and military relations signed in Washington in February 1994.

William Perry was informed of the development of the internal political situation in the republic connected with

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the announced nationwide referendum on the extension of Nursultan Nazarbayev's presidential powers.

The U.S. defense minister noted that for his country Kazakhstan was a state of a great strategical importance. In his view, over the last few years Kazakhstan has made historical achievements and by right occupies a notable place in the world community.

On the same day William Perry held talks with Kazakh Defense Minister Saghadat Nurmaghambetov, and then with Amangeldy Qazhibayev, chairman of the committee for the defense industry under the Cabinet of Ministers of the republic. The two sides discussed a wide range of issues concerning the military and conversion activities.

At a news conference organized later today, the U.S. defense minister expressed his satisfaction with the results of his visit to Kazakhstan, and spoke for the further development and deepening of bilateral partnership, including interaction in maintaining regional security and stability.

Nazarbayev Favors Extending NPT

LD0504190495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1631 GMT 5 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlinx]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As President Nursultan Nazarbayev had talks with the US Defence Secretary William Perry in Almaty on Wednesday [5 April], it was stated that Kazakhstan and the United States are satisfied with bilateral cooperation in various fields, including disarmament.

The Kazakh presidential press-secretary Dulat Kuanyshev has said Mr Perry stated with satisfaction that Kazakhstan was dismantling and removing strategic missiles and nuclear materials from its territory two to three months ahead of schedule.

Kuanyshev said Mr Perry confirmed that the United States regarded Kazakhstan as an important strategic partner and hoped that Nazarbayev would prove the leader of democratic processes in his own country and in the whole region.

Kuanyshev said that President Nazarbayev and Defence Secretary Perry called for prolonging the nuclear arms Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] indefinitely.

Mr Perry is going to have a meeting with the Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin and officials of the committee for the defence industry on Wednesday. At that meeting the United States is to declare its initiatives in promoting the conversion of Kazakhstan's defence enterprises.

Perry 'Displeased' With Nazarbayev Term Extension

LD0504153095 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1500 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] In Almaty the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has met with the visiting U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry. [passage omitted]

Mr. Perry voiced displeasure over Mr. Nazarbayev's recent moves to dissolve parliament and to call a referendum to extend his term in office until the year 2000. Mr. Nazarbayev argued that extending his presidency in such a way was possible in line with the republic's constitution.

U.S. To Give $14.7 Million for Disarmament

LD0504142595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1341 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almaty April 5 TASS—The United States administration is to give Kazakhstan 14.7 million dollars to promote the nuclear disarmament of the former soviet republic, while US companies involved in conversion projects in Kazakhstan will raise the amount to 36.9 million dollars.

Four joint ventures will be created to promote conversion, it was announced Wednesday at a joint press conference of Kazakh Defence Minister Saghadat Nurmaghambetov and his visiting US counterpart William Perry.

Perry said that US assistance to Kazkhstan in converting its defence industry to civilian production will decrease the threat of nuclear proliferation, strengthen the Kazakh independence and its international prestige, help build a democratic society and create a market economy.

Nurmaghambetov said his talks with Perry passed "in the spirit of trust and accord" and will help implement the agreements on a complete elimination of nuclear silos on the Kazakh territory.

He added that all issues raised by Kazakhstan "enjoyed unconditional support of the US secretary of defence".

Perry on U.S. Investments

LD0504200795 Almaty Kazakh Radio First Program Network in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This afternoon Kazakh Defense Minister Saghadat Nurmaghambetov and U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry held a news conference on the results of negotiations which took place in Almaty. During the news conference it was announced that it was decided to set up four Kazakh-American joint ventures.

The total sum of investments to implement these projects will be $36.9 million. The U.S. Government is to allocate $14.7 million under the program for jointly

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reducing the nuclear threat, the rest of the funds coming from American companies involved in these projects.

The funds will be channeled via Kazakhstan's national nuclear center for the conversion of the former test site near Semipalatinsk; for a plant manufacturing printed circuit boards; to the Gidromash plant, which used to produce rocket and aircraft systems, for setting up production of valves and pressurized vessels for cryogenic materials and gases; to the Biomedpreparat company for production of vitamins, antibiotics, and other pharmaceutical products instead of military chemicals; and to the Kazinformtelekom military industrial company, so it can be turned into an international telecommunications company.

As William Perry noted, the assistance the USA is giving Kazakhstan to carry out defense conversion will reduce the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and will help strengthen its independence and international prestige, build a democratic society, and create a commercially viable market economy.

The negotiations took place in a spirit of trust and accord, Saghadat Nurmaghambetov emphasized at the news conference. They will make it possible to be more active in fulfilling earlier agreements on completely destroying nuclear silo installations situated on the republic's territory. All the issues raised by the Kazakh side received the U.S. defense secretary's absolute support.

This evening William Perry left Almaty for Uzbekistan.

Tajikistan

Islamic Rebirth Official Meets Uzbek President

LD0504201995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—Deputy Chairman of the Movement for Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan Akbar Turadzhonzoda said the results of his meeting with Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Tashkent on April 3 were "promising."

Turadzhonzoda told Interfax today that Karimov considered it necessary to begin political settlement of the inter-Tajik problem as soon as possible as "stability in the entire Central Asian region depends on the problem's settlement."

Turadzhonzoda said the Uzbek president had earlier proposed to Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and the Tajik parliament "not to rush" to hold the parliamentary and presidential elections until the situation in the country was stabilized. "The Uzbek president told me that he did not have a particularly big chance of influencing Rakhmonov," Turadzhonzoda said.

Karimov said international organizations should take a more active part in resolving the inter-Tajik conflict, Turadzhonzoda said.

"Karimov also backed our proposal on creating a coalition Tajik government," Turadzhonzoda said. He said he believed that 40 percent of such a government should be representatives of the Tajik present authorities, 40 percent of the opposition and 20 percent of representatives of all Tajik parties and ethnic minorities.

Turadzhonzoda said he believed that the coalition government must be headed by a representative of North Tajikistan from the Leninabad Region (North Tajiks have traditionally occupied the leading posts in the republic - IF note) and that his deputies must be representatives of the both opposition and present authorities.

Turadzhonzoda said the Uzbek president was in favor of granting political and general amnesty to all parties and movements involved in the Tajik conflict.

Dushanbe 'Alarmed' at Possible Uzbek Withdrawal

LD0504203195 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0800 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A briefing was held for foreign journalists at the republic's foreign office on 4 April. Zafar Saidov, head of the information department at the Tajik Foreign Ministry, made an official statement. It says the following:

The leadership of Tajikistan gives high praise to the role of the CIS countries in assisting the resolution of Tajikistan's political problems by peaceful means and by organizing political negotiations for Tajikistan. The leadership of Tajikistan has thus supported and noted all the specific initiatives by the United Nations and other influential international organizations, and by the CIS countries, above all Russia, in the process of ensuring security in the region and stabilizing the social and political situation of Tajikistan, and their mediatory activity to secure peace and tranquillity in the region.

Independent Tajikistan has traditionally pursued good relations with the Republic of Tajikistan, and signed a treaty on friendship and mutual assistance with that country in January 1993.

As observers of the inter-Tajik political process, our neighbors certainly have the right to establish a relationship with representatives of the various political forces involved in the Tajik conflict, as long as this relationship proves useful. In this context we must view the meeting between President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the heads of the Tajik opposition, held in Tashkent on 3 April this year, as a continuation of the Uzbek leadership's efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of this process. This will contribute to creating a political situation of full normality in the region as soon as possible.

Despite this, the fact that the leadership of Tajikistan was not officially informed about this serious political initiative came as a surprise to us. It ran counter to the

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letter and spirit of the treaty between the republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on friendship, good-neighborliness, and mutual aid.

The Tajik leadership is seriously alarmed at the reports circulating in the foreign media that the leadership of Uzbekistan wants to withdraw its contingent—part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces—from our country's territory. If this information corresponds to the truth, this step may be regarded as a departure from the CIS Collective Security Treaty signed in Tashkent in May 1992.

The president of Uzbekistan was a signatory to the statement on Tajikistan of 10 February 1992, which the heads of state of Central Asia and Russia addressed to the UN Security Council, and in which they lent their support to the Tajik Government's request that the CIS Collective Peacekeeing Forces should be given the status of UN peacekeeping forces.

The leadership of Tajikistan expresses hope that any unilateral initiative by any side aimed at resolving the Tajik issue will be in accordance with the laws governing the republic and with the United Nations, which has assumed the responsibility of mediator. [passage omitted]

New Parliament Begins First Session

LD0604093495 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0600 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear listeners, today at 1000 sharp in the morning the first session of the Supreme Assembly began work. Kholmurod Sharipov, the chairman of the Central Electoral and Referendum Commission of the Republic of Tajikistan, opened the session and made a report to the people's delegates on the results of the election.

The people's delegates honored the memory of people's delegate Zayniddin Muhitdinov with a minute's silence. Of the 178 elected people's delegates, 176 of them are taking part in the work of the session. In the session's morning meeting, the temporary regulations of the session's work were adopted. The people's delegates confirmed the agenda of the session and elected a mandate commission. President Imomali Rakhmanov is taking part in the work of the session. A break in the parliament's work has just been announced at the Conference Hall.

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Armenia

Turkish Inspection Group Arrives in Yerevan

MM0404124695 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Denisov: "Foreign Military Experts Will Engage in Recording and Monitoring"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 3 April an inspection group from the Turkish Republic which also includes representatives of the U.S. and Danish armed forces arrived in Yerevan.

This is the second inspection group this year in the Transcaucasus region. It will check the presence of military equipment and weapons in accordance with the quotas set by the Tashkent agreement of the CIS heads of state and their compliance with the points of the treaty on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. Two inspections will be carried out at establishments of the 102d military base of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus stationed on Armenian territory.

President Hopes New Religious Leader Will Reunite Church

LD0504220095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, April 5 (Interfax)—Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan expressed the hope at a meeting with the Garegin II, the new catholicos of all Armenians, in Yerevan Wednesday [5 April] that the Armenian church will reunite soon.

The National Church Council of the Armenian Apostolic Church elected the catholicos of Cilicia Garegin II, born Nshan Sarkisyan.

Ter-Petrosyan said that Garegin II will be able to overcome the nearly 40-year-old split in the Armenian church.

Ter-Petrosyan expressed the hope that, once it acquired its supreme leader, the Armenian Apostolic Church will work even more vigorously for the good of the entire nation.

Festivities were held in Yerevan on the occasion of the election of the catholicos.

Vazgen I, the previous catholicos of all Armenians, died last August at the age of 86.

Finance Minister, World Bank Official Sign Credit Agreement

LD0504220495 Moscow INTERFAX in Russian 1824 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, April 5 (Interfax)—The World Bank's envoy to Armenia Vagram Nersisiants and Armenia's Finance Minister Levon Barkhudaryan signed an agreement on a $300,000 credit to Armenia in Yerevan Wednesday [5 April]. The credit will be used to modernize transport telecommunications and develop businesses. The interest-free credit is extended for a term of 35 years and Armenia is to begin to pay it back in 10 years' time.

Nersisiants said that the entire project was estimated at $30 million. The first credit of $300,000 is meant to form a working group to work out a program to build or modernize 1,200-1,400 kilometers of transport links in Armenia.

Armenia's Finance Minister Levon Barkhudaryan said that other agreements with the World Bank were being prepared for signing, including a credit to Armenia to form social security and investment funds.

Premier Reviews 1994 Socioeconomic Results

954F1884A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 21 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Speech of Grant Bagratyan in the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia: "Main Results of Socioeconomic Development and Economic Policy for 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

I. Main Results of 1994

The draft program of the Republic of Armenia's socioeconomic development for 1995 and the state budget that have been presented to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia proceed entirely from the logic of the phased resolution of the problems confronting our republic. The essence of these documents is based on the one hand on the current socioeconomic situation, on the other, on the goals that the government outlines. From this viewpoint, the program and the budget are qualitatively different from similar documents of previous years.

First and foremost, they have been presented in a period when five years of the creation of statehood and the fundamental reform of socioeconomic reality connected with it are behind us. In 1994, which was, I believe, one of the most significant years in the formation of our new statehood, we were able to complete here, in the main, the formation of the attributes and structures necessary for an independent state—from the viewpoint of the creation of both the political and socioeconomic institutional foundations.

Second, we are for the first time discussing such documents with the consciousness that in a statewide envelopment the economic reforms that we have undertaken have begun to produce definite results.

Third, the documents that have been presented have won the approval of international financial institutions, which to support the dynamics of Armenia's socioeconomic life have decided to make important financial injections in its economy.

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Let us attempt to collate the main results of 1994.

The Strengthening of the State and its Continued Formation and Increased International Authority

The year of 1994 was one of international political and economic recognition of the Republic of Armenia and its enhanced standing in the world.

Without going into the details of last year's numerous political and economic events, it should be noted that from the viewpoint of external relations, 1994 showed for the first time the interconnection of the unity of political and economic phenomena and the fact that the attitude toward our country is ultimately connected with a recognition by other countries of long-term economic interests and also the fact that the state's foreign policy predetermines to a considerable extent the positive or negative course of economic life within the republic. In other words, it is obvious that in order to achieve favorable political trends and guarantees, it is essential to know how to make the country interesting in the economic aspect. Otherwise, any policy will be based merely on emotions. It was the fundamental changes in the course of the economic reforms and the obvious fact of economic growth (which is rare with such a pace of reforms) that led to the political decision of international financial organizations to approve the economic programs of the Government of the Republic of Armenia and to render the country support.

Economic Growth and Sharp Acceleration of the Reforms

The year of 1994 was the first when growth was recorded in terms of all macroeconomic indicators compared with 1993: produced national income, 104.3 percent, utilized national income, 112 percent, industrial output, 106.9 percent, agriculture, 103.2 percent, exports, 126 percent, imports, 152.1 percent, and so forth. For the first time there was a decline in the level of unemployment, which constituted 5.8 percent compared with 6.3 percent the previous year. It should be noted that we will in 1995 also perceive economic growth compared with 1994. The sole CIS country that will in this respect.

The year's main result was the growth of real wages. Thus, in December 1994 average pay in the public sector had grown by a factor of 22.1 compared with December of the previous year, whereas the consumer price index had grown by a factor of 18.6, that is, the increase in pay outstripped the increase in prices by approximately 20 percent. And although the social situation of broad strata of the population remains extremely strained and the level of compensation of persons working in the publicly funded sphere is [word illegible] insupportable, we were able last year, nonetheless, to ease the severe economic consequences connected with the introduction at the end of 1993 of the national currency—the dram. Thus, compared with 1993, the average real wage in 1994 was inferior only by a factor of 1.56 to the average annual increase in prices, whereas in the period October-December 1993 the situation had deteriorated by a factor of 17. This means that in 1994 we were able to rectify 65 percent of the negative phenomena that had arisen as a result of the introduction in 1993 of the dram. It should be added to this also that in making the transition from the real wage to the living standard, account should be taken as well of the substantial economic assistance that comes from overseas and that constitutes one-third of personal income, on average.

The year of 1994 was special in the sense of reforms also. From the viewpoint of the extent of them, it is probably inferior to 1991, when the land was privatized, but it was unprecedented in terms of the scope, multifaceted character, and depth of the influence on the socioeconomic processes that occurred in society. The reforms incorporated not only privatization. There was a cardinal change also in the tax and budget spheres, a qualitatively new system of foreign trade—without licenses and quotas—was established, the work of a substantial part of domestic trade was streamlined, modern forms of the government order and the accomplishment of capital construction were introduced, the operation of the military-industrial complex was organized, the transfer of capital was liberalized, and investment restrictions were eliminated. Serious organizational and structural reforms were undertaken in the year in segments of the ministries of industry and construction, and this process was completed in aviation. These reforms were begun in power engineering and on the railroad. This work will shortly commence also in the sphere of health care. It may be said that, thanks to all this, the government has switched from the principle of direct control of the activity of economic entities to a policy of influencing the market with the aid of indirect levers.

All this was enshrined by the monetary policy that was pursued by the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia.

Serious progress has been made also in privatization, although the organization of the work here is in need of appreciable adjustments and clarification. The laws, edicts, and decrees adopted in the course of the past year by the Supreme Council, the president, and the Government of the Republic of Armenia made it possible:

to complete, in the main, the process of partial uncompensated privatization at approximately 1,050 enterprises and organizations;

to have privatized as of 1 February 1995 approximately 400 small facilities;

to have privatized approximately half of public housing.

It is estimated that 1994 was the first year when more than half the national income was produced by the private sector of the economy. It is important to note also that the privatization strategy for which we have opted (in order of priority: agriculture, processing, trade, the investment complex, large-scale production, and the

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social infrastructure) and the specific mechanisms of its realization, taking account of all the negative phenomena noted in the course of privatization in the countries of East Europe and in Russia, enabled us to secure in this period the dynamics of production and to tackle the overriding task of preventing a recession. The process of the issue to the public of privatization certificates was completed recently. Of the 3.438 million persons on the rolls, certificates had been received as of 5 March by 3.061 million persons. This means that 90 percent of the population, at a minimum, is directly or indirectly supporting the privatization process.

Mention should be made together with this of a number of very complex problems connected with privatization which not only were not resolved in 1994 but which intensified, even.

We should not, first and foremost, have confined ourselves merely to privatization. It was necessary to have made extensive use also of forms of denationalization (the lease, authorized management, and so forth), particularly in such spheres of the economy as power engineering, transport, and health care, where the state's domination is as yet obligatory. At the same time, however, the rapid process of privatization in other spheres is leading to macroeconomic disproportion, engendering and intensifying such negative phenomena as nonpayments, structural discrepancies, the unwarranted strengthening of one branch at the expense of another, and insufficient compensation.

Second, it is essential once again to take stock most seriously of our entire legal field, both laws and decisions adopted by the executive authorities, in order to exclude or reduce to a minimum loopholes for some reckless citizens who are defrauding people of their money for the purpose of subsequent enrichment, even at the price of loss of their own liberty. It is very important to prevent such phenomena from spreading from the credit and financial sphere to the production enterprises—the sphere of privatization in the form of stock companies.

Third, it is necessary to conclusively regulate government operations. By virtue of the above-mentioned objective structural discrepancy, the indebtedness of the public sector of the economy, and in some instances, of the government directly, to the private sector [sentence as published]. In 1995 a new, competitive, mechanism of the government order, the elimination of government quotas, the balanced state of the budget, and the accomplishment of the reforms will enable us to rid ourselves of the deplorable tradition of past years.

Curbing Inflation, Stimulating Foreign Trade, Tax and Budget Policy, and Stabilization of the Dram

The sharp reduction in the rate of inflation, and at the end of the year, its practical control, should undoubtedly be considered a most important result of 1994. Thus, whereas the growth of consumer prices constituted over the year a factor of 18.6, the average monthly inflation figure at the end of the first quarter constituted 46.2 percent, in the second, 38.5 percent, in the third, 2.7 percent, and in the fourth, 27.1 percent. This last was caused mainly by the increase as of 1 December 1994 in the cost of food and fixed-price services (bread, electric power).

Despite the appreciable slowing over the year in the rate of inflation, it should be noted, nonetheless, that the government did not "squeeze into" the framework of figures specified by the program of socioeconomic development for 1994. Inflation has now declined by a factor of 1.9. True, the planned indicators have been "overfulfilled" in 1995 already: Thus, inflation in January constituted 9.9 percent (instead of the planned 14.1 percent), and in February, 0.7 percent (5.5 percent was planned).

An analysis of the dynamics of inflation in 1994 permit the assumption that the increase in the cost of food and fixed-price services accounted for the lion's share here. Thus, for example, in the course of the year bread increased in price by a factor of 87, urban mass transit, 59, and communications, by a factor of 100, whereas basic foods (meat, dairy, vegetable) increased by a factor of 4-7, and fuel, by a factor of 2-3. In dollar terms, incidentally, the prices of food and fuel sold at unrestricted prices declined in the course of the year. As was to have been expected, the change in the cost of commodities sold at unrestricted prices accurately reflected the fluctuations in the price of the dram. This means that both inflation and the process of stabilization of the dram were influenced by the same factors:

the growth of production and the increased commodity supply;

the appreciable growth of exports and of imports connected with this;

the tightening of budget policy and the abandonment of the practice of the release into circulation (issue) of "unearned" money via the budget;

the regulation of credit and financial policy and the deprivation of the commercial banks of money issue by way of credit;

the improvement in tax work and the expansion, at the end of the year particularly, of the tax base.

Despite the positive results in curbing inflation in 1994, even its present rate is, nonetheless, high enough, inasmuch as serious non-government investments in the economy may be expected only under the conditions of prolonged stability. It is this that is the reason why the average annual level of inflation for 1995 is put at 65 percent, but excluding the increase in the prices of goods and fixed-price services, only 23 percent.

The year of 1994 was also marked by considerable progress in the sphere of foreign trade: The rate of growth of exports constituted 126 percent (67 billion

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drams), and imports, 152 percent (123 billion drams). A careful analysis of the balance of payments showed that we were able in 1994:

having increased foreign trade appreciably, to raise sharply the extent and proportion of their [as published] registration in the banking and tax spheres, securing thereby an influx into the republic of foreign currency;

to increase compared with 1993 foreign trade both with overseas countries (93.5 percent) and with republics of the former USSR (10 percent), which is a positive trend from the viewpoint of an outlet to new markets and the preservation of old ones;

to preserve and increase in the export structure the proportion of finished products—diamonds, jewelry, machinery, equipment, and chemical products;

to complete in full a new, nontariff system of the regulation of foreign trade, completely renounce the system of licenses and quotas, which has outlived its time, strengthen the fiscal system of the supervision of activity, and, finally, create one of the most unrestricted systems of foreign trade.

Together with this, problems intensified in the course of the year, and, in a number of cases, new ones appeared:

the absence of a regulator of imports and exports of ores and raw material resources;

the absence of reliable mechanisms of the organization of fuel imports;

the absence of a clear-cut policy and modus operandi on the foreign market, and the colossal losses which, as a consequence of ignorance and, in individual cases, as a result of criminal intent, are being incurred by society and economic entities—up to and including the appropriation of their funds. The year of 1994 was a year of the formation and a new quality of the efficiency of operation of the tax and fiscal system.

First, in the form of laws, edicts, and decrees, the legislative field took shape almost completely, which made it possible to "close" the tax chain in the sense of the unimpeded taxation of income.

Second, the existence of a classical tax system with low rates of taxation, considering the country's particular features (tax receipts in 1994 constituted 11.1 percent of the domestic gross product), became a reality.

Third, the tax base expanded, which afforded an opportunity for making the budget, as of June, self-sufficing, and as of October, for obtaining for the first time more than 4 billion drams ($10 million) in revenue.

Fourth, budget expenditure was regulated and streamlined in individual areas, which made it possible at the macroeconomic level to balance financial and material flows, and serious steps were taken to amalgamate (consolidate) the revenue of budgets of all levels and to record the revenue of all budgets.

But together with this, a tremendous amount of work has still to be done to collect excise tax, value-added tax, and property tax; the arrears have reached giant proportions; and the justification of budget expenditure is still at an inadequate level. Inspections in the ministries, departments, and executive committees uncovered instances of the scattering, inefficient use, and, in individual cases, the appropriation of budget funds.

A most important result of 1994 was the stabilization of the value of the dram. Ultimately, the exchange rate of the national currency collates in synthetic form the activity of the economy. Changes in it are essentially an evaluation of socioeconomic policy. The assurance by our own efforts of the stability of the dram as of the middle of 1994 was, aside from the main factors cited above, the result of the Central Bank's contraction of the proportion of the cash dram, the comparative improvement in the balance of payments, and the transition to an austere credit policy. An appreciable influence on the stabilization of the dram was exerted also by the use of foreign credit and investments funds of the all-Armenia Ayastan Foundation. Together with this, the nonpayments crisis is intensifying; a credit market, particularly along the lines of long-term lending, is absent as yet; and the securities market is in an embryonic state. The percentage of the on-time repayment of allocated credit is low, there are no forms of liquidity among economic entities as yet other than monetary payments, and there is a multitude of instances of the citizens' dubious accumulation of money.

New Stage of Economic Policy and its Realization With the Aid of International Financial Organizations

As of 1 December of last year, the Government of the Republic of Armenia embarked on the implementation of a new stage of its economic policy, the main goal of which is the completion in 1995 of the key reforms and transition to a market economy.

The basis of the economic policy of this stage is the following ideology. First and foremost, to exclude a budget deficit from the viewpoint of financing from money-issue sources. For it is necessary to close off all loopholes in tax policy and pool all state resources in the budget and to cover a shortage of revenue thanks to loan capital. Then to allocate the Central Bank borrowed foreign currency resources for reserves. These measures will afford an opportunity for the achievement of the main goal—stabilization of the dram, irrespective of current fluctuations in the level of production. The conclusive stabilization of the dram should create in people and economic entities incentives to earn drams, in other words, cause a stimulation of economic activity. This, in turn, should lead to a growth of revenue, initially for the economic entities and then, considering a certain time lag, of the state budget also. There will be a

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revitalization in parallel of investment activity also. Initially in respect to the production and social infrastructures on the part of the state (it is for this reason that the credit for financial stabilization will be replenished by investment credit) and then on the part of economic entities also.

It should be noted that the government has fulfilled and overfulfilled the promises made in November 1994 connected with the amounts of outside financial support. Even in terms of their absolute amounts, these sums exceed the resources allocated for far bigger countries, not to mention the resulting per capita amount of this assistance. It is thanks to these that the revenue side of the draft budget that has been presented to you today is approximately three times as high as last year's. Approval of the economic policy that we formulated was the principal guarantor of this success. The sum total in terms of the credit agreements and aid protocols shows a balance of approximately $1 billion, of which, at a minimum, $440 million represent current financing of the 1995 balance of payments.

Another important success in the work with international financial organizations is the fact that final agreement was reached on long-term (for three to five years) cooperation. It is contemplated concluding with the World Bank alone eight investment credit agreements totaling $300 million. This modus operandi will make it possible to increase appreciably the efficiency of the funds that are obtained. First, this program corresponds strictly to the government's plans to draw up a five-year plan of socioeconomic development for 1995-2000. Work on this program will be completed in September 1995. This, second, will make it possible to complete the transition from branch investment credit to an interbranch complex, which will increase considerably the anticipated resulting macroeconomic savings.

Strengthening of the Country's Defense Capability

The years of 1993-1994 were years of the further organizational development, deployment, and strengthening of the armed forces. In this period the armed forces of the republic tripled, reaching in 1994 the strength established for Armenia by international documents. It may be said with confidence today that they have taken shape and have accomplished the mission assigned them in previous years of defense of the country and the citizens. It should not be forgotten that the accomplishment of this vitally important task has taken the lives of a multitude of young people. We have had to pay this price for today's comparatively peaceful situation. The extensive path of the deployment and organizational development of the army and armed forces is a thing of the past, so to speak. It is already obvious that society must for its defense channel a substantial part of its available resources to this end. Particular importance will be attached subsequently in this connection to the intensive development of the armed forces, in other words, to their increased quality, including:

a reinforcement of the logistical base;
a solution of the social problems of the servicemen and their provision with normal housing and everyday conditions;
an increase in the combat capability and discipline of the troops.

A considerable amount of work was done in 1994 on the development and expansion of the republic's military-industrial complex. What is significant is that, first, the works that prior to the acquisition of independence had been specialized for our country came to be partially restored and, second, the foundations of new works were laid.

Structural Transformations

A prerequisite of the partial economic successes noted last year were the structural reforms undertaken in the republic, which enabled us with more limited resources than in 1993 to achieve a more significant economic result.

Mention should be made primarily of the work on energy conservation performed both at the state level (autonomous power supply, automatic water supply, the use of equipment operating on a lower frequency) and by economic entities. Although 11 percent less electric power was generated in 1994 compared with the previous year, the increase in national income constituted 4.2 percent. And in 1993-1994 altogether energy consumption per unit of national income produced declined by one-third.

The increase in the proportion of new types of product and technology in the total manufactured product in the system of industry and the expansion of the scale of domestic joint labor where this was expedient are gratifying. We are talking, specifically, about the electronic and instrument-making branches, the production of equipment, small-scale chemical industry, branch scientific and technological activity, agricultural engineering, garment production, alcoholic beverage production, and fruit and vegetable produce. But together with this, a difficult situation is shaping up in such metal-consuming industries as mechanical engineering and electric engineering, and also in large-scale chemical industry, microfiber, knitwear, and footwear production, and food industry. The industrial enterprises located in villages and townships are in a state of crisis—a large part of them is not operating at all. Positive structural changes should be noted also in the structure of exports and the organization of the manufacture of new types of local construction materials.

Mention should also be made among the successes of 1994 of heat supply for approximately 600,000 persons in 30 cities—instead of the 200,000 in the year before last. A great deal of work was performed also on the extension of the republic transport system and the construction of new highways, power lines, and water lines.

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Mention should be made of the serious contribution here of the Ayastan All-Armenia Foundation.

II. Social Problems of the Republic

The absence of a policy geared to the social sphere was an essential shortcoming of the government policy pursued in 1994. Resources are limited in any country, regardless of the level of its development. For this reason, the criterion of the social fairness of economic policy is not the provision of this stratum of the population or the other with such-and-such funds (this is a bureaucratic modus operandi in the direct rectilinear distribution and consumption of resources typical of authoritarian states) but the creation of mechanisms for obtaining income. From the viewpoint of the development of market relations, what is more, the version of so-called nomenklatura market distribution, when initial income is shaped formally, in accordance with the economic efficiency of the economic entities, but is essentially regulated by the arbitrary action of the state bureaucracy in the distribution of secondary income, is the most dangerous. This is undoubtedly far worse even from the viewpoint of the laws of the communist economy, which have not stood the test of time. We need now to present the economic freedom that is accorded people thanks to the reforms in the proper fashion: THE REFORMS HENCEFORWARD MUST BE GENERAL PROPERTY, inasmuch as their scope and volume are such that it is impossible to accomplish these reforms with the aid merely of laws, edicts, and directives alone. At the same time, on the other hand, a large part of the state bureaucratic machinery (in all branches of power without exception) and also of the local, supervisory, and law enforcement authorities, having succumbed to nostalgia, are not so much contributing to realization of the reforms as impeding them. Very many people dislike the policy of the creation of independent economic entities. Mechanisms for adapting the market to the personal interests of individual government officials are being devised. This pressure is assuming perfectly specific economic content and hitting at people's interests, thereby narrowing people's economic base.

The year of 1994 was the first since the acquisition of independence when there was a growth of society's living standard and an increase in real wages. And, even more: Whereas in 1993 Armenia was in terms of its living standard in last place among the countries of the CIS, in terms of the results of the following year it overtook Georgia, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan, rapidly catching up with the rest, where, on account of the comparatively slow pace of the reforms, a recession continues. Nonetheless, considering the economic crisis of 1991-1992 and also the difficulties connected with the introduction at the end of 1993 of a national currency, the situation here from the viewpoint of the living standard is still extraordinarily difficult. It should be noted that approximately 20 percent of the population finds itself below acceptable levels of subsistence, and approximately half lacks the opportunities to secure a minimum living standard. A particular difficult situation has come about in the publicly funded sphere.

An encouraging fact against the relatively adverse social background is the decline in 1994 in the number of unemployed—from 102,600 in 1993 to 91,700. As of this year, migration of the population has become positive. Together with this, the number of births and the natural increase in the population continue to decline. Simultaneously, we cannot fail to be heartened by the decline in mortality.

The next negative aspect of the current social policy is the absence of the necessary legislative field pertaining to occupational safety and wage regulation. The old provisions are simply impeding the reforms that are under way. With regard to the ongoing process of privatization, this legal gap on the one hand leaves the employees defenseless before management from the viewpoint of pay and the assurance of occupational-safety provisions and, on the other, fails to impose on the latter the proper obligations in terms of the observance of labor discipline and in the sense of the results of labor. In turn, all this is leading to speculative forms of appropriation of the results of the activity of the economic entities, leaving people defenseless, particularly at private enterprises, intensifying and making unacceptable the super- polarization of initial income, and reducing within the work force the employees' interest in obtaining the highest results. The year of 1995 must be one of the legislative regulation of these matters. It will be necessary to adopt a code of labor laws and laws on labor compensation and occupational safety, and the executive, in turn, has on the basis of these laws to adopt dozens of various decrees and decisions.

Absent the above-mentioned regulation, the reform process could stumble against serious obstacles. Specifically, the inordinate polarization of income (we are talking here about unlawful polarization by way of an unlawful legal field) could lead to a situation where, under the conditions of the growth of middle real income, the income of a substantial part of the population nonetheless declines. And this would mean the people's anger at the reforms and a conflict situation between them and the employers. For this reason, the speediest regulation of the correlations between labor and pay is an urgent necessity.

A principal structural reform of 1994 was the situation in power engineering. Whereas up to the end of the year, furthermore, the principal task here was the shortage of electric power, after 1 December, with the approval of the single rate, a second aspect of the problem—solvency—came to the fore. This by no means signifies, of course, that, following a settlement of the pay issue, a sharp increase in electric power generation is possible. It is simply that the amounts of the generation of electric power are connected with the level of remuneration also. It is not a question here of a macroeconomic disproportion: from the viewpoint of effective demand the state

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expects to receive compensation at least for the electric power supplied as of 1 December, but of returning to the energy system the amounts due for electric power that have been pocketed by every conceivable "enterprising person" and "princeling."

The resolution of the social problem pertaining to supply to the public of electricity in 1995 will require work to be performed in two directions.

First, the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (first six months) and the fifth unit of the Razdan State Regional Power Plant (at the end of the year) will be commissioned in 1995 from credit and investment funds from the budget, which will mean 500 megawatts of additional capacity, with the same quantity of fuel. Starting as of the latter half of the year, the population will receive electricity for 10-12 hours a day.

Further, the energy system will be fundamentally restructured, and its individual components will acquire the status of independent economic entities, use will be made of new forms of payments and debt clearance (shares included), the rate system will be improved, and mechanisms of sanctions for nonpayments will be tightened.

Another problem inherited from 1994 are the nonpayments. These are primarily the underfunded payments from the budget—approximately 9.7 billion drams, which pertain to the construction workers, peasants, and other economic entities. The reason here is the comparative shortage of budget revenue mainly caused by the debts receivable of entities of the Republic of Armenia operating within the framework of the CIS.

Debts owed economic entities on the part of enterprises outside of Armenia constitute a second chain (approximately $25 million), which is a reason for the shortfall in treasury receipts and a deterioration in the financial position of the economic entities. What we have here is the phenomenon of exports of nonpayments to Armenia from the CIS countries, from the Russian Federation in particular, inasmuch as this problem in these countries is, in connection with the continuing recession and the constriction of the market connected with this, more glaring.

Enterprises' purchase of agricultural products both in regard to the government order and aside from it have become a third chain of nonpayments. Approximately 6 billion drams of agricultural products were purchased from the peasants altogether (including Ministry of Defense purchases), payments for which constituted 4.5 billion. With regard to the budget, these debts are a consequence of the revenue shortfall, and as far as the organizations and enterprises are concerned, in some cases they are a consequence also of the contradictions between the producers (the peasants) and the state processors (the procurement enterprises) connected with the absence of liquid forms other than money.

The debts that arose along interstate-supply lines (12 billion drams) are a fourth chain of nonpayments. The basis of these are the deficit nature of the republic's balance of payments and the public's nonpayments for services rendered by the state (electricity, water, public utilities, and so forth). In the first case, considering the need for supplies of commodities for energy sources imported from the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, the state was forced over the year to make up the shortfall of the required $100 million, at a minimum, thanks to a policy of the shifting of the external to the domestic debt. In the second case the task is on the one hand the public's precise and timely discharge of its obligations to the state and, on the other, the establishment of appropriate payment discipline.

And, finally, the fifth chain of nonpayments are the debts between the enterprises and the banks of the order of approximately 20 million drams, 4 million of which along the lines of bank credit. The situation that has arisen at the enterprises and in the organizations created by virtue of the difficult economic situation and the shortage of working assets at them and also the fact that there is still no credit market in the republic are already obvious here [sentence as published].

A large part of the commercial banks has ceased to perform the role of credit institutions, preferring to obtain profit from currency organizations and the turnover of enterprise funds, and some, by the reckless method of personal deposits. Under the conditions of the negligible credit investments, these banks are hereby securing high profits for themselves, which, in my opinion, is unfairly swallowing up a substantial part of the produced national income.

The proposed draft program of socioeconomic development and the budget for 1995 provide for a comprehensive approach to a solution of this problem:

all debts of the 1994 budget are incorporated in the expenditure items of the draft and are secured by nondeficit (non-issue) sources of financing;

to prevent the accumulation of debts receivable, the government will switch to the compulsory registration of realization, proceeding from supplies, regardless of the fact of payments, forcing the economic entities to keep a close watch on the transactions that they perform;

the extensive scope of the privatization of processing enterprises, the introduction in circulation of government bills of exchange, and the formation of a securities market will make it possible to introduce new forms of payments, increasing the liquidity of the economic entities' liabilities;

an end to subsidies for services rendered the state and the covering of the balance of trade deficit thanks to external financial assistance will make it possible not only to avoid a growth of the absolute amounts of domestic debt, but also to reduce it in the course of the year;

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assurance of a stable dram exchange rate will make it possible to preserve the value of the resources obtained by the economic entities and to stabilize the shortage of working assets, which has been caused by inflation and which is growing from day to day.

The discrepancy between the organizational structure of management and the market nature of the economy that is taking shape is a continuing problem from last year. The present system of management, particularly as regards the executive, is coming into sharp conflict with the ongoing socioeconomic processes.

First, the entire executive should be structured on the basis of a precise principle of subordination (per the hierarchical principle), and the territorial and branch structures should be accountable in accordance with the hierarchical system to their superior component, the status of all lower components of dual subordination or dual responsibility must be clarified, and the repose of identical functions and responsibility in two different bodies must be excluded.

Second, the functions of the territorial and branch structures should be delineated per the following principle: This state structure or the other must be controlled fully by the proprietor. It is essential from this viewpoint to realize the provisions of the Privatization Act adopted back in 1990, clearly delineate the right to administer state property between organs of administration, and to have done with the appointment of personnel of the superior components.

Third, both the territorial and branch organs of administration are in need of simplification. Twenty-two ministries, eight state administrations, one inspectorate—such is the structure of the government, not counting a further 26 bodies under the government. The adoption of the Constitution will make it possible to streamline the functions of both the ministries and departments and the executive bodies of the council on the same territory, reduce their number considerably, exclude duplication, and put an end to the endless argument about rights. Five pairs of ministries could be merged, superfluous components eliminated, and the structure of the territorial organs of administration simplified today even.

Fourth, much work has to be done also on the regulation of relations of the legislature and the executive. On the whole, it should be noted with satisfaction that the legislative field that has been created in past years has made it possible to take serious steps forward in the building of the state. This phenomenon is deserving of high marks in itself, if it is considered that a great deal had to be started from scratch. But together with this, society is developing also, and new problems are arising. The process of the creation of the state requires an intensification of what has begun, and adjustments to be made to what has already been done. Thus, in particular, we should highlight the need for a further delineation of the legislative and executive authorities. The adoption of fundamental laws controlling the life of society should be preceded by the adoption of "specialized" laws regulating particular aspects of life. And the main task of legislative activity here is the formation in full, down to the last details, of the legal field around man, the individual, to prevent its "clarification" on the part of the bureacracy. The adoption of laws in the most general form, with the subsequent handover to the executive authorities of the elaboration of the mechanisms regulating its [as published] application, must be excluded henceforward. The executive, on the other hand, should have the right to operate freely within the framework of the adopted laws—without the additional harmonization of its actions with the legislature. From the viewpoint of the precise organization and responsibility of government, it is expedient to abandon the practice of the creation of superfluous administrations, commissions, and so forth.

III. Economic Policy for 1995

The government's economic policy for 1995 has been presented in the November 1994 statement of the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the Central Bank and the draft program of socioeconomic development, the budget, and monetary policy. Let us touch on ideology also.

The purpose of MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY is a sharp growth of revenue thanks to an expansion of the tax base. True tax revenue of the budget for 1995 as a whole will be 1.8 times more than anticipated in 1994, and it is planned to obtain 80 percent of this increase thanks to an expansion of the tax base, and 15 percent, thanks to a growth of production, and the cancellation of excessive tax privileges will account for only 5 percent. Added to our true tax receipts is loan capital obtained from outside, as a result of which the proposed budget is in terms of its revenue three times as large as the 1994 budget, which will make it possible to increase by a factor of 2-5 the expenditure of the publicly funded sphere.

The basic principles of monetary and fiscal policy are:

the creation for all spheres of the economy of equal conditions, regardless of form of ownership;

assurance of identical tax pressure and tax level in relation to each unit of income;

the gradual introduction of property tax mechanisms and the imparting to tax policy of a social orientation;

the "self-sufficiency" of the tax chain. As of the latter half of 1995, the current legislative field will make it possible to restore an amount outstanding in respect to one tax thanks to a higher payment along the lines of another tax;

budget expenditure in terms of areas of expenditure (with the separation of wages, electric power, general maintenance expenditure, and such), which will make it

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possible to make the preservation of macroeconomic proportionality more controllable;

the organization of budget expenditure on a competitive basis, which will afford the rapidly developing nonstate sector of the economy an opportunity to become a full participant in reproduction more easily and quickly;

application in full of the principle of the granting of subsidies from the producer to the consumer;

the consolidation of budget revenue for the purpose of more efficient use.

Almost all the laws and decrees, except for the fixed payments, have already been adopted.

Just one deviation from these principles has been permitted in 1995: The level of taxation of a unit of economic turnover in agriculture has been set five to six times lower than in the other branches of the economy, as a result of which the countryside will in 1995 receive 13-14 million drams of indirect subsidy.

From the viewpoint of an increase in economic efficiency, the determination of the start of the fiscal year as of 1 October will be an important step. The three-month gap between the fiscal and economic years will afford an opportunity with the same resources for a 10-15 percent rise in the efficiency of social production.

The main purpose of MONETARY POLICY is assurance of the stabilization in the course of the year of the dram thanks to an increase in the reserves of the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia. As in 1994 also, the basis of the stabilization of the dram will be the amounts of production and, particularly, exports. But, as distinct from last year, the presence in the Central Bank of substantial state currency reserves will make it possible to ensure stable feedback between production and the extent of exports and the exchange rate of the dram such that even with a certain diminution in the course of the year in the extent of production, the existing reserves will ensure the preservation of a stable dram exchange rate.

The main problems here are:

liberalization and continued improvement of the mechanisms of preservation of the floating exchange rate of the dram;

the creation of a credit market, primarily thanks to a tightening of the standards of the activity of the commercial banks and the introduction of new liquid forms (securities);

a differentiation of the provisions regulating the activity of the commercial banks in accordance with personal deposits (if the bank performs such transactions) and investments, tightening and easing reserve requirements accordingly.

The pursuit of such a tax and fiscal and monetary policy will provide for the solution of three main questions: a growth of production (5-13 percent along main macroeconomic indicator lines), a low and stable rate of inflation (65 percent, and excluding an increase in the prices of commodities with fixed prices, only 23 percent), and a growth of real wages and the living standard (up to 25 percent).

Serious reforms will be accomplished in parallel with this in the sphere of PRICES, FOREIGN TRADE, AND INVESTMENTS also. The basic principles here will be:

the complete termination of the practice of the granting of subsidies and the elimination of state voluntarist string-pulling by way of the secondary distribution of income in respect to the results of various types of activity;

control of all the rates of monopoly commodities and services in parallel with the complete liberalization of prices;

continuation of the process in regard to a reduction in the amounts of interstate supplies that has begun;

protection of the rights of consumers and a strengthening of the legal field connected with control of the rules of trade;

a solution of the question of the unrestricted transfer of capital, investment lending, and the stimulation of investment activity connected with the creation for the economic entities of favorable conditions for the replenishment of their own working assets;

the putting in order of the production and social infrastructure thanks to public monies (included borrowed investment credit) and a solution of the problems of the disaster zone, the border areas, and the building of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

Serious steps will be taken in the course of the year for affiliation to international trade and tariff organizations and also for the expansion of trade and economic relations and the conclusion of treaties with the European Community, the countries of the CIS and the Near East, and the United States and Japan. Particular mention should be made of the significance of the treaty with the European Community, which will make it possible to open European markets to our commodities.

The year 1995 will be decisive also in the sense of realization of privatization policy. Thirty percent of production enterprises and a large proportion of the facilities of trade, public catering, and consumer services and also public housing will be fully privatized in the course of the year. Production in the private sector of the economy—in industry, agriculture, power engineering, services, housing construction, and trade—will grow at a faster pace. Forty-five percent of industrial output and 70 percent of the national income will, at a minimum, be produced by the private sector of the economy (including the 20 percent partial uncompensated privatization conducted in 1994). The receipt, together with their pay, of

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income in the form of dividends also will become customary for huge masses of working people and the populace.

The year 1995 will be auspicious IN THE SENSE OF SOCIAL POLICY. The positive trends in the economy in 1994 and their continuation and development in 1995 permit for the first time confidence not only on the issue of a growth of the living standard but of real wages also. Despite this, the situation in the publicly funded sphere remains difficult, which testifies to the macroeconomic disproportions in the sense of social policy (shortcomings in the redistribution of the gross domestic product and the insufficient accumulation of funds in the budget, with a preponderance of expenditure on the nonsocial sphere) and the absence of a single-minded social policy. It should be understood together with this that there is an obvious chronic insufficiency of the social sphere, the bases of which are more profound: The reforms have yet to encompass this sphere, and for this reason a gulf between the social sphere and the economy has arisen. It should be understood that IN REALITY, THE SAID STRUCTURAL DISPROPORTION IS SO PROFOUND THAT EVEN WERE THE SOCIAL SPHERE TO BE ALLOCATED 10 TIMES MORE FUNDS (ALTHOUGH, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE DRAFT BUDGET, COMPARED WITH 1994 THE GROWTH OF SPENDING ALONG EDUCATION, CHILDREN'S AND JUVENILE ESTABLISHMENT, HEALTH CARE, AND CULTURAL LINES IS NOT COMPARABLE WITH THE GROWTH OF SPENDING IN THE OTHER BUDGET SPHERES), THEY WOULD STILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT, inasmuch as the absence of reforms here has led to the "effective demand" concept not having taken shape in this sphere. That is, there is in this sphere no kind of economic mechanism of the level of consumption and no "social service price" concept, that is, the extent of the sphere's real requirements is not recorded. Such expressions are frequently perceived by our opponents as just another attempt on the part of the government to avoid branch state protectionism, and statements of the following type are made: "People, you used to have this, but even this is being taken away from you!"

Of course, such posturing is, perhaps, a successful method under the conditions of the election campaign that has begun. But today even the government has no wish to succumb to emotions, and the documents that have been presented point out what should be done.

Thus, it has been possible in 1995 to grant the said spheres far more comparable funds than in 1994, and the proportion of all sectors of the social sphere in the budget has grown. Consequently, the state, if the budget is adopted, contemplates doing far more here than in 1995 [as published]. The question arises: What, then, is the point of the government speaking on the eve of the elections about reforms in the sphere of health care and education, the basis of which, it is no secret, are certain principles of chargeability. The explanation is clear: in order in a year or several years no longer to have a problem that has become more insoluble and not to pull down conclusively what has been created over decades. Were we today to raise the pay of the doctor and teacher twofold or fivefold, this would still be insufficient, inasmuch as the service they render should have within the framework of the solvency that exists within society at the given moment its corresponding price. The leitmotif of the reforms under way here, therefore, is not a diminution in state obligations and financing (on the contrary, as can be seen from the draft budget, they have grown sharply) but the establishment of state financing at a particular threshold level, at a level, moreover, which exceeds the present threshold, and above this, the application of the private principle. A procedure in accordance with which instances where financing shall be undertaken by the state is established here also.

It has already been pointed out that the absence of a single-minded social policy is the Achilles' heel of the current reforms. From this viewpoint, the basic principle in 1995 will be THE STATE'S DETERMINATION OF THE NEEDS THRESHOLD AND ASCERTAINMENT OF THE NEEDY AND THE RENDERING TO THEM OF PURPOSEFUL ASSISTANCE.

For this:

the government Paros program will be commissioned gradually as of April;

the system of all types of social privileges will be replaced by social transfers;

reform of the system of labor compensation for employees of the publicly funded sphere will begin as of the middle of the year, which contemplates a rapid growth of pay in this sphere, new principles of the differentiation of labor compensation, and the introduction of a new system of labor evaluation;

the tax system will begin to operate in full, as a result of which the prosperous strata of society will bear a heavier tax burden;

pension policy will be revised;

there will be a complete change in the approach to the unemployed, the time frame of the payments and the amounts of the benefits will be increased, their payment to citizens seeking work for the first time will be excluded, and the practice of the organization of public works will be extended.

The draft program of socioeconomic development and the budget for 1995 proposed by the government [words illegible] further development and strengthening [words illegible] reforms and greater visibility of their results for society. They are free of the preaching of false humanism and empty promises. We must all recognize that WE CAN LIVE WELL ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF THIS.

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Azerbaijan

Karabakh President Optimistic About Future

MK0604092395 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 2

[Interview with Robert Kocharyan, president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, by Armen Khanbabyan, place and date not given, under the "Leader" rubric: "One Hundred Days of the First Karabakh President. Robert Kocharyan Has No Ready-Made Formulas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Khanbabyan] The Armenian people has two states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the reasons for this are well known. Does this fact mean, however, that the nation, which has traditionally striven to achieve national unity, should have two presidents?

[Kocharyan] I have already answered such a question. I wish to repeat: The Armenian people has only one president; as for me, I am the president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR).

[Khanbabyan] Have there been any changes in the relations between the NKR and Armenia or in your relations with the Republic of Armenia's leadership since the presidential election in Nagorno-Karabakh?

[Kocharyan] There could be no radical changes, since relations between the NKR and Armenia are determined not by the state systems of these countries, but the degree of mutual understanding or differences as to how to settle the Karabakh problem, and by leaders' ability or inability to assess the situation quietly and soberly, to find correct decisions, and to coordinate their efforts. Another matter is of a greater importance here: Both in the NKR and in Armenia, the authorities must be able to realize their capabilities to the fullest extent.

[Khanbabyan] What have you, as the president and a politician, managed to do personally during 100 days in office?

[Kocharyan] What do you mean by "personally?" Under the law, the president exercises his powers using certain structures. Acting personally, one may write memoirs or give interviews.

The present military and political situation—which can be characterized by the "neither war nor peace" formula—is very specific. It requires new approaches to administrative, defense, economic, and law-enforcement issues. Today, it is impossible to rule the country in the same way as a year ago, when there was war. One should also not forget that military operations may be resumed any moment. We must be ready for any surprise. At present, we are working on the elaboration of mechanisms for the implementation of our political course—which is unchanging strategically, but which needs to be constantly updated tactically. We have already determined our stance on the majority of these issues.

[Khanbabyan] Stepanakert's traditional approaches to the possible ways and methods of settling the Karabakh conflict, in general, are well known. Have there been, however, any changes in this respect, in view of new regional geopolitical trends—for instance, linked with the problem of the oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey, or with the prospects for normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey?

[Kocharyan] It is not quite clear what you mean by Stepanakert's traditional approaches. We are attentively watching world developments and, as necessary, adjust our activities. But we have a goal, which we are striving to achieve, step by step—legal international recognition of the NKR's independence; as for actual independence, we have already won it in battle....

Oil-related games, by themselves, are dangerous, and they by no means always bring wealth. In any case, neither Baku nor Groznyy have become wealthy because of oil yet. As for the possible normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey, we adhere to the principle "let us wait and see."

[Khanbabyan] The NKR's status has been defined by the referendum on independence of 10 December 1991. Nevertheless, it can happen that the NKR's leadership will be put under strong external military and political pressure precisely in this respect. It is probably not by chance that, of late, there has been increasing talk about a Karabakh-Azerbaijani federation as a prototype of a future "common Caucasian home." What can you say on that matter?

[Kocharyan] This is the first I have heard about some Karabakh-Azerbaijani federation; as for the expression "common Caucasian home," it sounds a bit too romantic. We are fully aware of the probability that certain unfavorable factors may develop, and pressure from outside may be put on us in order to alter the NKR's stance. We have no ready-made formulas in this respect, in view of the complicated nature of the situation—although we do attempt to analyze them. What we have in store as a reliable refuge is the inborn Karabakh obstinacy.

[Khanbabyan] Do you, as the NKR's president, see any efficacy in the work the OSCE's Minsk Group and how, in general, do you assess the prospects for a final settlement of the conflict in the framework of the OSCE? Do you not think that the search for solutions on a bilateral (Stepanakert-Baku) and a trilateral (Stepanakert-Yerevan-Baku) basis would be more productive?

[Kocharyan] I doubt that this problem can be solved quickly by any sort of negotiations, in view of Azerbaijan's present stance.

[Khanbabyan] Can changes in the internal political situation in Azerbaijan affect the situation with respect to the NKR?

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[Kocharyan] We are analyzing probable variants of developments, including the one you have mentioned. Since 1988, the Azerbaijani Republic's leadership has changed six times, whereas its attitude to Karabakh has not been altered. Therefore, we have no illusions....

[Khanbabyan] Lately, in Azerbaijan, they have been saying that "there is no civil society in Nagorno-Karabakh." What do they mean by that: the absence of political freedoms, a liberal social system, or a certain politically structured unity? What is the actual situation, and why has Baku started to talk this way precisely at this moment?

[Kocharyan] Today, society in the NKR is organized in a way which is as adequate as possible for the situation which has taken shape in the region. The main thing is that this is the conscious choice of our people, ensuring our internal stability. The successful and unsuccessful coups in the neighboring republic are not to our liking.

[Khanbabyan] What are the prospects for economic development in Nagorno-Karabakh?

[Kocharyan] A serious economic reform in the NKR has already started. Virtually the entire package of necessary laws and legislative acts has already been adopted. The government is presently dealing with their implementation, but this is the topic for a separate long discussion. I am confident that the people of Karabakh will learn to develop their economy as quickly and as efficiently as they learned to fight.

Stepanakert Welcomes OSCE Officials' Meeting

LD0504202595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STEPANAKERT, April 5 (Interfax)—Nagorno-Karabakh's presidential secretary has welcomed the session of the committee of OSCE senior officials, which took place in Prague. Aleksandr Grigoryan described the session as an attempt to break the deadlock over the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process.

"The committee said that giving Nagorno-Karabakh's delegation the status of a conflicting party at all phases of the talks is a necessity, which is evidence that the world community has an ever better understanding of the realities in the region of the conflict", Grigoryan told journalists in Stepanakert Wednesday [5 April].

At the same time he said that the constrictive resumption of Nagorno-Karabakh settlement talks will be possible only on the principle of equality of interests of all parties to the conflict.

Baku Seen Wooing Foreign Oil Partners To Balance Moscow

MK0504133395 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 4

[Georgiy Bovt report: "Oil Gives Courage"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] U.S. pressure on Azerbaijan has produced its result: Iran has disappeared from among the potential participants in an international consortium for the development of the Caspian oil shelf. Approximately a month ago the Americans threatened to pull out of the consortium if Teheran joined it (Baku was planning to cede part of its share to Iran in exchange for Iran's paying Azerbaijan's part of the consortium's costs). And now it has been officially announced that "the participation of that country in the oil consortium with Western countries does not appear to be possible." On the other hand, Turkey and Exxon Corporation have had better luck: The former's stake has been increased and the latter has acquired its own share. Both at Azerbaijan's expense. [passage omitted]

The essence of Geydar Aliyev's foreign policy strategy is to attract maximum Western interests to the Caspian and to the region in general. For the sake of this goal he is ready to put up with the fact that the multibillion project itself, in the conditions of the Karabakh war, has so far been put on hold while its Western participants are effect only "driving in demarcation stakes," hoping that some day peace will come. For sake of this goal Aliyev seems ready to reduce Azerbaijan's share in the consortium to zero. In any event, he has long made it the subject of a "political tender." [passage omitted]

And what about Russia? Its interests are represented by Lukoil's 10-percent stake. Azerbaijan, aware of the disagreements between the Fuel and Energy Ministry and Lukoil (known for its very close association with the Russian upper political echelons), on one side, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the other, as regards the project's political consequences and the precedent-setting division of the shelf into "national sectors," is making some foreign policy use of these disagreements, as it were. Because the consortium issue has thus far been not so much economics as geopolitics. [passage omitted]

At the same time—on the political front—Baku is demonstrating enviable intransigence toward all initiatives by Moscow. Aliyev's firm "no" to plans to restore a Russian military presence in the republic (after Armenia and Georgia) has only strengthened. At a conference of CIS border troop commanders, which took place in late March in Ashkhabad, in response to yet another proposal to sign a document regulating the joint protection of the Commonwealth's external borders, Baku refused again. Even in spite of Moscow's readiness to make special provisos for Azerbaijan.

The more Western partners Geydar Aliyev attracts to the consortium, the more confidently he will be talking to Moscow.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Views Russian Influence in Georgia

MS0504134095

[FBIS Editorial Report]

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The BBC Television Network's "Newsnight" program at 2130 GMT on 4 April carries a 15-minute report by Gordon Brewer entitled "Back in the USSR" on growing Russian influence in Georgia. The report includes an interview with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze.

The report opens with winter scenes in Georgia's Northern border with Russia and shows Georgian militiamen extorting money from passing motorists at a checkpoint, cutting to show scenes in Tbilisi where people are struggling to survive. The report then interviews Nugzar Djicia, a former manager of a bank that collapsed as a result of state racketeering. The report continues with a visit to a civil defense camp 50 miles from Tbilisi, and shows members of the Mkhedrioni or "Knights", described as a private army-come mafia organization which is trying to pass itself of as a respectable part of the Georgian state, and which now controls Georgia's petrol market and Civil Defense, and a Rescue Corps, simply because it is too powerful to be gotten rid of. The report shows them in training, then follows with an interview with Jaba Ioseliani, Head of the Mkhedrioni. The report then shows a conference discussing the constitution and shows Irina Sarashvili, Chairperson, National Democratic Party, who complains about Ioseliani's influence.

Sarashvili speaks: "The problem is that he is in power, and the other problem is that no one is objecting against his influence on the economical situation, because the mafia is very well organized and it cannot be defeated by one man or by two writers, or two composers. He can be defeated the same, with organized force."

The report then shows a Rescue Corps member showing a store of arms which includes rifles, submachine guns and grenades. The report goes on to show Eduard Shevardnadze attending a meeting, then being interviewed.

Shevardnadze says: "It should be made quite clear that neither Mr Ioseliani, nor anyone else has any type of armed forces. There is only one kind of armed forces, although I admit they are not very large in number, that is our National Army. One of our achievements has been to reduce the illegal activities of many criminal organizations. Organizations such as these always surface when there is a civil war. When our civil war ended we managed to disolve these groups and created a one nation army under the rule of law."

The report then shows Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev arriving off a plane and being welcomed by Shevardnadze allegedly to sign agreements allowing for Russia to keep military bases in Georgia for 20 years.

Shevardnadze continues: "I was right then, and I'm still right now. I was protesting against the involvement of Russian civilians in the conflict and their support for the separatists. I was opposed to the fact that certain Russian groups were providing support in the form of modern technology, warplanes and artillery. This indeed is how things were. Now however, Russia is doing it's best to play a more positive role in resolving the conflict.

The report then shows scenes from South Osetia and shows many war damaged buildings, then shows tombstones for the young men who died during the civil war. the report continues with shots of a run-down hospital, and includes an interview with Dr Intal Parastev who Supports South Osetia's independence from Georghia. The report continues with shots of a checkpoint on the border with Georgia proper, manned by Russian peacekeeping troops, then follows with an interview with Col. Nikolay Puzenya, Commander, Russian Peace-keeping Force.

Puzenya says [with English translation]: "Each country has it's own interests. This country is seen as part of Russia's interests, I think no one has the right to interfere here. Russia is quite capable of coping with it's own problems."

The report goes on to show the Russian Army base and shows Russian soldiers in training.

Sarashvili continues: "The difference is that if they can act so openly in Chechnya, they cannot act the same way as open as it is in Chechnya, in Georgia, and that's the whole difference. Joining CIS, it's just one step to, as I think, to restoring a new empire with new forms of existing this empire. We know the history of Russia, we know perfectly that Russia would change any ideology, including religious, or Communist ideology. But today's Russia is not ready for changing it's imperialistic plans for the former territory of the Soviet Union."

The report concludes with shots of restoration underway of bombed out Government buildings in Tbilisi.

UN, EBRD Discuss Tbilisi Agricultural Market

LD0504194795 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1400 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, 5 April, Eduard Shevardnadze, the chairman of the Georgian Supreme Council and head of state, received Mr. (Ben Stirling), representative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], and Mr. (Christian Michaika), representative of the Investment Center of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO].

The meeting discussed establishing in Georgia a wholesale market for agricultural produce. It was noted that in the summer of 1994 the Georgian Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, together with the Tbilisi Mayor's Office, requested the EBRD to release credit for the setting up in Tbilisi of a wholesale market for agricultural produce. The EBRD reacted promptly to this request, allocating in September the same year the sum required for the project. The collection of the materials necessary for the project has now been completed. The EBRD has engaged a group of experts from

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the UN FAO Investment Center and Georgian specialists in work on the project, which is expected to be completed in May this year.

The project envisages the setting up of a wholesale market in Tbilisi to sell fruit and vegetables. The market's customers will be small-size wholesalers, as well as retailers, public catering facilities and, in the future, schools, hospitals, and other organizations.

Apart from the wholesale market in Tbilisi, collection bases are to be set up in Zugdidi, Gurjaani, Gori, Marneuli, and Akhaltsikhe. The project will be financed by the EBRD. It is expected that donor-states will also contribute to the project, and, of course, local investors will also be involved in it to a certain extent.

Apart from establishing markets, the project also envisages subsidizing all structures, irrespective of their form of ownership, involved in the production of basic agricultural produce and in packaging, storing, and supplying it to the consumer. In order to implement the project, it is planned to establish an agricultural finance corporation. One of its main tasks will be to coordinate financial operations envisaged by the project and create an effective mechanism for cooperation with various republican state structures.

The head of state stressed the great importance of the project for the republic and the need to give it all-round assistance.

This information was provided by the press service of the head of state.

Repression of National Minorities Deplored

MK0504135595 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Nodar Broladze under the "Georgia" rubric: "The Truth Must Be Told. Shevardnadze Is Concerned With the Position of National Minorities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The actions of the most probable leading participants in the forthcoming election campaign in Georgia, at first sight, lack enthusiasm and their intentions are unclear. In the next few days, however, when a new Constitution is to be submitted for open discussion, it can be reasonably expected that future candidates for deputy will start to act in a more resolute and energetic manner.

The most important of Georgia's still-unsolved problems remains the problem of the territorial reunification of the country and the return of refugees. It will be recalled that the first refugees left the country as early as the beginning of 1990, and not as a result of regional conflicts. They were fleeing a conflict-ridden society and new politicians of an extremist bent who intimidated a considerable part of the population by their aggressive intentions. People were leaving various cities and regions, but the exit of native Tbilisi residents—whose ancestors had been living and working there for many generations—was especially conspicuous and dramatic. According to various sources, by 1992, nearly 800,000 people had left Georgia—including, in addition to national minorities, ethnic Georgians, especially from urban areas.

Eduard Shevardnadze called that time—which drastically changed the plans and moods of the country's citizens, who were forced to leave their homes—a disgrace. At a meeting of leaders of the Citizens' Union, which he heads, with representatives of national minorities, he recalled how, in Tbilisi and in other regions, during the armed conflict in Tskhinvali, Ossetians were fired from their jobs ("I do not insist that there were only angels on the other side, but the truth must be told."); how Russians were refused residence permits when moving to another flat; how human rights were violated in Dmanisi rayon, which forced many Azerbaijani families to leave their houses and farmland and to go to Azerbaijan. Shevardnadze used word "disgrace" in his speech more than once or twice. The aircraft factory, which he visited recently, was left without many of his old acquaintances—highly skilled specialists. The ship-repair factory in Poti was also abandoned by dozens of skilled workers. "And although—thank God—one can not speak about a mass exodus of Russians, it hurts me that such things really happened," the head of state said. "It was painful to see many Armenians, especially intellectuals, leaving Georgia. The same applies to Greeks, Jews, Kurds." He recalled how separatists shot a friend of his—former Abkhazian Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Saakyan. He stressed that Georgia knows too well what injustice and humiliation are—meaning ethnic cleansing and genocide in Abkhazia—and, therefore, "from now on, everything will be done so that, in this country which has chosen democracy, all citizens can live a life worthy of a human being." He also gave another example: There are almost no representatives of national minorities in the ruling bodies of the country, which is "impermissible for a country pursuing the democratic course." It is noteworthy, however, that in the republic's parliament representatives of national minorities can be counted on one's fingers, although this legislative body numbers over 220 deputies; meanwhile, non-Georgians account for about one-third of the population.

Ioseliani Views Agreement on Russian Bases

AU0504163195 Tbilisi REZONANSI in Georgian 28-29 Mar 95 p 2

[Interview with Jaba Ioseliani, chairman of the State Commission for Settlement of Conflict in Georgia, head of Georgian delegation at Georgian-Abkhazian talks, and founder of the "Mkhedrioni" paramilitary organization, by BGI correspondent Inga Dadiani; place and date not given: "Jaba Ioseliani: 'The Elections Should Not Be Postponed'"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] [Dadiani] How do you view the agreement on the location of Russian military bases in Georgia?

[Ioseliani] I approve of this agreement. The state will not be able to exist without defense structures and our republic has neither a foreign nor a domestic defense; it has no army. There is also no air defense.

[Dadiani] On 25 March, this agreement was viewed in Parliament as a betrayal of Georgia.

[Ioseliani] Georgia cannot protect itself. Now is not the time for ultrapatriotic exclamations. Everyone remembers what opposition we encountered in Abkhazia. We lost the war not against the Abkhazians but against other forces, including the Russians. Times have changed. We have nothing to lose.

[Dadiani] Will this agreement not influence the plan to construct an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan across Georgian territory? After all, Azerbaijan has not allowed Russia to set up military bases on its territory.

[Ioseliani] The Russian bases on our territory should not present any threat to neighboring states. Their aim is to ensure peace in the Caucasus. It has traditionally been Georgian policy to search for a protector of the same faith. These are the Russians. Western countries let us down both in the past and during the Abkhazian conflict. We should not link the humanitarian aid they have been periodically sending to politics.

[Dadiani] How do you think the Abkhazian problem can be resolved?

[Ioseliani] Incidentally, this is connected with the Russian military bases. They are to be located in Batumi [capital of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic], Gudauta [Abkhazia], Akhalkalaki, and Vaziani. We are unable to control Gudauta and we only half control Batumi. It states directly in the agreement signed by the Georgian defense minister that all points come into force only when all Georgian territory is under our control.

[Dadiani] So, you pin all hopes on Russia....

[Ioseliani] Not only on it. However, Russia should help us. If there is no change in the situation in Abkhazia by 15 May, I will demand that the Russian troops leave Georgia. If Russia does not support us, we will ignore [Abkhazian leader] Ardzinba and his gang and negotiate directly with the Abkhazian people.

[Dadiani] Various rumors are circulating concerning the Rescue Corps to which you are directly connected. How do you see its future?

[Ioseliani] The Rescue Corps will be transformed into a state structure. I have links with those who started in the "Mkhedrioni" [paramilitary organization subsequently transformed into Rescue Corps]. I am its honorary chairman and give it advice, but I do not interfere in its work. In future, the Rescue Corps will be given more powers: Ecological inspection, nondepartmental defense, and also partial control over the fire service. The transformation of the Rescue Corps into a ministry is under discussion. I am opposed to this as we have too many ministries as it is. However, I would like to emphasize that many things do not depend upon me.

[Dadiani] The judge in the "Gelbakhiani-Dokvadze" [supporters of ex-President Gamsakhurdia found guilty of attempting to murder Ioseliani in June 1992] trial condemned two of the accused to death. What is your view regarding the passing of the death sentence in this specific case?

[Ioseliani] I am opposed to the death sentence. However, the state has been forced to take this measure during a special period. I do not wish to display cheap human emotion specifically regarding this case. However, I would not like to see the death sentence carried out in the case of Gelbakhiani. Having escaped death myself, I have no right to speak on behalf of those people who, as a result of the terrorist act committed against me, lost loved ones. I cannot understand to this day what wrong I had done them. When I inquired why they wanted me killed, I was told: Because Ioseliani had brought Shevardnadze to Georgia.

[Dadiani] The population's negative attitude toward the authorities is the result of the harsh reality of life today. Does this not affect the political climate in the republic?

[Ioseliani] I am not convinced that the entire population is dissatisfied with life. However, this is the case everywhere. Of course, government structures should take account of just demands and sensible ideas.

[Dadiani] Do you think it right that the elections should be postponed?

[Ioseliani] On no account should this happen. I am fighting to get the elections held on time. Otherwise, chaos will begin and the authorities will lose their legitimacy.

[Dadiani] Mariam Bagrationi, a representative of the [Georgian] royal family, is in Georgia. As far as it has become known, she paid you a personal visit. What was the purpose of this visit?

[Ioseliani] Mariam Bagrationi is my goddaughter. She plans to settle permanently in Georgia. Mariam wants to invest her own capital in the Georgian economy. She is now familiarizing herself with that potential and those enterprises and organizations in the republic in which she may invest her money in the future.

Party Chairman: Shevardnadze Behind Terrorist Acts

AU0504152795 Tbilisi SAKARTVELO in Georgian 23-30 Mar 95 p 1, 2

[Report by Nana Goderdzishvili: "They Fired at Temur Zhorzholiani."]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Conservative-Monarchist Party [Temur Zhorzholiani] had information about an expected terrorist act. Furthermore, he stated that he had also been informed beforehand about the attacks that took place upon [National-Democratic Chairman] Giorgi Chanturia and [former Defense Minister] Qarqarishvili and [First Deputy Defense Minister] Datuashvili. In the first case, it had not been stated who would be targeted. As regards the latter two, it was said only that the terrorist act would be committed outside Georgia by Georgian terrorists.

On 21 March, Temur Zhorzholiani intended to make a statement about terrorist acts in general at the session of Parliament. The previous day, Zhorzholiani had been told the names of the streets—Perovskaya and Kiacheli—where he was supposedly to be attacked. Early on 21 March, following insistent requests from those accompanying him, Zhorzholiani did not drive himself but sat in the back of the car with his sister. On leaving the house (Zhorzholiani lives close to the airport), they changed their usual route. Along the way, a white "Vaz" 2106 Zhiguli caught them up and slowed down as it began to overtake them. There were three or four people in the Zhiguli that drove for a while alongside Zhorzholiani's car. Zhorzholiani apparently told the driver to slow down and let the Zhiguli pass by. Just after the car slowed down, a shot was fired from a pistol that pierced the windshield. The white Zhiguli drove off without undue haste. Zhorzholiani subsequently told some soldiers and policemen stationed on the airport road what had happened. They went after the terrorists. The only things known are the white Zhiguli's registration number and that a man in a black leather jacket got out of the car at the subway station and disappeared inside.

It is Temur Zhorzholiani's view that this fact is a part of those terrorist acts that are being carried out in Georgia according to a specific timetable. He also said they were organized by representatives of supreme power who were acting on the orders of Eduard Shevardnadze. "The reason could be the Constitution," said Zhorzholiani. "Shevardnadze wants the adoption of that draft Constitution that provides for presidential rule. Furthermore, he wants Parliament to adopt this Constitution. This is proved by Shevardnadze's letter to the deputies in which this view is clearly expressed. We are hindering him in the adoption of such a constitution," stated Zhorzholiani.

According to him, if it is not be possible to adopt the Shevardnadze variant of the Constitution, which will probably threaten the extension of Shevardnadze's rule, the authorities will try to postpone the elections and, in this way, stay in power. As such, he viewed the Republicans' idea of a small constitution to be justified.

Temur Zhorzholiani said that another possible reason for these terrorist acts lay in the fact that those people who were being threatened possessed information capable of compromising the authorities. Zhorzholiani said that he could name foreign banks and numbers of accounts where money was being stashed that had been taken out of Georgia by representatives of supreme power without the payment of any tax whatsoever. Moreover, this money came from state loans exceeding billions [currency not specified].

Zhorzholiani spoke about 50,000 metric tons of petroleum products that had been sent by Russia as winter aid. However, the ship did not reach any Georgian port but was sold along with its cargo in Salonika. The Georgian Government has received an official note about this fact from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was only following the disclosure of this business that $3 million were paid into the treasury. "This situation shows that the Georgian authorities are extremely corrupt and that they are being protected by Eduard Shevardnadze," said Zhorzholiani.

"It is precisely because the opposition is trying to expose the authorities that terrorist acts are being carried out. Almost all those close to me are being hounded by the Security Service; searches are being carried out. I cannot pin the blame on any specific service, but all these terrorist acts have been planned on the orders of Eduard Shevardnadze," said Temur Zhorzholiani.

At the end of the press conference, [Tbilisi Police Chief] Demur Mikadze phoned Zhorzholiani. As it became known later, he had promised him that the criminal would be caught at all costs and that they would solve the case. "It doesn't matter if you cannot catch him. There will probably be no repetition of the Listyev [prominent Russian journalist recently murdered in Moscow] affair and you will not be removed from your post," joked Zhorzholiani.

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Estonia

Tiit Vahi Confirmed as Prime Minister

LD0504135095

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian at 1252 GMT on 5 April, during a relay from the parliament building, confirms that prime ministerial candidate Tiit Vahi has been elected as the country's prime minister. Vahi received 62 votes in favor, 34 against, and 1 abstention.

New Prime Minister Outlines Plans

LD0504162395 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1253 GMT 5 Apr 95

[Interview with Prime Minister Tiit Vahi by Gunnar Paal, parliamentary correspondent—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Gunnar Paal] A return, or as they say, a comeback for Tiit Vahi, as head of government has taken place, and now the implementation of his pre-election platform is ahead of us. [passage omitted] Now Tiit Vahi is here, in front of our microphone, in a live broadcast, with a first interview after resuming his post as prime minister. Tiit Vahi, let me first congratulate you.

[Vahi] Thank you very much.

[Paal] What will you be your first tasks? I understand it is first to form the government, but what next?

[Vahi] Under the constitution I will now have a week to form a government. I believe that with our coalition partner, the Center Party, we have quite substantially discussed the formation of the government and two-thirds of the government composition is firmly in place, with one-third still to be discussed as there are several candidates for the same post and we have to find the best ones.

Once the government is formed and it takes office, the first task will definitely be to clarify about the Riigikogu... [pauses] about the receipts into the state budget, because I know from data from the Ministry of the Economy and from Estonian statistics that there has been a serious shortfall in the receipts into the state budget within the first two months. Now we have to consider the reasons why that is and find solutions either through additional revenue or through reduction of expenditure.

[Paal] How does the government plan to resolve the situation verging on a crisis in both the police and school?

[Vahi] I believe the police have been pushed hither and thither for a long time. There has been a succession of ministers of internal affairs and Police Department directors general. It is precisely stable staff and stability in the staffing policy which come first here. Secondly, we must find additional funds for the police to cover the expenses that are absolutely necessary. However, I believe a review of the state budget can take place only at the time a new state budget is being adopted. [passage omitted] We have been handling both the police and the school using command methods.

[Paal] Could you tell me, please, when will you be presenting the government composition?

[Vahi] I believe we will be presenting it to the president early next weeek. I am not quite sure whether it will be Monday [10 April] or Tuesday, but definitely either on Monday or Tuesday. [passage omitted]

Tiit Vahi Addresses Riigikogu

LD0504165295 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1105 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Gunnar Paal] The moment has come for the prime ministerial candidate, Tiit Vahi, to appear in front of the Riigikogu here in the palace of Toompea, to make a speech on the foundations for his formation of a government and receive from the Riigikogu the right to form a government. There are 92 Riigikogu members in the hall here today. [passage omitted]

[Riigikogu Speaker Toomas Savi] I now request Tiit Vahi, the prime ministerial candidate nominated by the republican president, to come to the Riigikogu rostrum.

[Vahi] Esteemed Riigikogu speaker, the Riigikogu board! Esteemed Riigikogu members! Respected guests, ladies and gentlemen! On 23 March the republican president charged me with opening the talks leading up to the formation of a new government. [passage omitted]

I confirm that the new government will not go back on the main course as chosen by the people: Market economy reforms will continue. A string of tendencies causing concern have accompanied the indisputably swift economic development in Estonia. Like in other states that are transforming to market economies, the social price of reforms has also been heavy here. This has been demonstrated by the decline in the living standards and the birth rate, increase in mortality, uneven development region by region, and a sharp increase in crime. These phenomena, which inevitably accompany major social upheavals, have been deepened by shortcomings and incompetence. I have in mind the absence of an effective crediting policy and thought out regional policy, low degree of decentralization of both authority and responsibility, increased bureaucratic apparatus, and the emergence of a situation where both the police and school life are verging on a crisis. The rural people of Estonia are deeply aware of not being understood by the authority. [passage omitted] There are a quarter of a million voters behind the government coalition that has come about, and this will create conditions for the stable governing of Estonia. [passage omitted]

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I would like to draw you attention also to the fact that so far only politicians have come out with the wish to join the European Union and NATO. It is clear that once our membership is about to become reality, we will have to carry out a referendum in Estonia as customary in European democratic countries. The task of the government will then be to explain thoroughly the chosen course on integration to the population as being the right and only one.

Next, concerning our relations with Russia. It is as clear as day that we can live next door as good neighbors and trade partners. It will be foolish to keep away from the business competition for the Russian markets, which all our neighboring countries are involved in. Many international firms consider Estonia as a favorable foothold in their relations with Russia. We must take advantage of this opportunity. Naturally, this envisages stable political relations with our eastern neighbor. I consider it necessary for Estonia to signal more clearly Estonia's support for the democratic development in Russia. Contacts between Estonian and Russian top politicians must definitely become closer.

Sometimes problems have been raised at the international level about discrimination against the ethnic minorities in Estonia. The body of non-citizens, of over 100,000 non-Estonians, is also represented in the new Riigikogu. I am convinced that, in cooperation with the Russian faction in the Riigikogu, it will be possible to find solutions to issues that concern precisely this section of the citizens of the Republic of Estonia.

It is good that the ethnic issue does not exist among the Estonian citizens as an acute political issue. I am convinced that cooperation and domestic peace will also be maintained in the future. [passage omitted]

The recent parliamentary elections ended a stage of development in the Estonia that has regained its independence. Now another one is beginning. I think that only self-seeking political players will wish for it to be less successful than the preceding one. And for this reason I am counting on an understanding and constructive cooperation with all Riigikogu members, and also with those parties that are not included in the government coalition. [passage omitted]

Opposition Leader Warns Vahi on Economic Intervention

LD0604092295 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0600 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tiit Vahi, the chairman of both the electoral pact of the Party of Consolidation and Rural People's Party [KMU] and the Party of Consolidation, continues to hold talks with his coalition partner, the Center Party, on the formation of a government. [passage omitted]

Once Tiit Vahi had been given the authority to form a government, Reform Party Chairman Siim Kallas offered the opinion that the KMU and Center Party government coalition would be facing a choice soon: the Party of Consolidation has promised to continue the previous government's reform policy, but the Center Party under the leadership of Edgar Savisaar [prime minister 1990-1992] wants largely a return to old times—that is, the times of Savisaar's previous government. Siim Kallas, being the chairman of the largest opposition party in the Riigikogu, the Reform Party, warns Tiit Vahi against the government's administrative intervention in the economy and against issuing promises without cover, about the state budget.

Latvia

Ulmanis May Cancel Plans on VE Ceremony in London

WS0504143695 Tallinn BNS in English 1335 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Apr 05, BNS—Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis might not go to London for the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. His adviser in foreign affairs, Aivars Markots, told BNS that the decision by the Baltic presidents to not take part in the Moscow celebrations and the most recent set of consultations could possibly change the decision already made by the Latvian president.

Ulmanis said in an April 3 press conference that he was still considering the London trip and would advise on "possibly going to London or not going" as soon as the decision is made.

As reported earlier, Ulmanis informed British Ambassador Richard Ralph on March 6 of his decision to participate in the celebrations in London.

Ulmanis was to have lectured at four of the leading international relations centers and taken part in the opening of the Latvian Embassy in London during the visit.

Sweden May Help Return Kurd Refugees to Russia

LD0504192695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1658 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga April 5 TASS—Sweden is going to help Latvia deport to Russia 104 Kurds who planned to reach Scandinavia via the Baltic state, according to Latvian Interior Minister Janis Adamsons.

He told reporters Wednesday [5 April] that the Swedish Government plans to help Latvia to create a camp for interned people.

Thus Latvia will be able to take from Sweden illegal migrants who arrived there via Latvia and return them

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"to Russia from where they had actually come", the minister said and stressed that this also concerns 104 Kurds who had been kept in two railway cars at the Latvian Karsava station for a week already.

Adamsons pins great hopes on the Tuesday meeting of the Latvian Foreign Ministry parliamentary secretary with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov.

He said Russia had expressed readiness to begin negotiations on taking the refugees back.

But Russian Consul General in Latvia Georgiy Isakovskiy told TASS that proofs are to be submitted that the Kurds had arrived in Latvia from Russia. Besides, the rules for the handover of the refugees is to be fixed in a bilateral agreement which does not exist so far, he added.

Interior Minister on Refugee Problem

LD0504190095 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Illegal immigrants, Kurdish refugees, whatever one calls them, although they are Kurds, Palestinians, (?and Afghans, they are anyway) in Latvia. And this problem is certainly very serious for Latvia, as there is (?no knowing) how long these people will stay in Latvia. They are in fact being shunted from one state border to another. That is just why today the Latvian Interior Ministry held a news conference. At the news conference was my colleague Jevgenijs Pelss:

[Pelss] Yes, Mirdza, really, the problem is very grave. And I think this was shown when the interior minister [Janis Adamsons] spoke at this news conference, and it seemed quite topical. Let me hand over to him:

[Begin Adamsons recording] Today Latvia is being used as a transit country. And if we want seriously, quite seriously want, to enter into Europe, we have to do everything we can to strengthen our eastern border. In fact, Europe looks to us today to solve this issue of illegal immigrants, so that we are able to guard our border and thereby guard Europe against a flood of illegal immigrants, and that we can plan broad enough cooperation and enough assistance from Europe too, (?with business involvement, too). But if we go on doing as we have done up to now, not taking appropriate measures so as not to allow a flood of illegal immigrants into Latvia, I think that the relevant European countries will simply cut themselves off from us. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is absolutely (?in no doubt) from where these illegal immigrants—even this group that is located at Karsava station—came from. We have enough documents in our possession to show that they have all been in either Russia or Belarus.

Yesterday, Martins Virsis, the parliamentary secretary at the Foreign Ministry, had a meeting with the deputy foreign minister of Russia, and a decision was made that Russia is prepared to sit down at the negotiating table, and all people who have arrived in Latvia from Russia they are prepared to take back, and a bilateral agreement was concluded on the readmission of illegal immigrants, as is provided in the Geneva Convention. These are people who are crossing the world in search of a better life. It is not a question of political refugees. (?We) have instituted several criminal proceedings, [word indistinct] together with the (?courts), against those persons who are in organized groups to convey these people to Sweden. Of this last group, we have information about 15 people who were to be conveyed over the Latvian-Russian border, and a criminal case has been instituted against citizen (?Truberg), and he has already been charged. [end recording]

[Announcer] So much for Internal Affairs Minister Janis Adamsons. But is this only a problem for the Latvian Interior Ministry?

[Pelss] No, and that was emphasized: That this problem is a problem for all of us, our whole society. And Mr. Adamsons proposed as well that a news conference be convened in the near future with the participation of the Foreign Ministry, and representatives of the public. And the main thing we must all understand is the gravity of this problem, and if we relate to it lightly and indifferently, it will have very grave consequences for our country. And perhaps some practical issues raised by Mr. Adamsons: First, the eastern border has to be strengthened, which at present, up to today, is most badly served with the most basic necessities, and all attention has been paid to our northern and southern borders only—who knows why—the eastern border is in fact deprived. So first, to strengthen the eastern border.

Second, to create an internment camp at Olaine, though it will be expensive—it will cost up to four hundred thousand lats; and as I said, everyone must think about this problem. Then perhaps some good will come of it, and perhaps the problem we have today will be solved.

[Announcer] With that report on the news conference at the Interior Ministry, Jevgenijs Pelss was in the studio.

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